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 Formal controls are essential for well-functioning organizations, but 
research finds that they can negatively impact controlled individuals’ (agents) behavior.  
Specifically, controls can reduce agents’ intrinsic motivation to exert effort for employers 
(principals).  In this dissertation, I investigate how agents’ beliefs about the intentionality 
of control influence their response to it.  Further, I examine whether principals anticipate 
agents’ responses and adjust their risk-taking behavior accordingly. 
Using three interactive experiments, I examine the effects of control intentionality 
on agents’ effort and principals’ risk-taking.  In the first experiment, I focus on the effects 
of intentions and control, without permitting principals to transfer resources to agents. In 
vii 
the second and third experiments, principals take risk by entrusting resources to agents.  
Further, in the third experiment, I investigate the beliefs that influence participants’ 
actions. 
In each experiment, I manipulate agents’ beliefs about control intentionality by 
varying the control source across three conditions.  In the first condition, principals 
endogenously impose control, which can clearly be perceived as a distrusting signal.  In 
the second condition, control is imposed exogenously by a computer and therefore cannot 
be interpreted negatively.  In the third condition, the control source is unclear to the 
agent, such that it may be imposed by the principal or computer.   
I find that intentionality influences agents’ response to control.  Specifically, in 
the first experiment, when control is imposed exogenously, agents exert high effort.  
However, agents’ effort diminishes when control can be interpreted as a negative signal, 
even if the source is ambiguous.  Moreover, when the principal unambiguously imposes 
control, agents exert less effort than if no control is imposed.  The second experiment 
reveals that this dysfunctional effect of intentional control persists when principals 
entrust resources to agents.    
Despite these negative effects, principals prefer to impose control.  However, 
principals appear to accurately predict how control intentionality affects agents and take 
more risk when they have chosen not to impose control or when it is imposed by an 
exogenous or ambiguous source than when they have intentionally imposed it.  Results 
from the second and third experiments indicate that principals’ risk-taking is influenced 
by their beliefs about agent opportunism.   
viii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables and Figures.................................................................................................. ix 
Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2: Literature Review – Factors Influencing Agent Behavior ................................ 9 
Chapter 3: Literature Review – Factors Influencing Principal Behavior ......................... 22 
Chapter 4: Hypotheses Development................................................................................ 31 
Chapter 5: Experiment 1 - Intentions and Control............................................................ 50 
Chapter 6: Experiment 2 - Intentions, Control and Risk-taking ....................................... 73 
Chapter 7: Experiment 3 - Intentions, Control and Risk-taking in a Single Period.......... 91 
Chapter 8: Conclusion..................................................................................................... 109 
Appendix A – Experimental Materials for Experiment 1............................................... 114 
Appendix B – Experimental Materials for Experiment 2 ............................................... 132 
Appendix C – Experimental Materials for Experiment 3 ............................................... 151 
Appendix D:  Instructions for Risk Preferences Lottery ................................................ 170 




List of Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 .............................................................................................................................. 65 
Table 2 .............................................................................................................................. 66 
Table 3 .............................................................................................................................. 67 
Table 4 .............................................................................................................................. 83 
Table 5 .............................................................................................................................. 85 
Table 6 .............................................................................................................................. 86 
Table 7 .............................................................................................................................. 87 
Table 8 .............................................................................................................................. 88 
Table 9 ............................................................................................................................ 101 
Table 10 .......................................................................................................................... 102 
Table 11 .......................................................................................................................... 103 
Table 12 .......................................................................................................................... 104 
Table 13 .......................................................................................................................... 106 
 
Figure 1 ............................................................................................................................... 8 
Figure 2 ............................................................................................................................. 46 
Figure 3 ............................................................................................................................. 47 
Figure 4 ............................................................................................................................. 48 
Figure 5 ............................................................................................................................. 49 
Figure 6 ............................................................................................................................. 68 
Figure 7 ............................................................................................................................. 69 
Figure 8 ............................................................................................................................. 70 
Figure 9 ............................................................................................................................. 71 
Figure 10 ........................................................................................................................... 72 
Figure 11 ........................................................................................................................... 89 
Figure 12 ........................................................................................................................... 90 
Figure 13 ......................................................................................................................... 107 
Figure 14 ......................................................................................................................... 108 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Control systems are an integral part of a well-functioning organization, but a 
growing body of academic research suggests that formal controls often have negative 
consequences on the behavior of controlled individuals.  Research shows that controls 
can diminish organizational citizenship behavior, intrinsic motivation, effort, and can 
even lead to employee fraud or theft (Packard 1995).  Therefore, it is important to 
understand the specific aspects of control that compel employees to engage in these 
dysfunctional behaviors, and whether supervisors anticipate these actions.  Prior research 
generally assumes that the dysfunctional effects of control are caused by the principals’ 
intentions that are signaled through control implementation (Christ et al. 2006; Deci et al. 
1999; Tenbrunsel and Messick 1999).  Houser et al. (2007) assert that agents respond to 
their beliefs about the principals’ motivation for imposing control.  In practice, formal 
control systems can be imposed for a variety of reasons, including supervisors’ beliefs 
about employees’ competence or integrity, in response to regulatory requirements, or 
simply as mechanisms to improve process efficiency and effectiveness.  Employees’ 
reactions to formal control systems will likely depend on why they believe the controls 
have been imposed.   
Two recent experimental studies have considered the effects of the intentionality 
of control on agent behavior (Falk and Kosfeld 2006; Houser et al. 2007).  In these 
studies, control intentionality is manipulated by varying the source of control, where a 
control imposed by a principal is considered intentional, while one imposed randomly by 
a computer is deemed unintentional.  However, these studies have several limitations.  
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First, they do not address the influence of intentionality on principals’ behavior.  In 
theory, principals should recognize the extent to which control intentionality changes 
agent behavior, and should adjust their own risk-taking behavior accordingly.  Second, 
these studies only consider settings where the source of control, and therefore its 
intentionality, is common knowledge. Yet, agents in organizations are often uncertain of 
the source or cause of the control implementation and their reaction to the control is 
likely to be influenced by their beliefs regarding its intentionality.  Third, prior studies 
consider only single interactions, whereas in practice, individuals are likely to have a 
variety of experiences with controls that might influence their reactions, making it 
important to understand whether the dysfunctional effects of control persist across 
multiple periods.  Finally, prior studies yield inconsistent findings regarding the effect of 
intentionality on agent behavior.  Specifically, Falk and Kosfeld (2007) find that agents 
respond to the intentions of the controlling principal, while Houser et al. (2007) conclude 
that intentions do not matter.  A variety of differences between these two studies exist, 
including the principals’ ability to entrust resources to agents in Houser et al. (2007) and 
the manner in which control is operationalized in each study.  Therefore, the results are 
difficult to compare, such that the effects of intentionality on agent behavior remain to be 
fully understood. 
In this dissertation, I extend prior research by examining how principals’ 
intentions influence both agent effort and principal risk-taking when a control is imposed 
in a repeated setting.  Additionally, I consider a previously unexamined dimension of 
intentions in which the source of control, and therefore its intentionality, is unclear to the 
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agent.  The primary objectives of my study are to more fully understand how agents’ 
beliefs about the intentionality of control influence their response to it and whether 
principals anticipate these responses and adjust their risk-taking behavior accordingly.  
Further, I seek to reconcile the inconsistent findings from prior literature regarding the 
effects of intentionality.  To these ends, I design three interactive experiments (illustrated 
in Figure 1), in which I manipulate principals’ intentions using three control source 
conditions.  In the first condition, control is unambiguously imposed by the principal.  In 
the second, control is imposed by an exogenous source (e.g., a regulatory body).  In the 
third, the source of control is unknown to the agent, but may be imposed by either the 
principal or by an exogenous source.   When a control is imposed endogenously by the 
principal, agents will recognize that the control is intentional and are likely to perceive it 
to be a negative signal; however, when it is imposed exogenously, the agent should not 
perceive it as a purposeful, negative signal from the principal.  Thus, while I do not 
manipulate intentions directly, I am able to influence agents’ beliefs about the principals’ 
intentions by varying the source of control. 
In the first experiment, I focus on the effects of intentions and control only, 
without permitting principals to transfer resources to agents. Thus, I first establish that 
agents’ response to control depends upon their beliefs regarding its intentionality.   After 
establishing the effects of intentionality on agent effort in experiment 1, I conduct a 
second experiment to further examine the effects of intentions and control in a richer 
setting in which principals can transfer resources to agents before agents have the 
opportunity to reciprocate by exerting effort.  In this experiment, I explore principals’ 
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risk-taking behavior in the presence of a control, as well as agents’ reactions to both 
control and the principals’ transfer, which can be interpreted as a trusting action.  By 
introducing principals’ ability to take risk by transferring resources to agents, I am able to 
examine whether the effects of intentionality differ when agents’ reciprocity concerns 
(i.e., their tendency to reciprocate kind actions with kindness) are relevant, thereby 
helping to reconcile some of the inconsistent results from prior studies.  Further, I can 
observe principals’ risk-taking behavior in the presence of controls with varied 
intentionality.  In the third experiment, principals and agents engage in the same 
interaction as in experiment 2; however the participants do not repeat the interaction.  
This experiment allows me to examine further the motivational and cognitive factors that 
influence principal and agent behavior when a control is imposed, while controlling for 
feedback effects. 
In general, I find that the dysfunctional effects of control are driven by agents’ 
beliefs about principals’ intentions.  Further, principals recognize these consequences and 
adjust the amount of resources that they entrust to agents accordingly.  Results from the 
first experiment show an interaction between control implementation and control 
intentionality in which intentionality influences agent behavior when a control is 
imposed, but does not when there is no control.  Specifically, control implementation has 
a negative effect on agent effort and principal profit when the principal unambiguously 
imposes the control.  However, this negative effect is reduced when the agent is uncertain 
of the source and is eliminated when control is imposed by an exogenous source.  
Nonetheless, principals continue to impose control due to their beliefs about the 
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opportunistic nature of agents, despite receiving feedback that control yields low agent 
effort. 
In experiment 2, when principals have the opportunity to put a portion of their 
wealth at risk by transferring resources to agents, I find that agent effort is driven 
primarily by the amount of resources transferred by the principal and, to a lesser extent, 
by the imposition of control.  Again, agent behavior is moderated by the intentionality of 
control, such that agent effort is sensitive to the presence or absence of control when it is 
imposed endogenously and therefore perceived as an intentional signal of distrust, but is 
similar regardless of whether or not a control is imposed in the exogenous and uncertain 
conditions.  I also find that principals anticipate the effects of intentionality and take less 
risk when a control is imposed endogenously and can be perceived as an intentional 
signal of distrust by agents.  However, principals transfer the same level of resources with 
or without control when agents cannot clearly attribute the control to the principals.   
The third experiment confirms the results of experiment 2, indicating that 
principals’ propensity to control, and subsequent risk-taking, is driven by their beliefs 
about the opportunistic tendencies of agents.  Additionally, the results from this 
experiment verify that agents’ effort level depends upon their beliefs about principals’ 
intentions when a control is imposed. 
This study makes several important theoretical and practical contributions. First, it 
is the first study to examine how the intentionality of control affects the behavior of both 
the principal and the agent.  Prior research focuses on the effects of intentionality with 
respect to agent behavior only.  However, in practice, principals must recognize the 
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potential consequences of controls when evaluating their effectiveness and determining 
appropriate courses of action.  Therefore, it is important that we understand how 
principals anticipate the effects of formal controls.  In this study, I examine principals’ 
decision to impose control, the factors that drive the control decision, and principals’ 
risk-taking behavior in the presence of a control.   
Second, I investigate a previously unexamined condition in which the source of 
control is unknown to the agent.  In organizations, agents are often unsure of the source 
or impetus of a control and must make attributions about the cause when responding to it.  
For example, controls implemented during Sarbanes-Oxley compliance reviews could be 
imposed because managers are unsatisfied with employee performance, or simply in 
response to regulatory requirements.  Employees’ reactions to these controls are likely to 
depend on the attributions they make regarding control intentionality.  By varying the 
agents’ knowledge about the source of control, I am able to examine how agents attribute 
the intentionality of a control and investigate agents’ responses.  I also consider whether 
principals accurately anticipate these responses.   
Third, from a practical perspective, the results of this study will be important to 
managers and accountants, who assess risk, implement and evaluate controls, and make 
risky business decisions. Since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the release 
of the COSO Enterprise Risk Management Framework (COSO 2004), organizations have 
increased their focus on the many risks they face, implementing a variety of controls to 
mitigate them.  However, some controls give rise to new risks, including agents’ 
retaliation against the control, making it necessary for management to anticipate those 
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new risks as well. The results of this study suggest that agents’ negative response to 
control is primarily driven by their beliefs about control intentionality.  As accountants, 
who are often responsible for implementing and evaluating controls, it is particularly 
important that we understand agent responses to control and principal risk-taking in the 
presence of control so that these consequences can be considered during risk assessments 
and control evaluations. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapters 2 and 3 
provide literature reviews describing the relevant factors that might influence agent and 
principal behavior, respectively.  Chapter 4 provides hypotheses development.  Chapters 
5, 6 and 7 describe the experiments and experimental results.  In Chapter 8, I provide 









Figure 1 provides a graphical description of experiments 1,2 and 3.   
 
Experiments 1 and 2 employ a 3 X 2 X 2 design with control source varied between subjects at three levels 
(exogenous, endogenous or uncertain), and control existence (yes v. no) and feedback (yes v. no) varied 
within subjects.  In both experiments, participants interact for 20 periods.  Principal and agent participants 
are anonymously repaired for each round. 
 
In experiment 1, Agents are endowed with 120 points and can transfer any of their endowment to 
principals.  A control, which forces agents to transfer at least 10 points to principals, can be imposed 
(endogenously by the principal, exogenously by the computer or by an uncertain source).  Feedback, 
indicating the number of points earned in the period, is provided in periods 11 – 20 (only). 
 
In experiment 2, Principals are endowed with 120 points and can entrust any of those resources to Agents. 
Similar to experiment 1, Agents can return any portion of these entrusted resources to Principals (which are 
then multiplied by 3) and a control may be imposed (endogenously, exogenously or by an uncertain source) 
requiring the Agents to return at least 10 points.  Feedback is provided in periods 11 – 20 (only). 
 
Experiment 3 employs a 3 X 2 + 1 design with control source varied at three levels (exogenous, 
endogenous and uncertain) and control existence (yes v. no) varied between subjects and possibility of 
control (yes v. no) varied within subjects.   Contrasting experiment 2, in which participants interact for 20 
periods, in experiment 3, participants interact in 1 period in which the control is available and 1 period 
when no control system is offered.   
 
In experiment 3, similar to experiment 2 principals are endowed with 120 points and can entrust any of 
those resources to Agents. Agents can return any portion of these entrusted resources to Principals (which 
are then multiplied by 3) and a control may be imposed (endogenously, exogenously or by an uncertain 
source) requiring the Agents to return at least 10 points.  In experiment 3, participants also interact in a 
stage where control implementation is not an option. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review – Factors Influencing Agent Behavior 
2.1 Preferences for Social Norms 
 Challenging conventional economic assumptions, a growing body of literature 
suggests that individuals are not driven by self-interest alone.  Rather, research shows 
that people are also motivated by a variety of social norms including trust (Berg et al. 
1995), reciprocity (Berg et al. 1995; Fehr et al. 1993; Hannan 2005; Rabin 1993), 
cooperation (Axelrod 1980b, 1980a), honesty (Evans et al. 2001),  altruism (Forsythe et 
al. 1994; Fox 1974; Kahneman et al. 1986b), equity (Fehr and Schmidt 1999)  and 
fairness (Camerer and Thaler 1995; Luft 1997; Roth 1995).  These studies find that even 
in the absence of formal control mechanisms, individuals often will behave in a manner 
that is beneficial to others and not solely in their own self-interest. 
 Scholars have developed a series of economic games commonly used to examine 
individuals’ preferences for social norms (Camerer and Fehr 2004; Charness and Rabin 
2002; Fehr and Schmidt 2004).  In these games, the economically rational behavior for 
each player is to maximize his own wealth and to refrain from engaging in exchange with 
the other player(s).  However, these experimental examinations consistently find that 
individuals sacrifice some personal wealth to adhere to social norms.  What is more, these 
findings are robust across most populations and at various incentive levels (Camerer and 
Fehr 2004). 
For example, in trust games, one player (the trustor) has the opportunity to 
transfer a portion of his/her wealth to the second player (the trustee) (Berg et al. 1995; 
Camerer and Fehr 2004).  Any amount transferred is typically multiplied by the 
experimenter and the trustee then has the opportunity to return any amount of the 
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multiplied transfer back to the trustor.  Economic predictions based on the assumption 
that individuals are self-interested suggest that the trustee will not return any of the 
transfer to the trustor.  Therefore, a prudent trustor should refrain from transferring any 
funds to the trustee in the first place.   
However, examinations of trust games consistently find that trustors will transfer 
a portion of their endowment to (often unknown) trustees, thus exhibiting trust that the 
trustee will transfer at least that amount back in return.  What is more, trustees often do 
return more than the initial investment to the trustor, displaying both trustworthiness and 
a preference for positive reciprocity (Berg et al. 1995; Camerer and Fehr 2004).   
Similarly, gift exchange games find agents’ preferences for reciprocity cause 
them to reward higher wages with more effort, even when reciprocation is not the 
repeated-game equilibrium as a result of anonymous repairing of principals and agents 
(Camerer 2003; Charness 2004; Fehr et al. 1993).  In these games, an opportunistic agent 
should exert the lowest amount of costly effort possible regardless of the wage provided 
by the firm.  Instead, results indicate that agents consistently exert high effort in return 
for high wages.  Charness (2004) finds that these results are due to both distributive 
concerns and agents’ causal attributions.  That is, agents respond to both the size of the 
wage provided, as well as the intentions signaled through the wage level. 
 In dictator games, one individual (the dictator) is given an endowment and is 
permitted to divide that endowment between himself and another player (the receiver). 
Dictators can divide the endowment in any way they see fit and the receivers have no 
way to retaliate if the division is inequitable.  Economic theory predicts that the dictator 
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will keep his entire endowment for himself; yet numerous studies show that individuals 
share with their (anonymous) receivers.  As the dictator stands to receive no economic 
benefit from this gesture, and, in fact, is economically worse off by transferring funds to 
the receiver, this result has been attributed to pure altruism (Camerer and Fehr 2004).1  
Further, when given the option between two divisions of an endowment, one equitable 
and one providing more money to the dictator, dictators often show a preference for the 
equitable distribution (Kahneman et al. 1986b).  This suggests that individuals’ concern 
for fairness can outweigh their opportunistic tendencies.  Ultimately, the experimental 
studies described previously provide consistent evidence that individuals are not 
motivated by self-interest alone and often choose to make themselves (economically) 
worse off in the interest of improving others’ situations.    
In business settings, this research suggests that, due to their preferences for 
various social norms, employees can be intrinsically motivated to provide greater effort 
for their employers than they are explicitly incentivized to provide.  Hannan (2005) finds 
that employees increase effort when wages increase following a decrease in firm profit, 
concluding that employees are motivated by the perceived generosity of the firm.  
Similarly, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986a) find that participants believe 
employee wage reductions are acceptable only when the company has been losing profits, 
regardless of what wages the market might command.    Charness and Levine (2002) find 
similar results in a quasi-experimental setting, examining the effects of employment 
                                                 
1 Some research challenges the notion that transfers observed in dictator games can be attributed to 
altruism, instead attributing it to dictators’ desire to maintain a good image in front of the experimenter.  
Using a double-blind procedure, whereby the experimenter has no way to match the participant with his/her 
actions, Hoffman et al. (1994) find much lower frequencies of equitable or altruistic divisions of the 
dictator’s endowment than generally reported in dictator games that do not use the double-blind procedure.   
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contracts that are closely aligned with the external labor market.  Evans et al. (2001) find 
that employees have preferences for honesty and will sacrifice wealth to adhere to this 
social norm.  Additionally, Fehr and Falk (2002) find that employees’ motivation to be 
honest leads them to provide high effort when honest employers maintain a fair and 
respectful work environment. 
Employees’ intrinsic motivation often manifests itself through organizational 
citizenship behavior (OCB) (Bateman and Organ 1983).  OCB, defined as “constructive 
or cooperative behavior that are neither mandatory in-role behavior, nor directly or 
contractually compensated by formal reward systems” (Organ and Konovsky 1989), is 
influenced by employees’ beliefs that the organization treats them fairly.  Specifically, 
Organ and Konovsky (1989) find that OCB is driven by employee job satisfaction.  
Furthermore, extant research finds a direct link between OCB and firm performance 
(Koys 2001; Organ 1988; Podsakoff et al. 1997; Podsakoff and MacKenzie 1994, 1997; 
Podsakoff et al. 2000).   OCB has been found to enhance co-worker and managerial 
productivity, improve the quantity and quality of product output, increase customer 
satisfaction, thereby contributing to overall operating effectives (Bergeron 2007).  Thus, 
it is clear that employees’ preferences for various social norms can influence their 
intrinsic motivation and subsequently improve firm performance, and therefore are an 
important element of organizational success. 
2.2 The Harmful Effects of Formal Control 
Despite evidence that individuals are not wholly self-interested and do have 
preferences for fairness, altruism, trustworthiness and cooperation, organizations 
typically employ formal control systems.  Control, broadly defined as the “use of 
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procedures which help ensure that self-interested agents maximize the value of the 
organization,” (Zimmerman, 2000 p. 714) can take many forms.  Within organizations, 
policies and procedures, budgets, effort reports, and surveillance systems are used to 
direct and control employee activities (Reding et al. 2007).  Indeed, management control 
is a vital function in organizations, such that stakeholders generally expect that control 
weaknesses will result in large losses and, potentially, lead to organizational failure 
(Merchant and Van der Stede 2003).  
Notwithstanding such expectations, a significant body of research in psychology, 
economics and business suggests that formal control systems can “crowd out” 
preferences for social norms (Frey 1993).  Therefore, instead of exhibiting preferences 
for fairness, trust and reciprocity, and engaging in organizational citizenship behavior, 
controlled individuals often do act opportunistically.  That is, individuals exhibit the 
types of behaviors that the formal controls were designed to prevent.  This suggests that 
in certain situations, the implementation of formal controls can be detrimental to the 
relationship between the principal and the agent, ultimately resulting in lost profit for the 
principal.  In these circumstances, control systems can inadvertently increase the 
riskiness of the principal/ agent relationship. 
In general, this research suggests that the implementation of a control system by a 
principal sends a signal of distrust to the agent (Das and Teng 1999; Das and Teng 
2001b; Enzle and Anderson 1993; Malhotra and Murnighan 2002; Tenbrunsel and 
Messick 1999).  In response to this distrust, the agent tends to distrust the principal in 
turn.  Therefore, trust, or distrust, is reciprocal (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Christ et al. 
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2006; Gambetta 1988; Johnson et al. 1996; Zand 1972).   Ultimately, this distrust leads to 
a breakdown in cooperation and an increase in agents’ opportunistic behavior.   
These unintended consequences of control implementation have been examined in 
a variety of studies.  Falk and Kosfeld (2006) study a variation of the dictator game  
(Kahneman et al. 1986a), in which they allow the responder to set a minimum that the 
dictator must transfer.  The authors find that most agents reduce their contribution to the 
responder in response to the responder’s controlling decision, presumably because they 
perceive it to be a signal of distrust and a limitation of their choice autonomy.  Further, 
when responders do not set a minimum threshold, they are rewarded with greater 
contributions from the dictator. 
Fehr and Gachter (2001) examine the effects of incentive contracts, with a known 
probability of audit and a penalty, on voluntary cooperation using a gift exchange game. 
The authors find that incentive contracts are less efficient than contracts without 
incentives because voluntary cooperation is crowded out.  Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) 
use a setting similar to a trust game with the principal indicating a “desired back transfer” 
amount, finding that implementing a control system that penalizes agents who transfer 
less than the desired amount reduces altruistic cooperation.   
A recent study in accounting by Coletti et al. (2005) provides some evidence that 
particularly strong control systems, which induce cooperation, actually increase trust and 
future cooperation between parties.  However, Coletti et al. (2005) uses a public goods 
game, as does Fehr and Gachter (2001) which also finds that controls do not always have 
a negative effect on cooperation.  Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) suggest that the 
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conflicting results might be due to the “moral legitimacy” of the sanction in a public 
goods game context punishing free-riders is seen as an altruistic act and therefore morally 
legitimate.  However, in non-public goods settings, such as a business organization, 
sanctions are not typically likely to be seen as morally legitimate, but rather are likely to 
be construed as signals of distrust. 
A variety of studies further examine the psychological mechanisms through which 
formal control crowds out agents’ preferences for social norms. Using context-rich 
psychology based research, Christ et al. (2006) find that perceived distrust, due to the 
intrusiveness of a control system and the perception that the control limits the agent’s 
autonomy, reduces the agent’s willingness to cooperate with the principal.  Further, the 
authors find that these perceptions vary based on the type of control system implemented.   
Specifically, behavioral controls, which restrict agents’ actions, are more likely to lead to 
dysfunctional behavior than are less intrusive control systems such as output controls, 
which monitor the results of agents’ actions. 
Taylor and Bloomfield (2007) show that the initial control system presence 
affects whether the controls lead to self-interested behavior or result in socially-conscious 
behavior consistent with the best interest of both parties involved. The authors indicate 
that the existence of a control system at the start of the experiment creates a framing 
effect, or a general cue that the participants are not operating in a trusting environment.  
This effect induces participants to engage in strategic behavior.  A similar framing effect 
has been shown in several other experimental studies (Tenbrunsel and Messick 1999).  
Taylor and Bloomfield (2007) further note that in the absence of control, when principles 
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of social-interest dominate preferences for personal wealth, individuals tend to look 
outward to others’ behaviors, which increases the pressure for conformity.  This 
ultimately increases socially-beneficial behavior.  Indeed, the research examining the 
dysfunctional effects of control systems includes a wide array of variables and settings 
and provides a variety of explanations for why controls crowd out cooperative behavior.   
Importantly, the harmful effects of control appear to be specific to weak or 
incomplete controls.  As controls become stronger, and it becomes economically rational 
for agents to comply, controls can create positive results for principals.  For example, 
Falk and Kosfeld (2006) find that controls requiring agents to transfer small amounts of 
resources diminish agent effort, but principals are better off when they require agents to 
transfer larger levels of resources.  Likewise, Coletti et al. (2005) examine a control 
involving a high probability of audit and penalty for non-compliance, finding that 
participants are more likely to cooperate when the control is in place and continue to 
cooperate even after that control is removed.  However, in practice it is often cost-
prohibitive to implement controls that are strong enough to ensure agents always act in 
the best interest of the firm. Instead, weak or incomplete controls, such as incomplete 
contracts, are implemented routinely (Milgrom and Roberts 1992), therefore, it is 
necessary to examine how principals and agents respond to them. 
2.3 Intentionality of Control 
Ultimately, much of the literature examining the behavioral impact of control 
systems on individuals finds that controls designed to limit the behavior of self-interested 
agents often do not have the intended effect.  What is more, these control systems often 
prove damaging to the relationship between the principal and agent and diminish the 
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overall firm profitability.  As previously described, these findings are often attributed to 
the negative signal contained within the imposition of the control.  Therefore, individuals 
do not respond to the control itself, but rather, respond to their beliefs about the 
intentions, or motivations, of the controlling party.   
Prior psychological research examines how perceived intentions influence 
individuals’ beliefs and behavior (Heider 1958; Kelley 1967).  For example, perceived 
intentions influence individuals’ beliefs about the fairness and equity of outcomes (Bies 
and Shapiro 1987; Garrett and Libby 1973; Leventhal 1980). In addition, the 
intentionality of actions can be modified if one provides adequate causal explanations, or 
justifications, for the actions (Bies and Shapiro 1987).  This research suggests that it is 
the intentionality of the action, rather than the outcome itself, that influences behavior 
and leads to reciprocal action (Goranson and Berkowitz 1966).   
The effect of intentions on reciprocal behavior has also been examined in 
laboratory settings in which participants’ actions directly influence their earnings 
(Charness and Levine 2007; Hannan 2005).  Charness and Levine (2007) allow 
participants acting as the firm to select a wage (high, medium or low).  An exogenous 
shock, operationalized using a coin flip, determines whether the firm experiences good 
luck or bad luck, which directly impacts the employees’ wage positively or negatively, 
but does not affect firm profit.  After learning the firms’ wage decision and whether the 
firm has experienced good or bad luck, employees select a costly effort level (high, 
medium or low) that has varying effects on firm profitability.  The authors find that 
employee participants are much more likely to reward firms with high effort if they 
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perceive that the firm has good intentions, even if bad luck causes the employee to be 
paid a low wage.  Further, employees punish the firm for bad intentions even if good luck 
leads to high wages.  In this setting, an employer who intentionally chooses a low wage is 
perceived to have “misbehaved” and violated an established social norm (Charness 
2004).   
Charness (2004) continues his examination of the interaction of intentions and 
reciprocity in a labor market in which wages may be set endogenously by the employer 
or by an exogenous force.  He finds that employee effort is based on both distributional 
concerns (e.g., the wage level) and employees’ desire to reciprocate positive (negative) 
intentions with high (low) effort.  While the level of wages has the strongest influence on 
employee effort, the results also indicate that employees respond to perceived intentions 
when the wages are low.  Specifically, when low wages are set by the employer, 
employees exert lower effort than when the same low wages are set by an exogenous 
source. 
 Extending the literature regarding intentionality to a setting in which an agent is 
responding to the implementation of a control system, agents who believe a control is 
intentionally imposed and interpret it as a signal of distrust from the principal are likely 
to reciprocate that distrusting action with an unkind act in return.  Procedural justice 
theories (e.g., Tyler 1988) suggest that employees will perceive the imposition of an 
intentional control system to be unfair or disrespectful and, as a result, will punish their 
employers.  In essence, employees believe that the employers have breached the 
“psychological contract” to maintain mutual respect and fairness (Robinson 1996).  Thus, 
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agents who perceive a control to be intentional are likely to reduce effort levels, shirk, 
forego organizational citizenship behavior, or in the worst case, exhibit fraudulent or 
illegal behavior.  Ultimately, these dysfunctional behaviors have a negative impact on 
firm performance. 
Drawing from the implications of Charness (2004), it is also important to consider 
the extent to which any negative intentions signaled through the implementation of a 
control system might crowd out the positive reciprocity gained from high wages or 
increased responsibilities entrusted by the principal to the agent.  In organizations, 
employees often receive conflicting signals of trust or distrust from their employers.  For 
example, in decentralized organizations, employees are given increased responsibilities, 
such as investment authority or budgetary discretion, while at the same time being subject 
to management’s scrutiny or stringent policies and procedures.  In these situations, 
employees are likely to make tradeoffs between rewarding the trusting action (i.e., 
increased responsibility) and retaliating against the control.  Therefore, it is important to 
understand if and when the perceived intentionality of a control system will crowd out 
employees’ positive reciprocal behaviors. 
Importantly, the intentions of the controlling party are not always common 
knowledge or clearly understood by the individuals being controlled.  In business 
settings, management often implements control mechanisms without clearly 
communicating their purpose and benefits.  In these situations, employees must make 
attributions regarding the intentionality of the control that are likely to influence their 
responses to it.  
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Attribution theory suggests that agents will generally attribute the control 
implementation to the principal (Gilbert and Malone 1995; Ross 1977).  Experimental 
research examining individuals’ abilities to make causal attributions finds that individuals 
generally over-emphasize the dispositions of others and underestimate the effect of 
situational factors.  Further, the correspondence bias (or fundamental attribution error) 
suggests that when making attributions about others’ actions, individuals attribute 
unexpected outcomes to the dispositions of these others (Green et al. 1985).  Thus, when 
faced with uncertainty, agents prone to the fundamental attribution error would likely 
attribute the control to the principals’ choice to implement it, rather than to the exogenous 
source compelling the control implementation. 
However, when faced with such uncertainty, it is also likely that agents will not 
fully attribute the implementation of the control to the negative intentions of the 
principal.  The discounting principal of attribution theory suggests that when faced with 
several, likely alternative sources or catalysts for an action, individuals generally discount 
the extent to which they attribute the action to any one source (Kelley 1972).  Prior 
experimental investigations provide results consistent with the discounting principal.  
Using a trust game with a tremble (a 25% chance that a computer will change the first 
mover’s choice), Cox and Deck (2006) make it unclear to the second mover whether or 
not the first mover chooses an equitable split of his endowment.  The authors find that 
many second movers assume that first movers act fairly and that any unfair distributions 
are a result of the tremble.   These second movers are subsequently less likely to punish 
first movers even if the distribution shared with the second movers is small. 
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The discounting principal suggests that when faced with uncertain intentions, 
employees will not respond to a control as negatively as they would if they believed the 
implementation to be an unambiguous signal that their employer does not trust them.  
Nevertheless, employees will not give controlling employers the total benefit of the doubt 
either.  Therefore, controlled employees are likely to respond more negatively to a 
control with ambiguous intentions than one that clearly cannot be interpreted as a signal 
of distrust.   
In this dissertation, I examine how agents’ beliefs about the intentionality of a 
control system influence their behavior.  My main predictions, as set forth in chapter 4, 
suggest that when a control is unambiguously imposed by the principal, and can therefore 
be perceived as an intentional signal of distrust, the control will crowd out agents’ 
preferences for various social norms, including positive reciprocity and altruism.  
However, controls that are imposed by an exogenous or uncertain source, and thus cannot 





Chapter 3: Literature Review – Factors Influencing Principal Behavior 
While a wide-ranging body of academic literature examining aspects of agents’ 
responses to the implementation of formal control systems has developed, important 
questions that have not been extensively examined include whether and how principals 
anticipate the behavioral effects of these control systems. Drawing from the literatures on 
the illusion of control (Langer 1975; Langer 1983), social projection theory (Robbins and 
Krueger 2005) and risk perception (Heath 1999; Slovic 1987, 2000; Slovic et al. 2004), I 
describe principals’ propensity to impose control systems that crowd out agents’ 
preferences for positive social norms and principals’ ability to anticipate and respond to 
agents’ reactions to these controls.    
3.1 Principals’ propensity to control 
As previously described, control systems can have a variety of unintended 
consequences that can damage the relationship between principals and agents.  That is, 
formal controls often crowd out preferences for social norms and result in opportunistic 
behavior by agents that can diminish firm performance.  However, it is unclear whether 
principals effectively recognize these unintended consequences of control and choose to 
accept the risk of opportunistic behavior, or are lulled into a false sense of security by the 
existence of control and therefore do not effectively internalize or respond to the risk. 
There is some experimental evidence to suggest that principals may choose to rely 
on control systems despite knowledge of potentially negative consequences.  For 
example, after detecting the dysfunctional effect of control in their primary experiment, 
Fehr and Rockenbach (2003)  conduct a follow-up study in which a new set of principals 
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is informed of the results of the primary experiment.  The authors find that many 
principals choose to impose control despite knowing that controls were harmful in 
previous experimental sessions.  The authors attribute principals’ controlling behavior to 
their desire to punish deviant agents.  
 However, in practice, principals might impose dysfunctional controls for a 
variety of other reasons.  For example, principals might not recognize the potentially 
negative behavioral impact of formal controls.  Alternatively, principals might recognize 
the potentially harmful nature of formal controls, but prefer to have them in place to 
mitigate the most opportunistic actions of agents.  In my experiments, I examine 
principals’ propensity to impose a control, but design the control mechanism such that it 
cannot be used as a punishment mechanism by principals.  Therefore, I am able to rule 
out the punishment explanation advanced by Fehr and Rockenbach (2003), focusing 
instead on principals’ beliefs about the effectiveness of the control system and their 
expectations of agents’ behavior. 
3.1.1 The Extrinsic Incentives Bias  
Although principals might recognize the potentially negative influence of formal 
control on agents’ behavior, they are likely to weigh that potential cost against the 
potential benefits of the control.   While this analysis may be formal, such as a formal 
risk assessment process in an organization, or informal, based on the principals’ 
judgment, the principals’ beliefs about the opportunistic tendencies of agents are likely to 
be important factors for consideration.  Recent psychology research finds that individuals 
often overestimate others’ opportunistic tendencies, heightening their perception of this 
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risk and leading to unnecessary control implementation.  Heath (1999) finds that 
individuals have biased expectations about the effects of extrinsic incentives on others’ 
behavior.  In a series of psychology based experiments, Heath (1999) asks individuals to 
rate the importance of extrinsic incentives (e.g., money, job security, etc.) to other people 
as compared to themselves.  Individuals routinely overestimate the importance of these 
incentives to other people, while suggesting that they, themselves, are less motivated by 
extrinsic incentives.  Therefore, individuals appear to generalize others as being primarily 
extrinsically motivated, despite believing that they, themselves, are more intrinsically 
motivated. 
Heath (1999) implies that this extrinsic incentives bias can hinder organizational 
formation by leading principals to offer inappropriate contracts to agents.  An additional 
consequence of this bias, which has not previously been examined in the literature, is that 
it will lead principals to over-estimate the riskiness of interactions with agents causing 
them to implement control systems that can prove detrimental to the relationship between 
principals and agents, ultimately resulting in foregone profits.    
Extant research on risk perception finds that individuals do not exclusively 
engage in formal, methodical risk analysis processes focused on probabilistic factors, but 
instead incorporate behavioral factors such as experience, feelings, and knowledge to 
form a more subjective perception of risk (Koonce et al. 2005; Slovic 1987; Slovic et al. 
2004; Slovic et al. 1983, 2000; Slovic et al. 1982).  Specifically, Slovic and colleagues 
have developed an extensive portfolio of work examining how individuals perceive risk 
(Slovic 2000).  One important finding has been that two behavioral factors in particular, 
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dread and unknown, overwhelmingly influence individuals’ perception of and response to 
risk.   Dread encompasses the extent to which individuals fear or worry about the 
negative outcome of a risk.  The “unknown” factor describes the extent to which a risk is 
unobservable, new or mysterious.  While both of these factors influence individuals’ 
perceptions of risk, the dread factor has been shown to be most closely aligned with risk 
perceptions and attitudes.  Furthermore, the dread factor has been found to be positively 
associated with individuals’ desire to reduce risk, such as by using formal control 
mechanisms or regulations (Slovic 1987).   
Recent research in accounting finds these behavioral risk factors can also be 
important aspects of risk assessment processes in business settings. Specifically, Koonce 
et al. (2005) finds that investors incorporate both behavioral and probabilistic factors 
when assessing the risk of financial instruments.  Their findings imply that even in 
organizations, where management performs formal risk assessment processes and control 
evaluations, subjective factors are likely to play an important role in developing risk 
responses and designing control systems.  Formal hypotheses in chapter 4 stem from the 
reasoning that extrinsic incentives bias is a subjective factor that can exacerbate the 
perceived riskiness of the principal/ agent interaction.  Furthermore, this bias is likely to 
increase the propensity of principals to choose to impose a formal control mechanism to 
mitigate agents’ opportunistic actions. 
3.2 Principals’ risk-taking with control 
Importantly, observing principals’ propensity to control does not provide 
sufficient insight into their beliefs about control effectiveness.  As previously described, 
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principals might recognize the potentially harmful nature of formal controls but choose to 
implement them anyway due to their beliefs about agents’ opportunistic tendencies.  In 
this case, it is unlikely that principals would take unwarranted risk when formal controls 
are imposed.  Instead, principals would be likely to reduce their risk-taking in the 
presence of controls.  On the contrary, it is also possible that principals will be lulled into 
a false sense of security when controls are imposed, unwittingly taking greater risk that 
result in lost profitability.   
To further understand principals’ abilities to anticipate the effects of formal 
control and their beliefs about control effectiveness, it is, necessary to examine 
principals’ actions when controls are in place.  In the following sections, I provide 
competing theories to describe whether and how principals anticipate the effects that 
formal controls have on agents.  I first look to social projection theory (Robbins and 
Krueger 2005) to describe how principals predict agents’ aversion to being controlled.   
3.2.1 Social Projection Theory 
Social psychologists have developed a large literature examining how individuals 
make judgments about the beliefs, thoughts and feelings of others (Heider 1958; Kelley 
1967; Robbins and Krueger 2005).  Individuals rely upon several cognitive mechanisms 
to understand the motivations of others – most notably, projection and stereotyping 
(Ames 2004a, 2004b).   
Social projection theory describes individuals’ tendencies to project their own 
beliefs, thoughts and feelings onto others.  In short, individuals tend to expect others to be 
similar to themselves, leading people to anchor on their own beliefs when predicting what 
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others will do (Robbins and Krueger 2005).  While imperfect, social projection provides 
a simple heuristic for anticipating others’ behavior that often yields relatively accurate 
predictions (Krueger 1998, 2000).  
When principals are considering the level of resources to entrust to agents when a 
control system is in place, social projection theory predicts that they will first imagine 
how they, personally, would respond to the implementation of the control system.  
Furthermore, principals are likely to consider their response to both the existence of the 
control and its intentionality.  If principals believe that they, personally, would be 
offended by the implementation of the control system and would be less generous 
because of it, they are likely to project this belief onto agents and engage in less risk-
taking when the control is imposed than when it is not.  Additionally, if principals further 
recognize that a control intentionally imposed would be more offensive than a control 
imposed by an exogenous source they are likely to refine their risk-taking behavior 
accordingly.  Thus, principals are likely to take more risk with a control imposed by an 
exogenous source than one they impose themselves. 
Importantly, recent research finds that individuals can use both stereotyping and 
projection simultaneously when anticipating others’ behaviors (Ames 2004a, 2004b).  
Therefore, it is possible that principals may engage in both processes when trying to 
predict how agents will behave.  Specifically, principals who exhibit the extrinsic 
incentives bias (Heath 1999), stereotyping agents as opportunistic, are likely to impose 
control.  However, if principals simultaneously project their own beliefs about the 
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offensive nature of intentional controls, they would likely take minimal risk when they 
have chosen to impose the control.  
3.2.2 Illusions of control and risk-taking 
In contrast to the theory presented in the previous section, it is also possible that 
principals will not recognize the potentially harmful effects of formal control systems.  
Extant research suggests that individuals have preconceived notions or intuitive theories 
about what control is and how it will affect a risky situation (Abramson and Alloy 1980).  
People use a variety of invalid heuristics that can lead to erroneous judgments about 
control (Alloy and Abramson 1979).  These beliefs about the effects of control are likely 
to lead a principal to believe a series of contingencies, including that if s/he has control, 
good outcomes will occur more frequently.   
Research on perceived control finds that it results in a variety of psychological 
and cognitive effects, including increased confidence and reduced anxiety (Langer 1975).  
However, in general this literature has examined individuals’ irrational beliefs that they 
personally control a chance event, such as the outcome of a dice roll or a coin flip.  To 
my knowledge no studies have examined whether individuals also overestimate the 
effectiveness of an outside control mechanism and whether it leads to similar biased 
beliefs about residual risk.   
A significant body of research on the need for control suggests that perceived 
control increases individuals’ confidence in the likelihood of a successful outcome 
(Langer 1975; Langer 1977, 1983; Langer and Roth 1975).  Confidence focuses an 
individual’s attention towards the potential positive outcomes of a situation, rather than 
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downside risk.  Thus, confident individuals look for the opportunities in a situation 
(Lopes 1987), and are unlikely to sufficiently internalize the threats or risks that exist 
(Haleblian et al. 2004).  Further, confident individuals believe they will achieve their 
goals and are more apt to believe that they have the ability to control their environment 
(Klein and Kunda 1994).  In addition, Miyake and Matsuda (2002) find that confident 
individuals are more likely to commit and pursue specific courses of action despite initial 
setbacks.  In summary, this research finds that controls make a decision maker more 
confident in either his own abilities or the likelihood of a positive outcome.  Thus, s/he 
will overlook the residual riskiness of the situation, taking on unwarranted risk.  Further, 
this confidence and commitment to a course of action can persist despite evidence to the 
contrary.   In general, the illusion of control literature indicates that a principal will be 
more risk-seeking when a control is imposed than when there is no control because s/he 
will not sufficiently internalize the remaining risk. 
The illusion of control literature also provides a basis for understanding the 
effects of control intentionality on principals’ risk-taking.  Specifically, this literature 
indicates that principals will be more likely to rely on a control system that they have 
chosen than one that has been imposed exogenously.  Langer (1975) finds that 
participants who choose their own lottery tickets require greater compensation to 
exchange the tickets than participants who were not permitted to choose, indicating that 
the participants who choose have more confidence in the likelihood that they possess 
winning tickets.  Thompson et al. (1998) suggest that choice itself differentiates the 
illusion of control from simple optimism.  If participants in these studies were not able to 
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choose the lottery numbers, they would not have an inflated expectation that they 
possessed winning numbers.  Thus, these authors suggest that it is the choice that drives 
the resulting over-confidence.   
An alternative description of the role of choice in the illusion of control is 
advanced by Van den Steen (2004).  The author develops a theoretical model whereby 
individuals, who are presented with a variety of choices, will overestimate the probability 
of success of some of the available options, while underestimating the probability of 
success of others.  However, when selecting between available options, individuals are 
more likely to select the options for which they overestimate the likelihood of success.  
Thus, individuals are more likely to be overly-optimistic about the likelihood of success 
of the actions they choose to undertake, relative to impartial observers.  Extended to the 
current setting, when a principal chooses to implement a control system, he is more likely 
to be confident that it will sufficiently mitigate risk than will an independent observer.  If 
so, principals will be less likely to exhibit unwarranted risk-taking when the control 
system has been implemented by an outside source.   
Drawing from social projection theory and the illusion of control literature, this 
chapter has advanced competing theories describing how principals could adjust their 
risk-taking behavior in the presence of a control system and how the intentionality of 
control influences risk-taking.  In the following chapter, I integrate these theories to state 
formal hypotheses regarding principals’ propensity to impose formal controls and 
principals’ risk-taking in the presence of a formal control designed to eliminate agents’ 
opportunistic actions.  
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Chapter 4: Hypotheses Development 
4.1 The Effect of Intentions on Agents’ Behavior 
 
4.1.1 Known Intentions and Agent Behavior  
As described in chapter 2, individuals are not wholly self-interested, motivated 
instead by a variety of social norms.  However, prior research finds that formal controls 
can crowd out these social preferences and weaken agents’ intrinsic motivation to exert 
effort that would benefit their employer.  Specifically, prior research suggests that control 
sends a signal of distrust to agents, resulting in reciprocal feelings of distrust toward 
principals and diminished effort  (Christ et al. 2006; Falk and Kosfeld 2006; Fehr and 
Rockenbach 2003; Tenbrunsel and Messick 1999).  This research hinges on agents’ 
perception of the principals’ intentions signaled by their choice to impose control.  
Consequently, controls are less likely to have negative behavioral effects if they are 
imposed by an exogenous source or if the source is unclear to the agent cannot be clearly 
perceived as an intentional signal of distrust.   
Recent research has investigated the role of intentions in driving agents’ negative 
response to control (Falk and Kosfeld 2006; Houser et al. 2007).  Falk and Kosfeld 
(2006) (hereafter FK) compare agents’ responses to endogenously and exogenously 
imposed control.  They find evidence consistent with the notion that agents respond 
negatively to the intentions communicated by an endogenously imposed control.  
Specifically, agents return more resources to principals when a control is imposed 
exogenously by an outside source, rather than endogenously by the principal.  However, 
in organizations the intentionality of control implementation is not always common 
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knowledge, such that FK’s examination does not provide a complete picture of the effects 
of intentionality. 
4.1.2 Ambiguous Intentions and Agent Behavior 
An important dimension of the effect of intentions that has not been previously 
explored in the literature is agent uncertainty regarding the principal’s intentions.  In 
practice, it is not always possible for agents to determine the source or impetus of a 
control.  For example, when evaluating internal control systems for Sarbanes-Oxley 
compliance, a manager may implement a new internal control.  In this case, employees 
are often unable to determine conclusively whether the control signals the principal’s 
dissatisfaction with current performance or if the control is simply needed to ensure 
regulatory compliance.  In such cases, employees must make attributions regarding the 
intentionality of the control that are likely to influence their responses to it. 
Attribution theory describes how individuals make causal attributions when faced 
with uncertainty.  When considering the implementation of a control system with 
uncertain intentionality, attribution theory suggests that agents are more likely to attribute 
it to the principal rather than an exogenous source (Gilbert and Malone 1995; Ross 1977).  
Specifically, experimental research finds that individuals generally over-emphasize the 
role of others’ personal characteristics and underestimate the effect of situational factors.  
This tendency is commonly known as the correspondence bias or fundamental attribution 
error (Green et al. 1985).  Thus, when faced with uncertainty, agents prone to this bias 
would likely attribute the control to the principals’ choice to implement it, rather than to 
extenuating circumstances, such as a regulatory requirement. 
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While attribution theory provides a basis for predicting how agents will attribute 
the implementation of a control system, it does not fully explain how these agents will 
respond to the control imposed by an unknown source.    If agents believe the control is 
intentional, their behavior should mirror that of the endogenous control condition.  That 
is, agents are likely to respond negatively to control and reduce their effort level as a 
punishment to the principal.  However, there is some experimental evidence suggesting 
that agents will not respond as negatively to a control imposed by an ambiguous source.  
Cox and Deck (2006) examine participants’ behavior in a trust game setting which 
incorporates an exogenous probability that the trustors’ transfer to the trustee will be 
changed by a computer (i.e., a tremble).  Therefore, when the trustee receives the transfer 
from the trustor it is unclear whether or not the trustee chose to divide the endowment 
equitably.  Contrary to economic predictions, the authors find that many trustors attribute 
inequities to the tremble and therefore return a much larger percentage of the proceeds to 
the trustor than they would if low transfer had been unambiguously intentional. 
Cox and Deck’s (2006) experimental results are consistent with the discounting 
principal of attribution theory, which suggests that the “role of a given cause in producing 
a given effect is discounted if other plausible causes are also present” (Kelley 1972).  
Thus, trustees discount the extent to which they believe trustors choose the unfair 
distribution and are hesitant to punish them, transferring more resources to the trustors 
than they would if they knew the trustors selected the unfair distribution of the 
endowment. 
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The discounting principal of attribution theory suggests that agents could be 
hesitant to punish principals when the source of the control is unclear. Because there is 
more than one plausible source of control, agents will not be able to fully attribute it to 
either of those sources.   Therefore, agents are likely to exert more effort (or transfer 
more resources to principals) when a control is imposed by an unknown source than 
when it is unambiguously imposed by the principal.   
However, this principle also suggests that agents will not fully attribute the 
control to the exogenous source either.  Instead, agents will likely exert less effort (or 
transfer fewer resources) in the unknown condition than when the control is 
unambiguously imposed exogenously.  Therefore, I predict that agents’ reaction to a 
control will vary along a continuum, with an endogenously imposed control yielding the 
lowest effort, followed by somewhat improved effort when the source is unknown, and 
highest effort when the control is known to be exogenously imposed.  Hypothesis 1 is 
formally stated below and illustrated in Figure 2: 
H1: Agent effort will be influenced by the intentionality of control, such that 
effort will be lowest when control is endogenously imposed, followed by 
control imposed by an unknown source, and highest when control is 
imposed by an exogenous source. 
 
 Prior research finds that individuals respond more strongly to negative intentions 
than positive intentions (Offerman 2002).  Therefore, I do not expect intentionality to 
affect agent effort when a control is not imposed.  That is, I expect that agents will exert 
the same level of effort when they are not controlled regardless of whether the decision to 
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not control has been made endogenously by the principal or exogenously by the 
computer.  
 
4.2 Principals’ Propensity to Control 
When interacting with other, presumably self-interested, individuals, the most 
salient risk is that they will behave opportunistically.  However, recent psychology 
research suggests that individuals overestimate others’ opportunistic tendencies, 
heightening perceived risk and leading to unnecessary control implementation.  Heath 
(1999) suggests that individuals have biased expectations about the significance of 
extrinsic incentives to other people.  In a series of experiments, in which individuals rate 
the importance of extrinsic incentives (e.g., money, success, etc.) to others, individuals 
routinely overestimate the importance of these incentives.  Moreover, individuals hold 
these biased beliefs about others despite recognizing that they, themselves, are not 
focused on extrinsic incentives.   I expect that principals’ tendency to overestimate the 
effect of incentives on agents will heighten the perceived riskiness of the interaction and, 
therefore, will induce principals to impose control formal controls. 
However, I also expect that the principals’ risk perception and propensity to 
impose control will be influenced by their level of trust in their agents.  Trust, often 
defined as, “an individual’s behavioral reliance on another person” (Currall and Judge 
1995, p. 151), has been shown to be an important determinant in ones’ perception of the 
riskiness of an interaction with that person (Das and Teng 2004; Das and Teng 1998, 
2001a).  A high level of trust can lessen one’s concerns about another individuals’ 
opportunistic behavior and can reduce the perceived riskiness of the situation.  However, 
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when trust is absent, principals are likely to rely on control mechanisms to reduce the 
riskiness of the interaction (Das and Teng 2001a).  Some scholars have even gone so far 
as to suggest that trust and control are substitutes (Aulakh et al. 1997; Das and Teng 
1998; Leifer and Mills 1996; Madhok 1995; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Sitkin and Roth 
1993; Zaheer et al. 1998). 
Trust between participants can arise for a variety of reasons, most notably 
repeated, positive interactions (Kramer, 1999).  In the experiments employed in this 
dissertation, principals and agents do not know with whom they are paired in each round, 
and therefore it is impossible to form trust based on history or repeated interaction. 
However, despite the anonymity, it is possible for principals to feel trust for the agents 
because trust can be based on the social category or role of other person (Brewer 1981; 
Kramer 1999; Orbell et al. 1994).  Therefore, if participants believe other students (social 
category)  or participants acting as agents (role) to be trustworthy in general, then they 
are likely to have a higher level of trust in an individual that fits in that social category or 
role. 
 Figure 3 describes the expected relationship between principals’ beliefs about 
agents’ incentives and their propensity to impose control, including the mediating roles of 
trust and risk.  As shown in Figure 3, I expect that principals’ beliefs about agents’ 
incentives will be positively related to their decision to impose a control via their effect 
on the perceived riskiness of the interaction with the agent.  That is, principals who 
believe that agents are primarily motivated by extrinsic incentives will perceive the 
interaction to be riskier than principals who do not exhibit this bias.  I further expect that 
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this relationship will be mediated by the extent to which principals trust the agents.  
Specifically, I expect that these beliefs will be negatively related to principals’ trust in 
agents and low levels of trust will increase the perceived riskiness of the interaction.  
Finally, perceived riskiness will be positively associated with the extent to which the 
principals impose the control. 
Principals who impose the control will be able to mitigate their downside risk, but 
doing so likely sacrifice the upside potential of the interaction.  That is, while the control 
system might effectively eliminate agents’ most opportunistic behavior, it is likely to 
crowd out agents’ intrinsic motivation to exert high levels of effort.  Thus, agents who 
would have exerted high levels of effort without control may reduce their effort level 
when the control is imposed, resulting in lower profit for the principals.  With experience 
and feedback, principals have to opportunity to recognize the harmful effects of control, 
affording an opportunity to modify their reliance on it so that they can capitalize on 
agents’ intrinsic motivations.    
However, principals who exhibit the extrinsic incentives bias are likely to impose 
control, despite feedback suggesting that the control yields low agent effort.  In addition 
to fearing agents’ most opportunistic actions in the absence of control, it is likely that 
principals will expect that the control will be effective.  Extant research suggests that 
individuals have intuitive theories about how control will affect a situation (Abramson 
and Alloy 1980).  Individuals use a variety of heuristics that can lead to erroneous 
expectations about control, including that if one has control, good outcomes will occur 
(Abramson and Alloy 1980).  Thus, H2 below predicts that principals will continue to 
38 
impose control overtime, despite receiving evidence to suggest that it yields low returns.  
My second hypothesis follows, below: 
H2: Principals will continue to impose the control, despite feedback that the 
control yields low effort from the agent, due to their beliefs about agents’ 
opportunistic tendencies. 
 
4.3 Effects of Reciprocity, Intentions and Control on Agent Effort  
In practice, agents do not respond to control implementation by itself, but instead 
respond simultaneously to a combination of signals provided by principals – including 
some that may appear to be inconsistent.  For example, in a decentralized organization, 
managers empower employees to make decisions, while at the same time implementing 
review procedures to provide assurance that decisions meet company standards (Chenhall 
2003).  These employees receive both a trusting signal (increased responsibility) and a 
distrusting signal (control implementation) from their employers.  The important question 
is which signal will most strongly motivate employees.  
 The theory of reciprocity suggests that individuals repay kind acts with kindness 
and harmful acts with retribution (Falk and Fischbacher 2006).  Consistent with this 
theory, in gift-exchange games, high wages offered by principals are typically repaid by 
high agent effort (Fehr et al. 1993).  However, negative acts are also repaid in kind.  
When agents receive conflicting trust signals from principals, such as high wages coupled 
with an intrusive control, they must make tradeoffs between rewarding the trusting action 
and retaliating against the control.          
Recently, several studies have investigated the interactive effects of control and 
reciprocity using gift exchange (Falk and Kosfeld 2006; Fehr and Gächter 2001) and trust 
games (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Houser et al. 2007).  In general, these studies find 
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that even with a control, agents still show a preference for reciprocity and reward higher 
wages by exerting greater effort.  Nonetheless, the implementation of a control system 
has been shown to depress agents’ effort, such that agent effort is lower when a control is 
imposed, despite high wages.  Therefore, it appears that controls can still have harmful 
effects on agent effort despite agents’ preferences for reciprocity.      
  Hypothesis 1 predicts that agents’ behavior will be influenced by principals’ 
intentions.  However, it is unclear whether the effects of intentionality will be the same 
when agents react to control coupled with the transfer of resources from the principal 
(e.g., a wage).  Only one prior study, Houser et al. (2007), examines the effects of control 
intentionality in a setting in which principals entrust resources to the agent, manipulating 
whether controls are always chosen or always random.  In their study, agents do not 
respond to the intentionality of control and perform similarly regardless of whether the 
control is imposed by the principal or by an exogenous source.  In Houser et al. (2007), 
principals transfer resources (which are multiplied by the experimenter) to agents and 
indicate a desired back-transfer amount, which is the amount of resources they want 
agents to return.  A control, penalizing the agent if they do not return the desired back-
transfer amount, can be implemented.  However, compliance with the control is optional.  
Agents can disobey the request and accept the penalty.  The authors find that agents’ 
returns are sensitive to the strength of the control (which varies based upon desired back-
transfer amount), but not to the intentionality.   
In the current study, I hold the strength of control constant, so that I can examine 
the interaction of reciprocity and control intentionality more precisely. Therefore, I 
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expect agents will respond to the intentionality of the control in the same manner as 
described in H1.   I predict that agents’ reaction to a control will vary along the same 
continuum (i.e., as depicted in Figure 2), with the lowest effort occurring under 
endogenous control, followed by control from an unknown source and the highest effort 
under exogenous control.  
4.4 Effects of Reciprocity, Intentions and Control on Principals’ Risk-taking  
4.4.1 Effects of Control on Principals’ Risk-taking Behavior 
As previously described, individuals have preconceived notions about how 
controls will affect the riskiness of their actions (Abramson and Alloy 1980).  Research 
on perceived control finds that it has a variety of psychological effects, including 
increased confidence and reduced anxiety (Langer 1975).  Specifically, perceived control 
increases individuals’ willingness to take risk (Hammond and Horswill 2002) and 
confidence in the likelihood of success (Langer 1975).  The increased confidence focuses 
attention towards potential positive outcomes for the situation, and away from inherent 
riskiness (Lopes 1987).  Thus, confident individuals look for the opportunities in 
situations (Lopes 1987), insufficiently internalizing the risks (Haleblian et al. 2004).  In 
summary, this research suggests that controls are likely to make principals more 
confident that they will be successful, making it more likely that they will overlook the 
riskiness of the situation.  Therefore, an incomplete control could entice principals to take 
unwarranted risk.   
Importantly, however, prior research on the illusion of control focuses on external 
risks, and does not examine individuals’ behavior when the risk is strategic in nature, 
arising from interactions with self-interested others. Thus, it is possible that when faced 
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with strategic risk, principals will not be more risk-seeking when a control is imposed.  
Instead, principals’ propensity to control, predicted in H2, might be driven primarily by 
their trepidation regarding the riskiness of the interaction with (presumably) self-
interested agents rather than signifying that they believe the control will induce agents to 
put forth high effort. 
Specifically, while principals might prefer to have a control in place to protect 
their downside risk, that agents will exert no effort, they might recognize the potential 
consequences of the control.  Social projection theory suggests that individuals expect 
others to be similar to themselves, leading people to anchor on their own beliefs when 
predicting what others will do (Robbins and Krueger 2005).  If principals believe that 
they, personally, would respond negatively to the control, they will likely project this 
expectation onto the agents.  Thus, principals could be less risk-seeking when a control is 
imposed than when there is no control.   
It is unclear ex ante whether principals will take more risk when a control is 
imposed, as suggested by theories of illusion of control and overconfidence, or will take 
less risk when a control is imposed because they recognize that they, personally, would 
contribute fewer points if a control were imposed.  Accordingly, I present H3 as a two-
tailed hypothesis of a difference, which could arise in either direction depending upon 
which effect is stronger (see Figure 4). 
H3:  Principals’ risk-taking behavior when a control is imposed will differ from 
principals’ risk-taking behavior when a control is not imposed. 
  
4.1.2 The Effect of Intentions on Principals’ Risk-taking Behavior 
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  Principals might also be influenced by the intentionality (or source) of control, 
such that their risk-taking behavior may vary depending upon the source.  Houser et al. 
(2007) examines the effects of the intentionality of a control while allowing principals to 
take risk by entrusting resources to agents.  However, Houser et al. (2007) do not inform 
principals that a control might be imposed in the exogenous condition.  The authors 
indicate that they do not want the knowledge of a control to influence principals’ 
decisions.  However, in practice, principals do have the ability to moderate their behavior 
based on the existence of control.  In experiment 2, I incorporate principals’ ability to 
anticipate agents’ responses to control implementation so that I can examine the effect of 
intentionality on the behavior of both the principal and the agent. 
 If the mere existence of a control induces risk-taking by the principal, as 
described in the previous section, these results should be robust to both endogenously and 
exogenously imposed control.  However, it is possible that choosing to impose the 
control increases the likelihood that principals will rely on it.   In her examination of the 
illusion of control, Langer (1975) finds that participants who choose their own lottery 
tickets have more confidence in the likelihood that they possess winning tickets than 
those who do not choose the numbers.   
Alternatively, principals could recognize that agents are likely to react negatively 
to the intentions signaled by an endogenously imposed control, rather than the control 
itself.  Thus, principals could transfer more points when the control is imposed 
exogenously.  If principals believe that they, personally, would be insulted by an 
endogenous control, then social projection theory (Robbins and Krueger 2005) predicts 
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that they will project this expectation on agents.  Consequently, principals might take less 
risk when they have imposed the control compared to when it is exogenously imposed 
because they anticipate agents’ spitefulness.   
Principals’ behavior could also be differentially affected when the source of the 
control is unknown to the agent.  As noted, it is unclear whether principals will invest 
more or fewer resources when they have imposed the control themselves. If, as suggested 
by social projection theory, principals recognize that agents might be more offended by 
an endogenous control than an exogenous control, principals might try to capitalize on 
the uncertainty and transfer more resources when the source of control is unknown than 
when it is unambiguously imposed endogenously.  In this case, principals might expect to 
hide behind the ambiguity of the control source and deflect the blame and negative 
reciprocity that can accompany endogenous control.   
Alternatively, if principals are more confident in a control that they impose than 
in one implemented exogenously, as suggested by the illusion of control literature, it is 
likely they will transfer fewer resources, on average, in the uncertain condition than in the 
endogenous condition.  As it is unclear ex ante how principals will anticipate the effects 
of control intentionality on agents’ behavior, I provide a two-tailed hypothesis (see 
Figure 5): 
H4: When a control is imposed, principals’ risk-taking behavior will differ 
depending on the intentionality of the control. 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are two-tailed hypotheses describing the possible effects of 
control systems and control intentionality on principals’ risk-taking behavior.  Both 
hypotheses are developed comparing the social projection theory to the illusion of control 
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theory.  Figures 4 and 5 provide a graphical comparison of each of the competing 
predictions. 
To understand the effects of control intentionality on the behavior of both 
principals and agents I design three interactive experiments, as described in the following 
chapters.    In the first experiment, I focus only on the effects of control and the 
principals’ intentions as perceived by the agent.  This experiment employs a simple 
design that does not allow principals to entrust any resources to the agents.  That is, 
principals do not engage in any risk-taking behavior.   
After I establish the effects of control intentionality on agents’ behavior in 
experiment 1, I conduct a second experiment which employs a richer setting – allowing 
principals to entrust resources to agents.  In this setting, I am able to explore principals’ 
risk-taking behavior in the presence of a control, as well as agents’ reactions to both 
control intentionality and the principals’ trusting behavior.  By introducing principals’ 
ability to entrust resources to agents, I am able to examine whether the effects of 
intentionality observed in experiment 1 persist when agents’ concerns for reciprocity are 
relevant.  Thus, I investigate when and if the perceived intentionality of a control crowds 
out agents’ preferences to reward trusting actions by the principal.  More importantly, 
experiment 2 also allows me to observe principals’ risk-taking behavior under the various 
control intentionality conditions. Therefore, I am able to determine whether principals are 
lulled into complacency and take unwarranted risk when a control is imposed, or choose 
to control to eliminate agents’ most opportunistic tendencies while recognizing the 
potentially negative consequences that might occur. 
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Finally, in experiment 3, I again explore the interactions among intentions, control 
and reciprocity, but do so in a setting in which principals and agents do not engage in 
repeated play.  This design allows me to collect data regarding participants’ beliefs, risk 
assessments and motivations for their behavior.  Experiment 3 provides further insights 
into the cognitive processes that direct the actions of principals and agents. 
The following chapter describes the research design employed in experiment 1 
and describes the results of that experiment.  Experiments 2 and 3 are then described in 
chapters 6 and 7, respectively. 
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Figure 2 





H1 predicts that when a control is imposed, agent effort will vary along a continuum with the lowest 
performance when controls are endogenously imposed, followed by controls imposed by an uncertain 
source and the highest performance when controls are imposed exogenously.  The same pattern of 
performance is predicted for experiment 1 and experiment 2.  When there is no control imposed, I do not 
expect agent effort to vary based upon intentionality.  Agent effort is defined as the number of points agents 
transfer to principals. 
 
Control intentionality is varied using three control source conditions are defined as follows: In the 
Endogenous condition, principals impose the control.  In the Uncertain condition, the agent does not know 
if the control was imposed by the principal or the computer.  In the Exogenous condition, the control is 
imposed by the computer.  
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Figure 3 


















Figure 3 provides a model by which principals’ beliefs about agents’ opportunistic tendencies will 
influence principals’ decision to impose control.  Specifically, I expect that the extent to which principals 
exhibit the extrinsic incentives bias (i.e., believe agents are wholly self-interested) will increase the 
perceived riskiness of the interaction with the agent.  Further, I expect that this relationship will be 
mediated by the principals’ trust in the agents.  Finally I expect that the perceived riskiness of the 
interaction will increase the likelihood that principals will impose a control system that may have a 





Predictions Regarding Principals’ Risk-taking Behavior in the Presence of a Formal 
Control  
 
H3:  Principals’ risk-taking behavior when a control is imposed will differ from 






H3 predicts that principals’ risk-taking behavior will differ when a control is in place, as compared to when 
there is no control.  Illusion of Control and Social Projection Theories provide competing predictions for 
principals’ behavior.  Principal risk-taking is measured as the amount of points principals transfer to agents 
during each experimental period (of experiment 2). 
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Predictions Regarding Principals’ Risk-taking Behavior Based upon the 
Intentionality of Control 
 
H4:      Principals’ risk-taking behavior when control is imposed will differ depending 


































H4 predicts that principals’ risk-taking behavior will differ based upon the intentionality of the control 
system.  Illusion of Control and Social Projection Theories provide competing predictions for principals’ 
behavior.  Principal risk-taking is measured as the amount of points principals transfer to agents during 
each experimental period (of experiment 2). 
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Chapter 5: Experiment 1 - Intentions and Control 
The objective of experiment 1 is to determine how control intentionality affects 
agent effort and influences principals’ decision to impose control.  Therefore, experiment 
1 provides a direct test of H1 and H2 only.   
5.1 Experimental Design  
As an initial examination of the effects of intentionality on agents’ effort and 
principals’ decision to control, I use a 3 X 2 X 2 experimental design and vary the source 
of control implementation (endogenous, exogenous, or unknown) between subjects.  I 
vary the existence of control (yes or no) and feedback (yes or no) within subjects.  
Experiment 1 uses a structure similar to the main experiment described in Falk and 
Kosfeld (2006) (hereafter FK), but differs from their study by incorporating repeated play 
and a condition in which the control is imposed by an unknown source.  I conduct the 
study using z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007).   
I recruit 108 participants from graduate and undergraduate accounting classes to 
take part in this study.  Participants are randomly assigned to the role of either principal 
or agent.  To ensure that labels do not unnecessarily affect participant behavior, 
throughout the experiment, principal and agent participants are referred to as Participant 
B and Participant A, respectively.  Principal and agents interact for twenty periods and are 
randomly and anonymously re-paired with a participant of the opposite type at the 
beginning of each period.  Although during the course of the experiment principal and 
agent pairings are repeated, participants have no way of knowing with whom they are 
paired during any particular period.  Therefore, there is no ability to form reputations with 
other participants, such that each period simulates an independent one-shot experiment.        
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In this experiment, agents begin each round with an endowment that represents 
the total effort that they may exert.  The agents’ task is to determine how much of this 
endowment they would like to designate for work, which creates profit for the principal 
but at a direct cost for the agent, and how much they would like to keep for themselves.  
However, a control system that sets a minimum required level of effort can be imposed 
(see Figure 1 for illustration). 
Specifically, at the start of each period, agents are endowed with 120 points and 
principals are endowed with zero points.  Agents can transfer any number of their points 
(x), including zero points, to principals.  However, before agents make their transfer, a 
control, which requires agents to transfer a minimum of 10 points to principals, can be 
implemented.  Thus, if the control is in place, an agent is permitted to transfer between 10 
– 120 points to the principal.  All points transferred from the agent to the principal are 
doubled, such that each transferred point reduces the agent’s income by one point and 
increases the principal’s income by two points.  Principal and agent payoffs for each 
period are calculated as follows: 
∏principal  = 2x; and 
∏agent  = 120 – x 
 
  Economic theory would predict that agents are wholly self-interested and only 
have utility for wealth.  Therefore, if left uncontrolled, agents would transfer 0 points to 
the principal, resulting in agent profit of 120 points and principal profit of 0.  Economic 
theory would also predict that it is in the principal’s best interest to impose the control 
system because the control requires the agent to transfer 10 points.  Thus, when 
controlled, agents would transfer exactly 10 points, resulting in agent profit of 110 points 
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and principal profit of 20 points, which makes the principal better off.  However, as 
described in the previous chapters, psychology provides a basis for predicting that agents’ 
transfers will deviate from the economic predictions based upon the perceived 
intentionality of the control system. 
To examine the effect of intentionality on agents’ transfer, I vary the source of 
control implementation at three levels: endogenous, exogenous and uncertain.  In the 
endogenous control condition, the principal has complete discretion over whether or not 
to impose the minimum transfer requirement, and the agent is aware of the principal’s 
authority.  In the exogenous control condition, all participants are aware that the control is 
imposed randomly by the computer, and the principal has no authority.  Finally, in the 
uncertain condition, there is a 50% chance that the principal is able to impose the control 
and a 50% chance that it is imposed randomly by the computer.  Importantly, in the 
uncertain condition, agents do not know whether or not they are interacting with a 
principal who has the authority to impose a control.   
In the uncertain condition, the computer randomly determines whether each 
principal (or the computer) will make the control decision before the experiment begins.  
Once this is established, the principal (or computer) determines whether or not a control 
is imposed at the start of each period.  This allows me to compare principals’ behavior in 
this condition when the control is either endogenously or exogenously assigned for the 
entire session.  An alternative design choice would randomly reassign the principals the 
ability to make the control decision for each period.  However, in experiment 2, I would 
not be able to compare principals’ transfer decisions under exogenous and endogenous 
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treatments within the uncertain condition.  Therefore, my design choice in experiment 1 is 
consistent with experiment 2. 
  As described above, I do not directly manipulate the principals’ intentions.  
Instead, I manipulate control intentionality by varying the source of control.  When a 
control is endogenously imposed, agents should recognize that the control is intentional, 
perceiving it to be a negative signal from principals; however, when the same control is 
imposed exogenously, the agent has no cause to perceive it as a negative signal from the 
principal because the principal was not involved with the control decision.  Thus, while I 
do not manipulate intentions directly, I am able to influence agents’ beliefs about the 
principals’ intentions by varying the source of control.  Importantly, it is the agents’ 
beliefs about control intentionality that are expected to influence their response to the 
control. 
During each experimental session, principal and agent participants interact for ten 
periods without feedback.  Beginning with the eleventh period, each participant receives a 
report indicating the number of points earned during that period.  Participants receive this 
report for each of the subsequent periods.  In practice, feedback is often delayed and 
individuals must continue to make decisions without that information.  Therefore, this 
aspect of the experiment does not detract from institutional realism.2   
                                                 
2 Because feedback provides participants with the opportunity to learn, the feedback periods must always 
follow the no feedback periods.  As a result, any differences in behavior between the feedback and no 
feedback rounds may be due to the feedback, and/or learning that has taken place.  However, I am not 
interested in the effects of feedback itself, but rather want to examine the robustness of the results in 
situations where feedback does not exist and learning is minimal to that when feedback is abundant and 
learning takes place.  Therefore, similar results in both situations indicate that my results are not due to the 
feedback, or lack thereof. 
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  After period 20, participants complete a post experimental questionnaire.  For 
principals, the questionnaire elicits responses regarding their decision to control (if 
applicable) and their beliefs about agents’ incentives.  The agents’ questionnaire 
addresses the factors influencing their transfer decisions, their feelings about the 
principals and, in the uncertain condition, their attributions of the source of control.   
  Participants earn points each period, which are converted to U.S. dollars at a rate 
of $0.01 per point.  At the end of the experiment, participants receive their cash payment 
plus a $5.00 show-up fee.  The average payment for agents and principals is $24.56 and 
$13.50, respectively. 
  In this study, the control mechanism is a behavioral control that provides a lower 
boundary on the number of points an agent can share with the principal.  If implemented, 
this control eliminates the most extreme form of opportunistic behavior- that of keeping 
the entire endowment.  However, it is clear that this control sets a very low threshold, 
requiring only that the agent transfers more than 10 points.  To be sure, a control system 
requiring that the agent transfer 50%, or even all, of his points, would be more effective 
for the principal.  Nonetheless, as previously described, organizations often implement 
weak or incomplete control systems that cannot necessarily guarantee the highest level of 
effort by the employee, but are effective in eliminating the most egregious forms of 
opportunistic behavior.   
  The control system in this experiment provides such a low requirement that, on 
the surface, it seems unlikely that it would be offensive to the agent.  By design, the agent 
should not perceive the control, itself, to be unfair, as he might if he were required to 
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transfer a larger portion of his wealth to the principal.  Therefore, if, as predicted, agents 
respond negatively to this seemingly innocuous control, it will be clear that the agent is 
not responding to the control operationalization, but rather to the principals’ intentions 
that the agent infers from the control implementation.     
5.2 Experiment 1 – Results 
 
5.2.1 Agents’ Effort 
Consistent with prior economics experiments (Falk and Kosfeld 2006; 
Fischbacher et al. 2001), I utilize the “strategy method” to elicit agent transfers with and 
without control.  The strategy method requires that agents indicate the amount they wish 
to transfer to the principal if a minimum transfer of 10 points is required and if no 
minimum is imposed.  Falk and Kosfeld (2006) conduct an analysis to ensure that results 
are not driven by the strategy method.  They compare the results of their primary 
experiment to a condition where agents respond only to the principal’s control decision.  
Results are similar in both conditions.  Therefore, the strategy method is an acceptable 
experimental tool.  The earnings for both participants depend upon whether the minimum 
is imposed during the period or not.  The benefit of the strategy method is that it allows 
me to compare agent effort under both conditions. 
Figure 6 illustrates the effects of control intentionality on agent transfers, and 
consequently, principal profit.  Consistent with H1, when control is imposed, agents 
transfer the fewest points in the endogenous condition, followed by the uncertain 
condition, and the most in the exogenous condition.  I use the Jonckheere – Terpstra test 
for ordered differences to  confirm that this ordering is significant (untabulated, Z =3.55, 
p< .01) (Siegel and Castellan Jr. 1988).   
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Figure 6 depicts the effect of control intentionality on agents’ preferences for 
generosity and cooperation.  Specifically, when a control is imposed by an exogenous 
source, and therefore cannot be considered as an intentional signal of distrust, agents 
respond quite well to the control – even exerting more effort with the control system than 
without it.  However, as soon as the agent can begin to perceive the control as an 
intentional signal of distrust (in the uncertain condition), effort drops significantly.  
Further, when the control is clearly an intentional, negative signal from the principal, 
agents’ effort diminishes further.  Moreover, when the control is clearly intentional, 
agents exert less effort than they would if no control had been imposed.  
Table 1, Panel A provides descriptive statistics, averaged across periods, which 
provide further evidence that the effect of control implementation on agent transfers and 
consequently, on principals’ profits, depend on the source of the control.3  Specifically, 
Table 1 indicates that when control is imposed in the endogenous condition, agents 
transfer significantly fewer points to principals than if there were no control.  Therefore, 
in the endogenous condition, principals earn less profit when they choose to impose a 
control than when they refrain from controlling.  However, in the uncertain and 
exogenous conditions, average agent transfers are higher when the control is in place, 
indicating that in these conditions, there is a benefit to the principal if control is imposed.    
In Table 1, Panel B, I provide the results of planned contrasts between the amount 
transferred by the agent in the control and no control conditions.   T-tests reveal that the 
                                                 
3 Note that in experiment 1, the number of points an agent transfers, agent profit and principal profit are 
isomorphic.  That is, agent profit decreases and principal profit increases in direct relation to an increase in 
agent transfer.   
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differences are marginally significant in the endogenous condition (t=-1.41, p=.08) and 
significant in the exogenous condition (t=2.34, p=.01), but that transfers do not differ 
significantly regardless of whether or not a control is imposed in the uncertain condition 
(t=1.13, p=.13).   
Importantly, the influence of control on agent effort is not fleeting.  Figure 7 
illustrates that in the endogenous condition agents transfer more points when there is no 
control throughout the experiment.  Similarly, in the exogenous condition, control 
consistently yields higher agent transfers than no control.  
To further examine the effects of intentionality and control on principal profits I 
perform analysis of variance (Table 2).  Examination of the omnibus ANOVA reveals 
that when a control is imposed there is a statistically significant main effect of control 
source condition on the principal profit (F=3.09, p =.02), as well as a significant 
interactive effect of control implementation and control source condition (F=4.16, p = 
.01).  There is no main effect of control implementation, but given the significant 
interaction, further analysis of the simple effects of control by control source condition 
provides important insights.  While control results in a significant effect in the 
endogenous and exogenous conditions (F = 6.51, p =.01, and F=4.33, p =.03, 
respectively), the difference is not significant in the uncertain condition (F=0.35, p=.28).  
That is, principal profit does not vary significantly depending on whether or not a control 
is imposed when the agent is uncertain who imposed it. 
Examining the uncertain condition in more detail, note that although participants 
are informed that in this condition there is a 50% chance that individual principals have 
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the authority to impose the control, this does not necessarily mean that 50% of all 
controls are imposed by principals.  For example, if all principals choose to impose 
control in every period, then 75% of all periods would be controlled (assuming that the 
computer randomly imposes the control 50% of the time when the principal is not 
authorized).   
In a post experimental questionnaire, agents respond to questions regarding their 
beliefs about the source of the control when it was and was not imposed.4  Agents’ 
responses indicate that agents believe that imposition of the control is more likely to be 
intentional by the principal (M = 5.43).  Further, when there was no control imposed, 
agents believe it is more likely to have been determined by the computer (M = 4.17).  T-
test results (untabulated) indicate that the difference is marginally significant (t = 1.95, p 
= .06).  Additionally, examining whether agents’ attribution of the control system 
influences their beliefs about principals’ intentions, I find that agents who believe the 
control is more likely imposed by the principal feel less trusted than do agents who 
believe the control is more likely imposed by the computer (untabulated, F=2.08, p = 
.08).   
To gain further insights into the beliefs and motivations that influence agents’ 
transfer decisions when the control is and is not imposed, I perform additional analysis 
                                                 
4  To measure agents’ attributions of control in the uncertain condition, agents answer the following 
questions using an 11 point Likert scale: “When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points to participant 
B, how likely do you believe it was that the minimum transfer was forced by Participant B rather than the 
computer?” and “When you were free to transfer any number of points to participant B, how likely do you 
believe it was that Participant B chose not to force the minimum transfer rather than the computer?”  The 
end points of the scale indicate agreement that Participant B (the computer) definitely imposed (chose not 
to impose) the minimum transfer requirement.  The mid-point indicates that it was equally likely that the 
control was imposed by either Participant B or the computer. 
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using information collected from agents in the post experimental questionnaire.  I employ 
structural equation modeling, using AMOS, to investigate the effects of the control 
source conditions on several factors that could influence agents’ transfer decisions.  
Specifically, I test the assumptions that agents’ transfers are driven by the extent to which 
they feel trusted by the principal.  Further, I examine whether agents purposefully reward 
principals when the control is not imposed or punish principals when the control is in 
place.  I also examine a potential alternative explanation for agents’ low transfers when a 
control is imposed – the possibility that agents believe the principals only expect them to 
transfer 10 points, and therefore are acting in line with the principals’ expectations. 
Figure 8 presents the results of the structural-equations analysis describing agents’ 
behavior when the control is imposed.  I first conduct a test of the goodness of fit.  The 
Tucker-Lewis Index, a measure of the proportion of improvement of the fit of the model 
over a null model, is 112 percent, which is well above the generally accepted cutoff value 
of 90 percent (Kline 1998, p. 131).  I confirm the model’s goodness of fit with a 
conventional χ2 test (χ2 = 2.38, p = 0.50) and an Incremental Fit Index (102 percent).  
Thus, the overall model describes the relationships in the data well. 
  The coefficient on the variables associated with Link 1 indicates that the source 
of control has a significant effect on the extent to which agents feel trusted by principals 
(as described using the Force-Trust Factor).  I calculate a Force-Trust Factor for each 
agent based upon their responses to four related questions in the post experimental 
questionnaire regarding their perceptions of principals’ beliefs about their 
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trustworthiness, generosity, and fairness, as well as principals’ level of trust.5  I perform a 
factor analysis on these four questions (untabulated), which reveals that these questions 
describe a single underlying factor.  I interpret this factor as the extent to which an agent 
feels trusted by the principal.  Using the Jonckheere-Terpstra Test for ordered differences 
(untabulated), I confirm that agents’ feel least trusted when a control is implemented in 
the endogenous control condition, followed by the uncertain condition.  Agents feel the 
most trusted in the exogenous control condition (Z = 1.33, p <.01).  
In this model, I also examine two other factors that potentially influence agents’ 
generosity to principals.  Link 2 examines the relationship between the control source and 
agents’ desire to (intentionally) punish the principal when the control is imposed.  Link 3 
examines whether the source of control effects agents’ beliefs about principals’ 
expectations. The coefficients on Links 2 and 3 are not significant, indicating that the 
source of control does not differentially affect the extent to which agents tried to punish 
principals for the control system or the agents’ beliefs about the number of points 
principals expected them to transfer.  Accordingly, when a control is imposed, only 
agents’ perceptions of being trusted by the principal appear to be differentially influenced 
by the source of the control.  
                                                 
5 Using  11 point Likert scales, agent participants answered the following four questions: (1) When you 
were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you feel like Participant B trusted you; (2) 
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you feel Participant B believed you 
would be a generous person; (3) When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent do you 
feel Participant B believed you would be a fair person; (4) When you were forced to transfer at least 10 




I turn next to the relationships between agents’ beliefs and motivations and the 
number of points agents transfer to principals. The coefficient on Link 4 is positive and 
significant.  Consistent with expectations, this indicates that the number of points agents 
transfer is positively associated with the extent to which they feel trusted.  Further, Link 5 
shows a significant negative relationship between the extent to which agents tried to 
punish the principal and the amount transferred.  I do not find a significant relationship 
for the link between agents’ beliefs about principals’ expectations and the amount 
transferred (Link 6).   
Some prior research suggests that boundary controls, such as the one used in this 
experiment, provide a signal to the agent that the principal has low expectations (Falk and 
Kosfeld 2006).  In experiment 1 the minimum transfer requirement could signal that 
principals only want or expect agents to transfer 10 points.  However, the results of this 
analysis suggest that any such perceptions do not influence agents’ transfer decisions.  
Rather, agents determine the number of points to transfer based on the extent to which 
they feel trusted and their desire to punish the principal for imposing the control system.    
Figure 9 presents the results of a structural equation analysis of agents’ transfer 
decisions when there was no control imposed.  As with the previous model, I confirm the 
model’s goodness of fit with a conventional χ2 test (χ2 = 4.47, p = 0.22) and an 
Incremental Fit Index (95 percent).    
The coefficient on Link 1 indicates that the source of control condition does 
influence the extent to which agents perceive they are trusted by principals, as described 
by the Free-Trust Factor, which is calculated using factor analysis in the same manner the 
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Force- Trust Factor has developed.  Further, the control source condition has a significant 
effect on the extent to which agents try to reward principals for not imposing the control 
system.  However, the model shows that when not controlled, agents’ transfer is only 
influenced by the agents’ perception of trust (Link 4, t=2.37, p <.05).   These results 
again suggest that agents are influenced mainly by their beliefs about principals’ trust, 
and not by their inferences of principals’ expectations.   
5.2.2 Principals’ Controlling Behavior 
Examination of the principals in the endogenous condition, and those in the 
uncertain condition who are permitted to choose whether or not to control indicates that 
principals control approximately 50 percent of the time (see Table 3) and all principals  
impose the control to some extent (>15%).    Further, consistent with H2, the propensity 
to control persists throughout the feedback periods when principals learn that control 
yields a minimal return.  As shown in Table 3, the frequency of control does not vary 
between the no feedback and feedback periods (χ2 =1.21, p=.27).  These findings indicate 
that principals continue to impose the control about half of the time, despite evidence that 
it results in low payoffs.   Further, additional analysis indicates that within the feedback 
periods, principals impose control to the same extent in the first 5 periods (11 – 15) and 
the last 5 periods (16 – 20), indicating that principals do not change their controlling 
behavior after receiving feedback that control yields low agent transfers. 
However, the feedback mechanism used in this experiment (and in experiment 2) 
reports only the points earned during the prior period.  The mechanism does not inform 
principals of the number of points they would have earned had they made a different 
control decision.  Therefore, I cannot conclude that principals ignore information 
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indicating that higher earnings would be available if they were to make different choices.  
It is possible that feedback indicating that agents have transferred the minimum allowable 
points when the control is imposed is consistent with the principals’ concerns that agents 
are opportunistic. 
To examine principals’ beliefs that influence their propensity to control, I test the 
model developed in Chapter 4, relating principals’ extrinsic incentives bias to their 
controlling behavior.  I perform a structural-equations analysis using AMOS (see Figure 
10). I confirm the model’s goodness of fit with a conventional χ2 test (χ2 = 4.83, p = 
0.184) and Incremental Fit Index (.957), which indicate that the overall model describes 
the relationships in the data well (Byrne 2001).  
The focus of this analysis is principals’ propensity to control.  As such, the 
dependent variable is the percentage of periods in which each principal chooses to 
impose the minimum transfer requirement.  Therefore, only principals in the endogenous 
condition and those in the unknown condition who are randomly assigned at the 
beginning of the experiment to be able to impose the control themselves are included in 
this analysis.   
To examine the effect of principals’ beliefs about agents’ incentives, I elicit 
principals’ responses to three questions addressing their beliefs about agents’ 
opportunistic tendencies.6  Using factor analysis, I find that these three questions load 
together on one factor (Belief Factor), which describes principals’ beliefs about agents’ 
                                                 
6 Principals answered the following three questions using an 11 point Likert scale: (1) To what extent do 
you believe Participant A is only interested in earning as many points as possible, no matter what; (2) To 
what extent did you believe that Participant A was concerned with fairness; and (3) When Participant A 
was not forced to transfer at least ten points, how likely did you believe it was that s/he would keep all of 
the points for himself/herself?  
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opportunistic tendencies.  Using this factor, I find that principals’ beliefs about agent 
opportunism influence the perceived riskiness of an uncontrolled interaction both directly 
and indirectly, via the principals’ trust in the agents.  Specifically, Link 1 shows a 
marginally significant positive relationship between principals’ beliefs about agents’ 
incentives and the perceived riskiness of the (uncontrolled) interaction (t= 1.69, p = .09).  
Link 2 shows a significant negative relationship between principals’ beliefs about agents’ 
opportunism and trust (t = -3.85, p <.01), indicating that principals’ trust in agents is 
negatively associated with the extent to which they believe the agents are motivated 
primarily by extrinsic incentives. Link 3 shows a significant, negative relationship 
between trust and the perceived riskiness of the uncontrolled transfer       
(t= -3.17, p <.01).  Importantly, Link 4 shows that the perceived riskiness of the 
uncontrolled interaction is positively and significantly related to the principals’ 
propensity to impose control (t=2.68, p <.05). Interestingly, Link 5 indicates that there is 
no statistically significant relationship between principals’ propensity to control and their 
perception of the riskiness of a controlled transfer (t=.776, p=.438), suggesting that 
principals’ propensity to control is not driven by their beliefs about the lack of risk in the 
controlled transfer, but rather by concern that they will earn no points if they do not 
protect their downside risk.   
These results, coupled with the agents’ behavior, suggest that principals’ desire to 
protect their downside risk leads them to forgo upside potential.  In experiment 2, I allow 





Experiment 1: Effects of Control Implementation on  
Agents’ Transfer & Principals’ Profit 
 
Panel B: Planned Contrasts  
Comparison of Agents’ Transfer with and without Control in each Control Source Condition 
  T statistic  p-value 
     
Endogenous  -1.41  0.08 
     
Uncertain  1.13  0.13 
     
Exogenous  2.34  0.01           
          
(a) Agent responses are collected using the strategy method. For each period, agents indicate the amount to 
transfer as if they were required to transfer at least 10 points and if they were not held to a minimum.   
 
Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous condition, principals impose the control.  
In the Uncertain condition, the agent does not know if the control was imposed by the principal or the computer.  
In the Exogenous condition, the control is imposed by the computer.   
 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for agents’ transfer of points to the principal (Agents’ Transfer) and 
principals’ profit for experiment 1, averaged across periods. Principals’ Profit is calculated as: 2 X points 
transferred by the agent.   
 
Panel B reports the planned contrasts between the amounts of points agents transfer (Agents’ Transfer) if a 
control is and is not imposed in each control source condition.  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Means (Std. Deviations) 
         
 Endogenous  Uncertain  Exogenous 
 N = 16 N = 21  N=17 
 No Control Control No Control Control No Control Control
Agents' Transfera        
    Average 18.33 15.04 17.08 19.37 20.72 26.02 
    St. Dev (4.30) (3.29) (3.70) (2.83) (3.19) (3.18) 
       
Principals' Profit        
    Average 37.55 29.21 38.31 40.46  40.09 57.16 





Experiment 1: ANOVA on Profit 
       
Panel A: Analysis of Variance of  Principal Profit 
       
Variable  df  F  p 
       
Period  19  1.04  0.21 
Control  1  1.29  0.24 
Control Source Condition  2  3.09  0.02 
Control X Control Source Condition  2  4.16  0.01 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance for Principal Profit by Condition 
       
Effect of Control under        
     Endogenous Condition  1  6.51  0.01 
Effect of Control under        
    Uncertain Condition  1  0.35  0.28 
Effect of Control under        
     Exogenous Condition  1  4.33  0.03 
        
 
Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous condition, principals impose the 
control.  In the Uncertain condition, the agent does not know if the control was imposed by the principal or 
the computer.  In the Exogenous condition, the control is imposed by the computer.   
 
Principal profit is calculated as 2 X points transferred by the agent. 
 
Panel A provides the results of the analysis of variance of the effects of control (yes/no), control source 
condition (endogenous/ exogenous/ uncertain) and period (1 – 20) on principal profit in experiment 1.     
 







Experiment 1: Descriptive Statistics for Principals’ Propensity to Control 
 
Table 3 reports the frequency with which principals in the endogenous condition and 
those in the uncertain condition that have the ability to impose the minimum return 
requirement choose to impose the minimum.  Frequencies in both the first 10 periods, 
when no feedback is provided and the last 10 periods, when a feedback report is provided 
after each period, are reported. 
 
   
No 
Feedback  Feedback  
Chi-
Square   
         
Average  Percent Control a        
 All Endogenous  136  124  0.27  
   52.31%  47.69%    
         
         
 Endogenous Condition  91  84  0.43  
   52.00%  48.00%    
         
         
 Uncertain  Condition  45  40  0.43  
   52.94%  47.06%    
         
                 
(a) Average Percent Control is calculated as the percentage of principals who choose to implement 
the minimum transfer requirement in each period.  Periods 1 – 10 do not include feedback; 
feedback is provided in periods 11 – 20.  
 
Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous condition, principals impose 
the control.  In the Uncertain condition, the agent does not know if the control was imposed by 
the principal or the computer.  In the Exogenous condition, the control is imposed by the 






























Figure 6 illustrates the effect of control on agent effort in each control source condition.  Agent effort is 
defined as the number of points agents transfer to principals.  For each condition, the average agent transfer 
amount, with and without control, is presented.   Consistent with H1, agents’ transfers (x) are presented.  
However, principal profit is a function of agent return (∏principal = 2x) and follows the same pattern as 
presented in Figure 6, above. 
 
Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous condition, principals impose the 
control.  In the Uncertain condition, the agent does not know if the control was imposed by the principal or 
the computer.  In the Exogenous condition, the control is imposed by the computer. 
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Figure 7 
Experiment 1: Average Agent Transfer by Period 
Panel A: Average Agent Transfer by Period – Endogenous Condition   
 
         
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Panel B: Average Agent Transfer by Period - Uncertain Condition   
 
         
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Panel C: Average Agent Transfer by Period -Exogenous Condition   
        
 
         
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Figure 7 illustrates average Agent Transfer (points transferred from the agent to the principal) by period in 
each control source condition. 
 
Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous condition, principals impose the 
control.  In the Uncertain condition, the agent does not know if the control was imposed by the principal or 

















Figure 8 illustrates the results of a path analysis examining the factors that influence agents’ transfer to 
principals when a control is imposed.  The standardized path coefficients and corresponding one-tailed 
significance are shown next to each path.  Goodness of fit is measured using the Tucker-Lewis Index (1.12) 
which is well above the generally accepted cutoff value of 90 percent (Kline 1998, p. 131) and confirmed 
with a traditional X2 test (X2= 2.38, p = .50) and Incremental Fit Index (1.02).  ***, **, * indicates 
significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively (one-tailed). 
 
Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous condition, principals impose the 
control.  In the Uncertain condition, the agent does not know if the control was imposed by the principal or 
the computer.  In the Exogenous condition, the control is imposed by the computer. 
 
The Force-Trust-Factor describes the extent to which agents feel trusted when a control is imposed.  I use 
factor analysis to create the Factor from four questions answered by agents on 11 point Likert Scales.  The 
questions are: (1) When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you feel like 
Participant B trusted you; (2) When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you 
feel Participant B believed you would be a generous person; (3) When you were forced to transfer at least 
10 points, to what extent do you feel Participant B believed you would be a fair person; (4) When you were 
forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent do you feel Participant B believed you were trustworthy?  
 
Force_Punish describes the extent to which agents indicate they tried to punish principals when a control 
was imposed. 
Force_Expectations describes agents’ beliefs about the amount of effort principals expect agents to exert. 
 


















Figure 9 illustrates the results of a path analysis examining the factors that influence agents’ transfer to 
principals when there is no control imposed.  The standardized path coefficients and corresponding one-
tailed significance are shown next to each path.  Goodness of fit is measured using a traditional X2 test 
(X2= 4.47, p = .22) and Incremental Fit Index (.95).  ***, **, * indicates significance at the .01, .05, and .10 
levels, respectively (one-tailed). 
 
Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous condition, principals impose the 
control.  In the Uncertain condition, the agent does not know if the control was imposed by the principal or 
the computer.  In the Exogenous condition, the control is imposed by the computer. 
 
The Free-Trust-Factor describes the extent to which agents feel trusted when a control is not imposed.  I 
use factor analysis to create the Factor from four questions answered by agents on 11 point Likert Scales.  
The questions are: (1) When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you feel like 
Participant B trusted you; (2) When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you 
feel Participant B believed you would be a generous person; (3) When you were forced to transfer at least 
10 points, to what extent do you feel Participant B believed you would be a fair person; (4) When you were 
forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent do you feel Participant B believed you were trustworthy?  
 
Free_Reward describes the extent to which agent participants indicate they tried to reward principals when 
a control was not imposed. 
 
Free_Expectations describes agents’ beliefs about the amount of effort principals expect agents to exert. 
 




Principals’ Propensity to Control 
 
           
 
            
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
 
Figure 10 describes the results of the structural equation analysis of principals’ propensity to impose 
control.  Only principals in the endogenous condition and those in the uncertain condition who were 
permitted to choose whether or not to impose control are included in this analysis. 
 
The standardized path coefficients and corresponding one-tailed significance are shown next to each path.  
Goodness of fit is measured using a traditional X2 test (X2= 4.83, p = .184) and Incremental Fit Index (.96).  
***, **, * indicates significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively (one-tailed). 
 
The Extrinsic Incentive Bias factor describes principals’ beliefs about agents’ opportunistic tendencies.  To 
obtain this factor I perform factor analysis on three questions related to the extrinsic incentives bias theory 
developed by Heath (1999).  Principals answered the following three questions using an 11 point Likert 
scale: (1) To what extent do you believe Participant A is only interested in earning as many points as 
possible, no matter what; (2) To what extent did you believe that Participant A was concerned with 
fairness; and (3) When Participant A was not forced to transfer at least ten points, how likely did you 
believe it was that s/he would keep all of the points for himself/herself? 
 
Trust describes the extent to which principals indicate they trust agents to transfer more than 10 points. 
 
The uncontrolled risk impact is calculated as a combination of principals’ beliefs regarding the likelihood 
that agents would transfer more than 10 points and whether agents would return more or fewer points if the 
control was imposed. 
 
Propensity to control is calculated as the percentage of rounds that each principal chooses to impose 
control. 
 
The controlled risk impact is calculated in the same manner as the uncontrolled risk impact, but relates to 
principals belief when a control was imposed.
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Chapter 6: Experiment 2 - Intentions, Control and Risk-taking  
 
Evidence from experiment 1 indicates that principals impose control 
approximately half of the time, despite feedback indicating that it leads to low agent 
transfers.  However, the design of experiment 1 does not allow me to examine the extent 
to which principals’ beliefs about control effectiveness lead them to take risk by 
entrusting resources to agents.  In experiment 2, principals can transfer some of their 
endowment to agents, thereby putting their own wealth at risk.  
Additionally, results from experiment 1 suggest that agents respond to principals’ 
intentions, as signaled by the implementation of a control.  While these results are 
consistent with the intuition provided by FK, a recent study by Houser et al. (2007), 
which incorporates principals’ ability to entrust resources to agents, finds conflicting 
results.  Specifically, Houser et al. (2007) find that intentions do not matter, insofar as 
agents in their study return similar amounts to principals regardless of whether the 
control is imposed endogenously or exogenously.  A variety of differences exist between 
Houser et al. (2007) and experiment 1, including principals’ ability to transfer points to 
agents and the type of control implemented, making them difficult to compare.  In 
experiment 2, I seek to disentangle the effects of intentionality by incorporating 
principals’ ability to transfer points, while utilizing the control mechanism from 
experiment 1 that differentially affects agent effort based upon the principals’ intentions 
in that experiment.  In addition, I investigate whether principals anticipate that agents will 
respond differently to control depending upon its perceived intentionality, adjusting their 
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risk-taking accordingly.  Therefore, experiment 2 specifically addresses H3 and H4 from 
Chapter 4, as well as provides further tests of H1 and H2. 
 
6.1  Experimental Design  
As in experiment 1, I use a 3 X 2 X 2 design, with source of control (endogenous, 
exogenous, or uncertain) varied between participants and existence of control (yes or no) 
and feedback (yes or no) varied within subjects (see Figure 1).  Participants from 
graduate and undergraduate accounting classes (n = 106) are randomly assigned to the 
role of principal or agent at the beginning of the experiment and interact via computer for 
20 periods.  I conduct the study using z-Tree software. 
For all three control source conditions, principals are endowed with 120 points 
and agents are endowed with 100 points at the beginning of each period.  Principals and 
agents are randomly and anonymously paired.  Principals can transfer between 10 and 
120 points to agents (in increments of 10) (y).  Agents can then return any portion of the 
points transferred from the principal back to him/her (x).  All points returned by the agent 
to the principal are tripled by the experimenter and agents keep any points not returned.7  
A control requiring agents to return at least 10 points can be imposed endogenously by 
the principal, exogenously by the computer, or by an unknown source (see Figure 1).  
Agents have the economic incentive to keep all points transferred by the principal.  
If a control is imposed, the agent is required to return at least 10 points to the principal.  
If the control is not imposed, the agent is free to return any number of points to the 
                                                 
7 The multiplier used in experiment 2 is greater than that in experiment 1 to provide a stronger incentive to 
the principal to transfer points to the agent and for the agent to return points. 
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principal, including zero.  Profits for principals and agents, respectively, in each period 
are calculated as follows: 
∏principal  = 120 – y +3x; and 
∏agent  = 100 + y – x,  
 
Analogous to experiment 1, economic theory predicts that agents, who are 
presumed to be wholly self-interested, will return 0 points to the principal if left 
uncontrolled, and 10 points if the control is imposed.  Thus, if no control is imposed, 
principals should transfer 0 points to the agents, resulting in both participants earning 
only their respective endowments.  Alternatively, if a control is imposed, principals 
should transfer only 10 points to agents, insuring themselves a profit of 140 pts (120 – 10 
+ 30) and the agents with their endowment.  However, it is clear that both participants 
can be better off if principals entrust all of their resources to the agents and the agents 
return an equitable distribution to the principals.  For example, if principals transfer their 
entire endowment (y =120) and agents return enough points so that both participants have 
the same profit for the period (x = 55), both participants will earn 165 points  
(∏principal: 120 – 120 + 3 X 55 = 165; ∏agent: 100 + 120 – 55 = 165). 
 As in experiment 1, participants receive no feedback during the first 10 periods.  
Beginning in period 11, the number of points earned is disclosed to participants at the end 
of each period.  After the 20th period, participants complete a post-experimental 
questionnaire.   
After the post-experimental questionnaires are complete, all participants engage in 
a lottery designed to elicit risk-preferences (Boylan and Sprinkle 2001).  Each participant 
is given a set of instructions and a list of 15 lotteries, of increasing riskiness.  Each lottery 
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offers participants the opportunity to earn $2.50 for certain, or to gamble for the chance 
to win $5.00.   For each lottery, participants indicate whether they would prefer to take 
the sure thing or participate in the lottery.  Once all decisions are made, a pre-numbered 
ball (1 – 15) is drawn to determine which of the 15 lotteries will be played.  Any 
participant indicating a preference for the sure thing for that particular lottery is paid 
$2.50.  Other participants’ earnings are determined by the draw of a second pre-
numbered ball (1 – 100).  A winning draw is one where the number written on the ball 
corresponds to the winning probability described for the lottery.  Lottery winnings are 
added to the total earnings for each participant.   
At the end of the experiment, participants are paid for the points earned during 
each period, which are converted to US dollars at an exchange rate of $0.01 per point, a 
$5.00 show-up fee and their lottery winnings. The average payment for all participants is 
$31.71. 
6.2 Experiment 2 Results 
 
6.2.1 Principals’ Propensity to Control and Risk-taking Behavior 
An examination of principals’ controlling behavior indicates that principals who 
are permitted to choose whether or not to control implement the control approximately 
75% of the time.  Recalling that principals controlled approximately 50% of the time in 
experiment when principals did not have the opportunity to transfer resources to their 
agents, it appears that the increased riskiness of experiment 2 increases principals’ 
propensity to control.  Further, as predicted in H2 and consistent with experiment 1, I find 
that principals impose control to the same extent with and without receiving feedback (X2 
= 0.041, p=0.84). 
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The primary goals of experiment 2 are to examine principals’ risk-taking behavior 
in the presence of a control and to determine whether principals effectively anticipate the 
effects of control intentionality on agents’ behavior.  In Chapter 4, I develop several 
hypotheses predicting that the existence and intentionality of control would influence 
principals’ risk-taking behavior.  However, extant theories, the illusion of control theory 
and social projection theory, yield conflicting predictions; therefore, I provide two-tailed 
hypotheses (see Figures 4 and 5).   
The results from experiment 2 are generally consistent with Social Projection 
Theory (Robbins and Krueger 2005), suggesting that principals are able to anticipate how 
control implementation and intentionality will influence agents’ behavior.  Hypothesis 3 
predicts that principals will transfer different levels of points to agents when a control is 
in place as compared to when there is no control.  Table 4, Panel C, reveals that, indeed, 
principals’ transfer amount is influenced by the existence of control.  Specifically, 
principals transfer fewer points (on average) when the control is imposed endogenously 
(F = 39.05, p<.01) and similar amounts regardless of the existence of control in the 
uncertain (F= .75, p=.20) and exogenous conditions (F = .08, p =.38).  Moreover, 
consistent with H4, Table 4, Panel A, shows that principals anticipate that agents’ 
reactions will vary based upon the perceived intentionality of the control.  Specifically, 
when a control is imposed, the average principal transfer is 18.92 in the endogenous 
condition, 30.86 when the control source is uncertain and 24.26 when it is exogenously 
imposed.  Planned contrasts, shown in Table 4, Panel D, indicate that the differences are 
all statistically significant at conventional levels.  Further, a comparison of the amount 
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transferred in the endogenous condition compared to the other two conditions combined 
is also statistically significant (F=16.98, p < .01).  Thus, it appears that principals 
recognize the potentially harmful nature of controls and appropriately believe that it is 
driven by intentionality.  What is more, when they cannot be clearly blamed for imposing 
the control, principals appear to capitalize on this advantage by transferring more points 
to the agent (see Figure 11).   
However, by examining principals’ risk-taking behavior in the first round only, it 
is evident that principals do not immediately recognize how the intentionality of control 
systems influences agent behavior.  Specifically, as shown in Table 5, principals transfer 
similar amounts of points both with and without control in each of the three control 
source conditions in the first round.  None of these differences are significant at 
conventional levels.  However, overtime, principals appear to better anticipate how 
agents might respond to the intentionality of the control system and adjust their transfers 
accordingly.  
One plausible explanation for these results is that principals in the endogenous 
condition self-select into more or less risky decisions based on their risk preferences.  
That is, endogenous principals who are risk averse might be more likely to impose 
control and subsequently take low amounts of risk.  Alternatively, risk-seeking principals 
would be more likely to refrain from controlling agents and take more risk by transferring 
larger amounts of points.   To investigate this possibility, I examine the correlation 
between principals’ risk preference and the frequency with which they impose control.  
Risk preference is determined by their decision in the risky lottery.    Principals’ risk 
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preferences range from 1 – 15, with 15 indicating the highest risk appetite.  Control 
frequency is calculated as the percentage of the 20 experimental periods in which 
endogenous principals impose control.  Correlation analysis reveals that risk preferences 
and control frequency are not significantly correlated (untabulated, p=.295).  Therefore, 
the difference between endogenous principals’ risk-taking behavior with and without 
control is not an artifact of principals’ risk preferences. 
Further examination of the endogenous principals’ risk-taking behavior reveals 
that approximately 50% of principals (8/17) experiment by imposing control in some 
rounds, while refraining from controlling in other rounds. Those endogenous principals 
who experiment with implementing control transfer an average of 45.23 points to agents 
when they do not control and 23.37 points when they impose control.  Paired t-tests 
reveal that these means are significantly different (untabulated, t=-3.295, p=.01).   
I use regression techniques to examine the motivations that drive principals’ 
transfer decisions, thereby examining whether principals’ transfers to agents is are driven 
by their beliefs about the riskiness of this interaction with strategic agents and/or by their 
general risk preferences.  I include principals’ risk preferences as determined by their 
decision in the risky lottery in the analysis, principals’ beliefs about agents’ incentives 
(Belief Factor),8 the control source condition, and control frequency, calculated as the 
                                                 
8 To examine the effect of principals’ beliefs about agents’ incentives, I elicit principals’ responses to three 
questions addressing their beliefs about agents’ opportunistic tendencies.  Factor analysis indicates that all 
three questions load on one factor, which I interpret as principals’ beliefs about agents’ opportunistic 
tendencies. Principals answered the following three questions using an 11 point Likert scale: (1) To what 
extent do you believe Participant A is only interested in earning as many points as possible, no matter 
what?; (2) To what extent did you believe that Participant A was concerned with fairness?; and (3) When 
Participant A was not forced to transfer at least ten points, how likely did you believe it was that s/he would 
keep all of the points for himself/herself? 
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percentage of the 20 rounds with control, in the model.  I estimate the regression as 
follows: 
Average Transfer = α0 + α1Control Source Condition + α2Risk Preference +  
α3Belief Factor + α4Control Frequency + ε  
 
The results of this regression analysis, shown in Table 6, indicate that the 
coefficient on the Belief Factor is negative and marginally significant (p=.06, one- tailed) 
and the coefficient on risk preference is not significant (p=.42, two-tailed).  These results 
suggest that principals’ transfers are not driven by general risk preferences, but are 
instead specifically related to the extent to which they believe that agents are 
opportunistic.  The analysis also reveals a negative and significant coefficient on control 
frequency, indicating that higher principal transfers occur when no control is imposed, 
consistent with evidence from Table 4.  
6.2.2 Agents’ Return Transfers 
In experiment 2, agent returns are on average higher when the control is imposed, 
than when it is not imposed.  As shown in Table 7, in all three source conditions, agents 
return significantly more points, and principals earn more profits, when the control is 
imposed (p<.01 in all condition).  Interestingly, however, agents’ transfers vary between 
control source conditions.  Controlled transfers are the lowest in the endogenous 
condition (10.93) and are significantly higher in the exogenous and uncertain conditions, 
(12.75 and 14.18, respectively).  These results support the supposition that agents do not 
punish principals for imposing control in the exogenous and uncertain conditions.  These 
results are somewhat consistent with H1, in that control imposed in the endogenous 
condition yields significantly lower effort than control imposed by an exogenous or 
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uncertain source (F=7.43, p<.01); however, contrary to predictions, agents exert more 
effort in the uncertain condition than when the control is imposed exogenously.   
However, given that principals’ transfers vary, I next examine the effects of 
control implementation on agent return relative to principal transfers.  To this end, I 
divide the principal transfers into five transfer levels and examine the effects of control at 
each level.  Transfer 1 includes only principal transfers equal to 10 points (the minimum 
amount permitted).  Transfer 2 includes transfers of 20 – 30 points.  Transfer 3 includes 
transfers of 40 – 60.  Transfer 4 includes transfers of 70 – 90, and Transfer 5 includes all 
transfers above 90.   
As expected, agents exhibit positive reciprocity and repay higher principal 
transfers with higher returns.  As shown in Table 8, and illustrated in Figure 12, for all 
three control source conditions, agent returns increase monotonically under both control 
and no control conditions as principal transfers increase.  However, agent transfers under 
control and no control conditions differ by condition at various transfer levels. 
Specifically, Table 8 shows that in all three source conditions, agents transfer 
more points on average when a control is imposed when the transfer is between 10 and 30 
points (Transfer groups 1 & 2).  As transfers increase above 30 points, agents’ responses 
to the control vary based on the perceived intentionality.  Specifically, for transfers of 40 
– 60 points, agents return similar amounts to principals in the endogenous condition, 
although there is still a benefit to control in the uncertain and exogenous conditions.  
Beginning with transfers greater than 60 (Transfer group 4), agents respond negatively to 
control in the endogenous condition.  In the uncertain and exogenous conditions, control 
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continues to improve agent effort until the highest level of principal transfer (Transfer 
group 5), when agent effort is similar with and without control.  The differences in agent 
behavior are further illustrated in Figure 12, panels A – C, which shows a negative effect 
of control only in the endogenous condition when principals transfer a large number of 
points (i.e., at least 50%).  Thus, it appears that controls partially crowd out agent’s 
preferences for positive reciprocity when the control is clearly imposed intentionally and 
the agent can perceive it to be a signal of distrust. 
Interestingly, beginning with principal transfers of 20 points, the average agent 
return with control is always higher under the exogenous and uncertain conditions than in 
the endogenous condition.  This provides further evidence that agents do not punish the 
principals for imposition of the control in these conditions.  However, as transfers 
increase (above 60), I find that agents transfer more points when there is no control 
imposed by the principal in the endogenous control condition (as compared to when no 
control is imposed in the other two conditions).  Thus, while principals may not be 
punished for the implementation of a control in the uncertain and exogenous conditions, 




Experiment 2: Principals’ Transfer Decisions 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Means (Std. Deviations) for Principals' Transfer 
      
  Total No Control Control 
      
Endogenous  33.62  50.04 18.92 
N=16  (20.98)  (36.79) (15.89) 
      
Uncertain  29.99  29.33 30.86 
N=21  (28.94)  (28.20) (29.74) 
      
Exogenous  24.94  25.16 24.26 
N=17  (26.18)  (29.31) (23.05) 
   
 
Panel B: ANOVA of Principals' Transfer by Control Source Condition   
       
Variable  df F  p 
       
Period  19  1.19  0.13 
Control  1  47.87  <.01 
Control Source Condition  2  3.79  0.01 
Control X Control Source Condition 2  9.46  <.01 
       
Panel C: Planned Contrasts        
Comparison of Principals’ Transfer with and without Control in each Control 
Source Condition 
       
  df F  p 
Endogenous  1 39.05  <.01 
      
Uncertain  1 0.75  0.20 
      




Panel D: Planned Contrasts        
Comparison of Principals’ Transfer with Control among Control Source Conditions 
       
  df F  p 
Endogenous v. Uncertain  1 23.67  <.01 
       
Endogenous v. Exogenous  1 4.80  0.02 
       
Uncertain v. Exogenous  1 6.86  0.01 
       
Endogenous v. Other Conditions  1  16.98  <.01 
 
 
       
 
Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous condition, principals impose the 
control.  In the Uncertain condition, the agent does not know if the control was imposed by the principal or 
the computer.  In the Exogenous condition, the control is imposed by the computer. 
 
Principals’ Transfer is the amount of points principals transfer to agents in experiment 2. 
 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) for principals’ transfer of points to 
the agents (Principals’ Transfer) in each control source condition.      
 
Panel B reports the analysis of variance reports the ANOVA results for the effects of control (yes/no), 
control source condition (endogenous/exogenous/uncertain) and period on the amount principals transfer.   
 
Panel C compares the amounts principals transfer with and without control in each control source 
condition. 
 
Panel D compares the amount principals transfer with control in each control source condition to the 





Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Means (Std. Deviations) for Principals' Transfer in   
               First Round Only 
      
  Total No Control Control 
      
Endogenous  18.82  20 18.75 
N=16  (9.93)  (0.00) (10.25) 
      
Uncertain  25.00  23.33 25.83 
N=21  (17.90)  (19.66) (17.82) 
      
Exogenous  25.00  18.75 30.00 
N=17  (26.84)  (13.56) (33.99) 
   
 
Panel B: Planned Contrasts        
Comparison of Principals’ Transfer with and without Control in each Control 
Source Condition (First Period Only) 
       
  Df F  p 
Endogenous  1 0.01  0.45 
      
Uncertain  1 0.07  0.39 
      
Exogenous  1 0.77  0.20 
       
 
Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous condition, principals impose the 
control.  In the Uncertain condition, the agent does not know if the control was imposed by the principal or 
the computer.  In the Exogenous condition, the control is imposed by the computer. 
 
Principals’ Transfer is the amount of points principals transfer to agents in experiment 2. 
 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) for principals’ transfer of points to 
the agents (Principals’ Transfer) in each control source condition in the first period (only)     
 
Panel B compares the amounts principals transfer with and without control in each control source condition 
in the first period (only). 
.   
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Table 6 
Experiment 2: Factors Influencing Principals' Transfer Decision 
    
Regression analysis examines the factors that influence the amount of resources principals transfer 
to agents.  The dependent variable is Average Transfer for each principal.  Risk Preference is 
determined based upon participants' decision in risky gamble conducted after the main experiment.  
Belief Factor calculated based on factor analysis of three questions regarding principals' beliefs 
about agents' interest in earning points, concerns for fairness and the likelihood agents would keep 
all transferred points.  Control Frequency is calculated as the percentage of the 20 rounds of play 
that were controlled. p values are two-tailed unless a directional prediction is provided. 
    
Variable Prediction  T stat.  p value 
Control Source Condition ? -1.11 .27 
    
Risk Preference ? 0.82 .42 
    
Belief Factor - -1.6 .06 
    




Experiment 2: Agents’ (Return) Transfers & Profit 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
         
 Endogenous  Uncertain  Exogenous 
 N=17 N=18 N=18 
 No Control Control No Control Control No Control Control
Agents’ Transfer 4.74 10.93  8.53 14.18 6.04 12.75 
(St. Dev) (9.17) (4.80)  (14.46) (11.78) (12.61) (10.14) 
        
Agents’ Profit 137.61 108.30 118.21 116.4  118.78 112.70 
(St. Dev) (24.85) (14.71) (22.20) (24.98)  (23.75) (19.97) 
        
Principals’ Profit 117.84 132.30 124.28 132.08  113.38 132.06 
(St Dev) (38.53) (13.39) (30.46) (32.08)  (36.25) (21.01)  
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance of Agents' Forced Transfer by Condition 
Variable  Df F  P 
Period  19  0.64  0.44 
Control Source Condition  2  13.12  <.01 
Principals' Transfer  11  52.33  <.01 
Control Source Condition*Transfer  20  3.57  <.01 
 
Panel C: Analysis of Variance of Agents' Free Transfer by Condition  
Variable  df F  P 
Period  19  0.56  0.47 
Control Source Condition  2  0.63  0.27 
Principals' Transfer  11  93.66  <.01 
Control Source Condition*Transfer  20  2.52  <.01 
 
Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous condition, principals impose the 
control.  In the Uncertain condition, the agent does not know if the control was imposed by the principal or 
the computer.  In the Exogenous condition, the control is imposed by the computer. 
 
Principal profit = 120 – y + 3x; and Agent profit = 100 +y- x; where y = the number of points the principal 
transfers to the agent, and x = the number of points the agent returns to the principal. 
 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for agents’ transfer of points to the principals (Agents’ Transfer) and 
agents’ profit, and principals’ profit.   
Panel B provides analysis of the variance of agents’ transfer of points if a minimum of 10 point transfer is 
required. 




Experiment 2: Agents’ (Return) Transfer by Principal Transfer 
 
Table 8 reports the amounts agents return to principals partitioned by the number of points principals transferred to the agents 
(Transfer groups).  Agents’ returns are reported for each condition, with and without control.  Transfer groups are determined as 
follows:  Transfer group 1 = 10 point transfer; Transfer group 2 = 20 - 30 pts, Transfer group 3 = 40 - 60 points, Transfer group 
4 = 70 - 90 points, Transfer group 5 = 100 - 120 points.  Associated p-values are two-tailed and indicate the differences between 
the controlled and uncontrolled return amounts. 
            
 Endogenous   Uncertain   Exogenous  
 N=17   N=18   N=18  
 No Control Control p value No Control Control p value 
No 
Control Control p value
Transfer 1 1.22 10.01 <.01 2.15 10.00 <.01 1.44 10.15 <.01 
 (2.57) (0.00)  (3.14) (0.00)  2.40 (0.00)  
          
Transfer 2 5.81 10.61 <.01 6.14 11.73 <.01 5.49 10.83 <.01 
 (6.00) (2.30)  (6.63) (4.32)  (5.82) (3.60)  
          
Transfer 3 10.45 11.77 0.06 15.69 18.19 0.02 13.88 17.38 <.01 
 (8.74) (3.77)  (13.18) (11.80)  (14.66) (11.62)  
          
Transfer 4 23.60 12.94 <.01 20.24 24.29 <.01 22.29 24.52 0.01 
 (22.52) (5.77)  (20.87) (19.16)  (21.85) (19.67)  
          
Transfer 5 44.32 31.30 <.01 38.11 37.78 0.42 31.77 32.89 0.16 
 (20.13) (21.15)  (30.40) (26.36)  (33.08) (30.35)  
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Figure 11 












Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous Condition principals impose the 
control.  In the Uncertain Condition the agent does not know if the principal or computer imposed the 
























Experiment 2: Average Agent (Return) Transfer by Principal Transfer 
 
Panel A: Average Agent (Return) Transfer by Principal Transfer - Endogenous Condition
Panel A: Average Agent (Return) Transfer by Principal Transfer - Uncertain Condition







































































Figure 12 illustrates Agents’ (Return) Transfer, the points transferred back from the agent to the principal, for 
each level of Principal Transfer.  Principal Transfer is divided into 5 groups: Tran1 = 10 pts, Tran 2 = 20-30 pts, 
Tran3 = 40 – 60 pts., Tran 4 = 70 – 90 pts., Tran 5 = 100 – 120 pts. 
 
Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous Condition principals impose the control.  
In the Uncertain Condition the agent does not know if the principal or computer imposed the control.  In the 
Exogenous condition the control is imposed by the computer. 
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Chapter 7: Experiment 3 - Intentions, Control and Risk-taking in a Single Period 
7.1 Experiment 3 Design 
 
The goal of experiment 3 is to provide a more careful examination of the beliefs 
and motivations that influence agent effort and principal risk-taking behavior in the 
presence of control.  To this end, I conduct a two-stage game designed to replicate the 
interactions of experiment 2, but without providing feedback to the participants before I 
collect process data using psychological questionnaires.   Specifically, I employ a 3 X 2 
+1 experimental design with source of control (endogenous, exogenous or uncertain) and 
existence of control (yes or no) varied between subjects and the possibility of control (yes 
or no) varied within subjects.   
As in experiment 2, participants are randomly assigned to the role of either 
principal or agent and are randomly and anonymously paired.  Experiment 3 consists of 
two stages, in which participants interact in a trust game, similar to that employed in 
experiment 2 (see Figure 1).  Principals, endowed with 120 points, are able to transfer a 
portion of their endowment (10 – 120 points) to agents and the agents can return any 
portion of these points back to the principal.  Points returned by the agent to the principal 
are tripled by the experimenter.  An important departure from experiment 2 is that in one 
stage there is no control system available to the principal.  However, in the other stage a 
control system may be imposed endogenously by the principal, exogenously by the 
computer, or by an uncertain source, either the principal or the computer.  This design 
allows me to examine principals’ perception of the riskiness of the interaction when it is 
uncontrolled and to determine whether the implementation of the control, and its 
intentionality, changes principals’ risk-taking behavior.  Further, I am able to investigate 
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whether the existence of the control system in all periods in experiments 1 and 2 creates a 
framing effect, causing principals and agents to behave more strategically than they 
would if control were not introduced immediately, as suggested by Taylor and 
Bloomfield (2007).  
Between stage one and stage two, participants complete an experimental 
questionnaire.  Agents respond to questions regarding the extent to which they feel 
trusted by their partner and regarding their decision to transfer points to their partner.  
Principal participants are asked questions regarding the trustworthiness of their partner 
and their decision to entrust resources to their partner.  Following the second stage, 
participants answer similar questionnaires; however, these questionnaires also address 
participants’ beliefs about the implementation of the control system (if applicable). 
Finally, participants participate in lottery phase similar to that conducted in experiment 2 
so that I can measure risk preferences.   
I conduct 9 experimental sessions – 3 for each control source condition.  The 
order of the stages is counter-balanced between sessions such that approximately two-
thirds (one-third) of participants interact in the stage without the possibility of control 
first (second), followed (preceded) by the stage when control is introduced. 
In experiment 3, the interactions between the principal and agents are the same as 
those undertaken during experiment 2.  However, by collecting measures of participants’ 
beliefs before any feedback is provided, I am able to corroborate the results of 
experiments 1 and 2, which suggest that principals’ impose controls due to their beliefs 
about agents’ tendencies to be opportunistic. 
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7.2 Experiment 3 - Results 
Participants (N = 106) were recruited from the same population as those involved 
in experiments 1 and 2.  A comparison of demographic statistics reveals no statistically 
significant differences between the participants from experiments 1, 2 or 3.   
7.2.1 Principals’ Risk-taking 
I first examine principals’ risk-taking in the stage in which the control system is 
available (for comparison with experiment 2).  Results reveal that on average principals 
take more risk, in all conditions, when there is no control imposed as compared to when a 
control is imposed.  These differences are all statistically significant at conventional 
levels (see Table 9).  At first, these results appear inconsistent with the results from 
experiment 2, in which I find that principals take greater risk when the have chosen not to 
impose a control in the endogenous condition, but take similar amounts of risk regardless 
of whether or not a control is imposed in the uncertain and exogenous conditions.  
However, further examination of principals’ risk-taking behavior in experiment 3 reveals 
that the significant differences in the uncertain and exogenous conditions are driven by 
the behavior of those principals who interacted in the first stage without control available 
(or introduced).   That is, principals in the uncertain and exogenous conditions transferred 
significantly more resources to agents if the control system was not introduced in the first 
stage than did those principals who had a control available immediately. 
These results are consistent with the notion that controls can create an initial 
framing effect  (Taylor and Bloomfield 2007).  That is, when principals are aware that a 
control is available, it is likely that the control acts as a cue that they are not participating 
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in a cooperative environment and therefore are more skeptical about entrusting resources 
to the agents.  
A primary goal of experiment 3 is to confirm the psychological processes that 
influence principals’ control decisions and their risk-taking behavior.  In the previous 
experiments, I examine principals’ propensity to control over the course of 20 periods, 
while receiving feedback about the effect of the control decision on agents’ responses.  
Alternatively, in experiment 3, I examine the decision to impose a control system in a 
single period, without any feedback.  This design allows me to clarify the factors that 
motivate principals’ initial control decisions. 
As described in chapter 3, I expect principals’ beliefs about the opportunistic 
tendencies of agents to influence the perceived riskiness of the principal/ agent 
interaction, which in turn is likely to influence the decision of whether or not to impose 
the control.  Further, I expect that the relationship between principals biased beliefs about 
agents’ opportunism and their implementation of the control to be mediated by the 
principals’ trust in agents’ behavior (see Figure 3).   
I use logistic regression analysis to test these predictions.  Logistic regression is 
appropriate because the dependent variable, control, is categorical – coded 1 if a control 
is imposed and 0 if there is no control.  Because I am examining the principals’ 
propensity to impose control, only principals from the endogenous condition and those in 
the uncertain condition who are allowed to select control are included in the analysis.  I 
estimate the logistic regression as follows: 
Control = α0 + α1Belief Factor + α2Trust+ α3RiskImpact + ε  
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 The results of this regression are consistent with the results of the path analysis 
performed for experiment 1 (see Table 10).  That is, principals’ propensity to control is 
positively associated with principals’ beliefs that agents are primarily motivated by 
extrinsic incentives (p=.07) and by the perceived riskiness of the interaction (p=.03).  
Further, the extent to which principals believe agents are trustworthy is negatively related 
to principals’ controlling behavior (p=.04).9  
 Next I use regression analysis to determine the factors that influence the number 
of points principals transfer to agents.  Consistent with experiment 2, the regression 
includes principals’ risk preferences, as measured by their decisions during the lottery, as 
well as the Belief Factor, calculated as described previoulsy, perceived risk, a dummy 
variable indicating whether or not a control is imposed, and the control source condition.  
I also include the amount principals’ transfer in the stage in which control is not 
available, as I expect that each principal's risk-taking will be correlated across stages.  
Thus, I estimate the following model: 
ControlTransfer = α0 + α1Belief Factor + α2RiskPerception + 
α3RiskPreference+α4Condition + α5Control+ 6NoControlTransfer+ ε  
 
 Results, shown in Table 11, are consistent with experiment 2 and indicate that 
principals’ risk-taking is influenced primarily by their beliefs regarding agents’ 
                                                 
9 I also test the following logistic regression model omitting the trust variable to determine whether the 
current model provides the best fit.: Control = α0 + α1Belief Factor + α2RiskImpact + ε.   Comparison of 
AIC, SC and -2 Log L statistics for the two models suggests that the model including trust is a better fit and 
therefore describes the results more accurately.  Importantly, when Trust is omitted from the model, the 
Belief Factor and Risk Impact no longer have a significant effect on the principals’ propensity to control.  
This further confirms the results of the path analysis in experiment 1, which indicates that trust (partially) 
mediates the relationship between principals’ beliefs about agents’ incentives and the perceived riskiness of 
the encounter.  However, it appears that when principals are only interacting with agents 1 time, trust 
becomes even more important to their control decision. 
96 
opportunism (t=-2.00, p =.03) and the riskiness of the interaction (t=-2.23, p=.02).  Not 
surprisingly, I also find that the existence of the control and principals’ level of transfer in 
the stage without control are significantly related to their transfer in the control stage.   
 In sum, tests of beliefs and motivations that influence principals’ behavior in 
experiment 3 generally confirm the results from experiments 1 and 2.  Principals impose 
controls because they believe agents to be primarily motivated by extrinsic incentives. 
Further, these beliefs and the perceived riskiness of the interaction influence principals’ 
level of risk-taking when the control is imposed.  However, although principals 
overwhelmingly impose control, they (generally) take less risk when a control is imposed 
than when there is no control.  Thus, principals appear to impose control to mitigate the 
downside risk that agents will be entirely opportunistic, but knowingly sacrifice some of 
the upside potential that might be gained if they refrained from controlling. 
Next, I examine agents’ behavior in this single shot experiment. 
7.2.2 Agents’ Return Transfers 
In experiment 3, average agent returns are higher when a control is imposed than 
when it is not (see Table 12, Panel A), but these differences are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  Further, on average, agent returns do not vary across 
the three control source conditions (see Table 12, Panel B).  However, because principals 
transfer points to agents in experiment 3, agents are influenced by both the amount 
transferred from the principal and whether or not a control is imposed, simultaneously.  
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the interactive effects of control intentionality and 
the amount transferred by the principal.  To this end, I divide observations into groups 
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based on the amount transferred by the principals.  “Transfer 1” includes only principal 
transfers equal to 10 points (the minimum amount permitted). “Transfer 2” includes 
transfers of 20 – 60 points.  “Transfer 3” includes all transfers greater than 60 points 
(greater than 50% of the principals’ endowment).10   
As expected, agents generally exhibit positive reciprocity and repay higher 
principal transfers with higher returns. As shown in Table 13, for all three control source 
conditions, agent returns increase monotonically under both control and no control 
conditions as principal transfers increase.  However, agent transfers under control and no 
control conditions differ by condition at various transfer levels.  Specifically, Table13 
shows that in all three source conditions, agents return, on average, more points when a 
control is imposed when the transfer is between 10 and 60 points (Transfer groups 1 & 
2).  As transfers increase above 60 points, agents’ responses to the control vary based on 
the perceived intentionality.  Specifically, in the endogenous condition, agents return 
significantly more points to principals who do not impose control than to principals who 
do (t =-2.61, p =.08).  However, in the uncertain and exogenous control condition, 
agents’ returns do not significantly differ between principals who have control imposed 
and those who do not. (See Figure 13 for graphical representation) 
 I employ structural equation modeling using AMOS to investigate the underlying 
mechanisms that influence agents’ behavior when controls are imposed.  Drawing from 
                                                 
10 Because each principal makes only 1 transfer in experiment 3, as compared to 20 transfers in experiment 
2, I partition the sample into slightly larger transfer groups than used in experiment 2.  Using the finer 
transfer group divisions from experiment 2 yields several groups containing only 1 observation which 
results in insufficient power for statistical analysis. 
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the results of experiment 1, I incorporate agents’ perceptions about principals’ trust and 
agents’ intentions to punish principals who do not trust them (see Figure 14). 
I first conduct a test of the goodness of fit.  The Tucker-Lewis Index, a measure of 
the proportion of improvement of the fit of the model over a null model, is 119 percent, 
which is above the generally accepted cutoff value of 90 percent (Kline 1998, p. 131).  I 
confirm the model’s goodness of fit with a conventional χ2 test (χ2 = .251, p = 0.62) and 
an Incremental Fit Index (102 percent).  Thus, the overall model describes the 
relationships in the data well. 
  The coefficient on the variables associated with Link 1 indicates that the source 
of control condition does not directly influence agents’ beliefs about being trusted by the 
principal (as described using the Force-Trust Factor).  I calculate a Force-Trust Factor for 
each agent based upon their responses to four, related questions in the post experimental 
questionnaire, regarding their perceptions of principals’ beliefs about their 
trustworthiness, generosity, and fairness, as well as principals’ level of trust.11  I perform 
a factor analysis on these four questions (untabulated), which reveals that these questions 
describe a single underlying factor.  I interpret this factor as the extent to which an agent 
feels trusted by the principal.   
                                                 
11 Using  11-point Likert scales, agent participants answered the following four questions: (1) When you 
were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you feel like Participant B trusted you; (2) 
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you feel Participant B believed you 
would be a generous person; (3) When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent do you 
feel Participant B believed you would be a fair person; (4) When you were forced to transfer at least 10 




The coefficient on Link 2 indicates that the source of control condition has a 
significant negative effect on agents’ desire to punish controlling principals.  This 
suggests that agents are more likely to try to intentionally punish principals who have 
chosen to impose control, and are less likely to punish principals who are subject to an 
exogenous control mechanism, or for whom the source of control is uncertain.  Further, 
Link 3 indicates that there is a negative relationship between the extent to which agents 
feel trusted and their desire to punish controlling principals.  Link 4 indicates that the 
amount that agents return to principals is, significantly influenced by the extent to which 
they feel trusted by the principal (irrespective of the control condition).  Finally, Link 5 
indicates that there is no significant relationship between agents’ intention to punish 
controlling principals and the actual amount they return.  
In summary, results from this analysis indicate that agents’ behavior when 
controlled is determined by the extent to which they feel trusted by the principal – such 
that those agents who believe principals find them to be trustworthy return higher 
amounts of resources to those principals.  The effect of trust appears to be unintentional, 
as I find no significant relationship between agents’ intent to punish controlling principals 
and the amount returned, and the effect is robust across all conditions.  Therefore, 
consistent with the results of the previous experiments, I conclude that agents’ behavior 
in the presence of control results from agents’ beliefs about being trusted by the principal. 
In sum, experiment 3 confirms the underlying psychological mechanisms that 
influence principal and agent behavior when a control is imposed.  That is, principals 
choose to impose control due to their beliefs about opportunistic tendencies, but expect 
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that agents might be offended by the control.  Therefore, principals take less risk when a 
control is imposed than when agents are not controlled.  This suggests that principals are 
most concerned with mitigating their downside risk, and are willing to forego the upside 
potential that might be available if agents are left to adhere to their own social principals.  
However, experiment 3 adds some insights regarding principals’ ability to anticipate 
agents’ differential responses to the intentionality of control.  Specifically, it appears that 
principals do not immediately recognize that agents will not respond as negatively to a 
control that is not perceived to be an intentional signal of distrust.   
Experiment 3 also confirms that formal controls can crowd out agents’ intrinsic 
motivation to exhibit positive reciprocity when the control can be clearly perceived as an 
intentional signal of the principals’ distrust.  Further, agents respond differently to control 





Panel B: Analysis of Variance of Principals' Transfer by Condition 
        
Variable  df MS F  p 
         
Control  1  5491.39  5.04  0.01 
Condition  1  215.38  0.20  0.33 
Control X Condition  1  811.71  0.75  0.19 




Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous condition, principals impose the 
control.  In the Uncertain condition, the agent does not know if the control was imposed by the principal or 
the computer.  In the Exogenous condition, the control is imposed by the computer. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Means (Std. Dev) for Principals' Transfer 
      
  Total No Control Control 
      
Endogenous 40.00 71.67 22.73 
  (31.62) (18.41) (21.95) 
  n=17 n=6 n=11 
     
Uncertain 48.89 63.00 31.25 
  (36.60) (42.70) (16.42) 
  n=18 n=10 n=8 
     
Exogenous 53.89 63.33 35.00 
  (42.99) (48.49) (21.67) 




Experiment 3: Factors Influencing Principals' Propensity to Control 
    
Logistic regression analysis is used to examine the factors influencing principals’ decision to impose 
the control system.  Only principals from the endogenous condition and those in the uncertain 
condition who are permitted to choose whether or not to impose control are included in the analysis.  
The dependent variable is Control, which is dummy coded where 1 indicates that the principal chose 
to imposed control when it was available and 0 indicates the principal refrained from controlling.  
The Belief Factor is calculated based on a factor analysis of three questions regarding principals' 
beliefs about agents' interest in earning points, concerns for fairness and the likelihood agents would 
keep all transferred points.  Trust is measured using principals’ responses on an 11 point Liker scale 
regarding their trust that the agent would return more than 10 points.  Risk Impact is calculated by 
multiplying principals’ expectations about the likelihood that agents would return more than 10 
points and the amount of points they expected agents to return if a control was imposed (as compared 
to when there was no control).   
    
Variable Prediction  Wald Stat  p value 
    
Risk Impact + 3.66 .03 
    
Belief Factor + 2.68 .07 
    
Trust - -3.19 .04 





Experiment 3: Factors Influencing Principals' Transfer Decision 
    
Regression analysis examines the factors that influence the amount of resources principals 
transfer to agents.  The dependent variable is the number of points transferred by each principal 
during the stage when control was available. The control source conditions are endogenous, 
exogenous and uncertain.  Risk Preference is determined based upon participants' decision in 
risky gamble conducted after the main experiment.   Risk perception is based upon principals’ 
response on an 11 point Likert scale regarding their beliefs about the riskiness of the transfer, and 
is intended to capture principals’ subjective risk perception. Belief Factor calculated based on 
factor analysis of three questions regarding principals' beliefs about agents' interest in earning 
points, concerns for fairness and the likelihood agents would keep all transferred points.  Control 
is a dummy variable coded as 1 if control was imposed and 0 if not.  Transfer in the no control 
stage is the amount of points the principal transferred in the stage when control was not available. 
 p values are two-tailed, unless a directional prediction is provided. 
    
Variable Prediction  T stat p value 
Control Source Condition ? .584 .56 
    
Risk Preference ? 1.08 .29 
    
Risk Perception - -2.23 .02 
    
Belief Factor - -2.00 .03 
    
Control  ? -1.57 .06 
    







 Endogenous  Uncertain  Exogenous 
 N=17  N=18  N=18 
 No Control Control Baseline  
No 




Transfer 12.82 15.47 14.71  19.33 20.56 17.39  16.61 18.89 17.11 
(St. Dev) (16.18) (11.72) (13.23)  (22.97) (21.89) (17.33)  (21.94) (17.54) (27.18) 
            
Agent Profit 143.33 111.82 139.41  134.00 117.60 125.94  142.00 123.25 131.78 
(St. Dev) (8.76) (19.40) (26.99)  (26.79) (15.06) (24.70)  (42.44) (14.00) (26.27) 
            
Principal Profit 133.33 130.00 110.00  140.00 126.25 128.83  117.50 140.00 122.44 
(St. Dev) (28.93) (14.83) (35.83)  (64.47) (15.06) (35.10)  (27.51) (49.57) (63.70) 
 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance of Agents' Transfer by Condition 
     
Variable  F Stat P value 
      
No Control Return  0.44  0.65  
      
Control Return  0.38  0.69  
      




Table 12, Panel A provides descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) for agents’ transfers, and agent and principal profit, when control is 
and is not imposed by control source condition. Further, descriptive statistics from the “Baseline” condition are also provided.  The Baseline condition is 
the stage of the experiment where principals and agents interact without a control being available.  The Baseline stage was counterbalanced across 
experimental sessions.  66% of participants engaged in the Baseline stage first, while 34% engaged in the Baseline condition second.   
 
Table 12, Panel B provides the results of two omnibus ANOVA analyses.  In the first, the dependent variable, “No Control Return” is the number of 
points the agent indicates s/he will return if no control is imposed.  In the second analysis, the dependent variable, “Control Return” is the number of 
points the agent indicates s/he will return if a control is imposed.  Both analyses indicate that the average amount agents return when control is (or is 
not) imposed does not differ significantly across control source condition. 
 
Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous condition, principals imposed the control.  In the Uncertain condition, the agent 
does not know if the control is imposed by the principal or the computer.  In the Exogenous condition, the control is imposed by the computer. 
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Table 13 
Experiment 3: Agents’ (Return) Transfer by Principal Transfer 
Agents' return by transfer amount in each condition with and without control.  Transfer groups are determined as follows:   
Transfer group 1 = 10 point transfer; Transfer group 2 = 20 - 50 pts, Transfer group 3 > 60 points.  Associated p-values are 
two-tailed and indicate the differences between the controlled and uncontrolled return amounts. 
            
 Endogenous   Uncertain   Exogenous  
 No Control Control p value No Control Control p value No Control Control p value 
Transfer 1 0.43 10.00 <.01 5.00 10.00 0.50 0.34 10.00 <.01 
 (1.13) (0.00)  (7.07) (0.00)  (0.58) (0.00)  
 n=17  n=2  n=3  
          
Transfer 2 11.67 12.17 0.86 11.55 11.82 0.85 6.30 11.50 <.01 
 (8.16) (3.92)  (7.62) (6.03)  (3.37) (6.90)  
 n=6  n=11  n=10  
          
Transfer 3 36.25 30.00 0.08 42.20 44.00 0.37 47.00 39.00 0.37 
 (13.76) (18.25)  (34.08) (31.50)  (17.88) (24.083)  
 n=4  n=5  n=5  
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Figure 13 
Panel A: Average Agent Return by Transfer Group - Endogenous Condition
Panel B: Average Agent Return by Transfer Group - Uncertain Condition




















































   
   
Figure 13 illustrates Agents’ (Return) Transfer, the points transferred back from the agent 
to the principal, for each level of Principal Transfer.  Principal Transfer is divided into 
3groups: Transfer1 = 10 pts, Transfer 2 = 20-50 pts, Transfer3 >60 points. 
 
Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous Condition principals impose the 
control.  In the Uncertain Condition the agent does not know if the principal or computer imposed the 




























Figure 14 illustrates the factors that influence the amount that agents return to principals when a control 
is imposed.  The standardized path coefficients and corresponding one-tailed significance are shown 
next to each path.  Goodness of fit is measured using the Tucker-Lewis Index (1.19) which is well 
above the generally accepted cutoff value of 90 percent (Kline 1998, p. 131) and confirmed with an 
Incremental Fit Index (1.02).  ***, **, * indicates significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, 
respectively (one-tailed). 
 
Control source conditions are defined as follows: In the Endogenous Condition principals impose the 
control.  In the Uncertain Condition the agent does not know if the principal or computer imposed the 
control.  In the Exogenous condition the control is imposed by the computer.   
 
I use factor analysis techniques to create the Force-Trust-Factor from four questions answered by agents on 
11 point Likert Scales.  The questions are: (1) When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what 
extent did you feel like Participant B trusted you; (2) When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to 
what extent did you feel Participant B believed you would be a generous person; (3) When you were forced 
to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent do you feel Participant B believed you would be a fair person; 
(4) When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent do you feel Participant B believed 
you were trustworthy?  
 
Punish describes the extent to which agent participants indicate they tried to punish principals when a 
control was imposed.  
 
Controlled Return is the raw number of points agents indicated they wished to return if a control was 
imposed. 
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 Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation provides evidence from three experiments regarding the 
interactions among control implementation, the intentionality of control and reciprocity 
on agent effort, and principal risk-taking.  In general, my results show that agents respond 
to their beliefs about principals’ intentions when a control is imposed.  In addition, 
principals choose to impose controls to eliminate agents’ most opportunistic actions, but 
appear to anticipate how control intentionality will influence agent behavior and adjust 
their risk-taking accordingly.  
Specifically, I find that when principals cannot transfer resources to agents, 
agents’ effort varies along a continuum based upon the intentionality of control.  When 
the control is known to be imposed by an exogenous source, and thus, agents cannot 
interpret the control as a negative signal from principals, agents exert the highest level of 
effort, as proxied by the amount of an initial endowment that agents transfer to principals.  
When the control source is unknown, and agents cannot clearly interpret the control as a 
negative signal, but also cannot rule out the possibility that it is intentional, agents’ effort 
level is somewhat diminished.  Finally, when controlled, agent effort is the weakest when 
the agent knows with certainty that the principal has imposed the control and can clearly 
perceive the control to be a signal of distrust from the principal.   Further, when a control 
is imposed unambiguously by the principal, it leads to dysfunctional behavior by the 
agent.  That is, agents’ effort is lower than if the principal refrains from controlling.  
Therefore, principals who choose to control earn lower profits than those who leave 
agents’ uncontrolled.  Importantly, when controls are imposed by an exogenous source or 
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the source is unknown to the agent, control benefits the principal because agents’ effort is 
higher with control than without.  Yet, despite evidence of low agent effort when 
principals impose control, my results reveal that principals are often inclined to impose 
the control anyway, and that the propensity to control persists over time. 
When principals are able to put their own wealth at risk in experiments 2 and 3, I 
find that principals recognize the potentially harmful nature of incomplete control 
systems.  Further, over time, principals appear to understand how agents’ beliefs about 
intentionality will influence their response to a control.  Specifically, when controls are 
clearly imposed by the principal, principals exhibit lower risk-taking in the presence of a 
control than when agents’ behavior is unrestricted.  However, when the control is 
imposed exogenously or the control source is unknown, principals exhibit the same level 
of risk-taking with or without the control.  Further, risk-taking in both of these conditions 
exceeds that taken in the presence of a control that is endogenously imposed.  
This study makes several important theoretical and practical contributions.  First, 
it is the first study to consider the effects of intentionality of control implementation on 
the behavior of both the principal and the agent.  Second, this study examines a 
previously unexplored condition in which the control is implemented by an unknown 
source to determine how agents make attributions about the intentionality of the control 
implementation.  Third, it extends prior literature examining the harmful effects of 
control to a multi-period setting in which principals receive feedback revealing that 
endogenous control yields sustained low effort. 
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From a practical perspective, the results of this study will be useful to accountants 
and managers who are responsible for designing and evaluating control systems.  I 
identify specific conditions in which controls contribute to dysfunctional employee 
behavior and describe how management should respond to controls in these settings.  
These insights can be used by management and accountants as they perform risk 
assessments and control evaluations.  The results of this study suggest that the perceived 
intentionality of a control system should be carefully considered when evaluating its 
effectiveness. 
8.1 Limitations and areas for future research  
The current study examines principal and agent reactions to a very specific 
control system, a required minimum transfer from the agent.  While this type of 
behavioral control mechanism is common in practice (for example, budgetary constraints, 
mandatory work hours, etc.), the specific parameters of the control in this study may have 
influenced participants’ behavior.  A different type of control, such as an audit 
mechanism or a larger minimum requirement might differentially influence agent effort.  
For example, if the minimum requirement was considerably higher (requiring 50% or 
more of agents’ endowment) agents might perceive the control itself to be unfair and may 
retaliate by taking advantage of any uncontrolled opportunities, as opposed to rewarding 
those principals who do not control, as agents do in my study. 
Additionally, it is possible that principals are better able to anticipate agents’ 
responses to a control that provides a clear benchmark for the agent than they would be 
for a different type of control mechanism.  For example, principals might be more likely 
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to over-estimate the effectiveness of a control that incorporates a probability of audit and 
a penalty for non-compliance.  If principals believe that type of control would have a 
strong deterrent effect, it is possible that they would exhibit unwarranted risk-taking, 
unlike the principals in the current study.    
Further, the results from this study suggest that agents respond to their beliefs 
about the intentionality of a control system.  Importantly, agents react positively to 
controls if they do not believe that the control contains a negative signal from the 
principal.  Accordingly, proper communication regarding the purpose and benefits of the 
control could improve agents’ responses to formal control systems and reduce the 
likelihood that control systems will crowd out agents’ preferences for social norms. Since 
the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, many organizations have transferred control 
responsibilities to operational managers and operating-unit personnel.  As a result, it is 
likely that individuals who are subjected to control systems have a greater appreciation of 
the purpose and need for these controls.  The results from the current study imply that 
these employees should not be offended by the implementation of the control system 
because they will not view them as intentional signals of distrust.   Further research 
should explore this possibility and determine whether agents’ negative reactions to 
endogenously imposed control can be diminished if agents understand the purpose of the 
control system.  That is, if agents understand the riskiness of the situation, perhaps they 
will not punish the principal for an endogenously imposed control.    
Finally, in this study, principal/ agent pairings are anonymous and reassigned 
every period to eliminate participants’ opportunity to form reputations during the 
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experiment or for outside relationships to influence behavior.  However, clearly, the 
personal relationship between an employee and the employer will influence agents’ 
beliefs about control intentionality, trust and effort.  Therefore, future studies should 
incorporate features that allow the relationship between principals and agents to develop 
and affect their behavior. 
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Appendix A – Experimental Materials for Experiment 1 
 
 
How will you be compensated? 
 
In today’s experiment, you will have the opportunity to earn points based on the choices 
you and others make.  Points will be converted to cash and each point you earn will 
increase your cash payment.  
 
The formula I will use to convert points to cash has the following structure: 
 
US $ Payment = (Points earned X .01) + 5.00 
 
The amount of points and money you earn will be based on the decisions you make and 
the decisions made by others.  Therefore, the exact amount of money you will be paid 
cannot be precisely estimated beforehand.  However, I can tell you that you will be paid a 
minimum of $5 for sure with maximum possible earnings exceeding $40.  You will 
receive your payment, in cash, today before you leave. 
 
The choices you will make during today’s experiment are described in more detail below.  
 
 
Overview of session 
 
This is a computerized decision making study. I expect the entire session to last 
approximately 60 minutes.  The session will consist of 20 periods. 
 
In this experiment, you will assume the role of either Participant A or Participant B.  You 
will remain in the same role throughout the entire experiment. 
 
At the start of each period, the computer will randomly match participants by type (one 
Participant A with one Participant B). Points will be earned based on decisions made 
participants and by outcomes determined randomly by the computer.  
 
The pairings are anonymous and will be reassigned each period.  You will not be told 
who you are paired with either during or after the experiment.   
 
Detailed information about the specific decisions made each period and how points are 
allocated to each participant as a result of his/her decisions is provided on the pages that 






You are Participant A (B). 
 
 
At the beginning each period, every Participant A will receive 120 points. 
 
Participant B will not receive any points. 
 
 
Decision of Participant A: 
 
During the period, Participant A can choose any number of points to transfer to 
Participant B (up to 120).  Every point transferred from Participant A to Participant B 
will be doubled by the experimenter.   
 
Every point transferred from Participant A to Participant B therefore decreases 
Participant A’s income by one (1) point and increases Participant B’s income by two (2) 
points. 
 
The formulas for the each participant’s earnings in each period are below: 
 
 









The following examples will clarify the formulas for earnings: 
 
  Earnings for A Earnings for B 
Example 1 A transfers   0 points to 
B 
120 0 
Example 2 A transfers 20 points to 
B 
100 40 











Decision of Participant B: 
 
In each period, Participant B can determine a minimum transfer before Participant A has 
chosen how many points s/he wants to transfer to Participant B.  
 
In particular, Participant B can force Participant A to transfer at least 10 points to 
Participant B.   
 
However, Participant B can also choose not to force Participant A to any minimum 




In summary, there are two (2) possible cases: 
 
Case 1:   Participant B forces Participant A to transfer at least 10 points to Participant B.  
In this case, Participant A may transfer any whole numbered amount between 
10 and 120 to Participant. B.  
 
Case 2:   Participant B leaves Participant A completely free to decide the number of 
points to transfer and does not force him/her to transfer a minimum of 10 
points to Participant B.  In this case, Participant A may transfer any amount 
between 0 and 120 to Participant B.  
{ PAGE APPLIES TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE UNCERTAIN CONDITION ONLY} 
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Decision of Participant B: 
 
At the beginning of the experiment the computer will randomly determine if:  
(1) Participant B makes the following decision in each period, or  
(2) The decision is made by the computer for each period.   
 
If Participant B makes the decision: 
 
In each period, Participant B can determine a minimum transfer, before Participant A has chosen 
how many points s/he wants to transfer to Participant B.  
 
In particular, Participant B can force Participant A to transfer at least 10 of his/her points to 
Participant B.   
 
However, Participant B can also choose not to force Participant A to any minimum transfer and 
thus to leave the decision completely free to Participant A.  
 
In summary, there are two (2) possible cases: 
 
Case 1:   Participant B forces Participant A to transfer at least 10 points to Participant B.  In this 
case, Participant A may transfer any whole numbered amount between 10 and 120 to 
Participant. B.  
 
Case 2:   Participant B leaves Participant A completely free to decide the number of points to 
transfer and does not force him/her to transfer a minimum of 10 points to Participant 
B.  In this case, Participant A may transfer any amount between 0 and 120 to 
Participant B.  
 
If the computer makes the decision: 
 
In each period, the computer will randomly determine whether a minimum transfer is forced, 
before Participant A has chosen how many points s/he wants to transfer to Participant B.  
 
Case 1 & Case 2 are the same regardless of whether Participant B or the computer makes the 
decision. 
 
{ PAGE APPLIES TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE UNCERTAIN CONDITION ONLY} 
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Each period therefore consists of two steps: 
 
Step 1: 
In the first step: 
− If Participant B makes the decision, s/he decides either to force Participant A to a 
minimum transfer of 10 points or to leave him/her free to decide the number of points 
to be transferred. 
 
− If the computer makes the decision, the computer randomly determines whether or 
not to force Participant A to a minimum transfer of 10 points or to leave him/her free 
to decide the number of points to be transferred. 
 
Step 2: 
In the second step, Participant A decides on the amount which s/he wants to transfer to 
Participant B.  This may be an amount: 
− Between 10 and 120, if s/he is forced to transfer at least 10 points to Participant B, 
or 
− Between 0 and 120, if Participant A is free to decide the number of points to be 
transferred. 
{PAGE APPLIES TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EXOGENOUS CONDITION ONLY} 
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Role of Participant B: 
 
In each period, the computer will randomly determine whether there is a minimum 
transfer requirement imposed on Participant A, before Participant A has chosen how 
many points s/he wants to transfer to Participant B.  
 
In particular, the computer can force Participant A to transfer at least 10 of his/her points 
to Participant B.   
 
However, the computer may not force Participant A to any minimum transfer and thus 
will leave the decision completely free to Participant A.  
 
 
Each period therefore consists of two steps: 
 
Case 1:   The computer forces Participant A to transfer at least 10 points to Participant B.  
In this case, Participant A may transfer any whole numbered amount between 
10 and 120 to Participant. B.  
 
Case 2:   The computer leaves Participant A completely free to decide the number of 
points to transfer and does not force him/her to transfer a minimum of 10 
points to Participant B.  In this case, Participant A may transfer any amount 
between 0 and 120 to Participant B.  
 
Each period therefore consists of two steps: 
 
Step 1: 
In the first step: 
− The computer determines whether Participant A is forced to transfer a 
minimum of 10 points or is left free to decide the number of points to be 
transferred. 
Step 2: 
In the second step, Participant A decides on the amount which s/he wants to transfer to 
Participant B.  This may be an amount: 
− Between 10 and 120, if s/he is forced to transfer at least 10 points to 
Participant B, or 
− Between 0 and 120, if Participant A is free to decide the number of points 
to be transferred. 
 
After Participant A has decided how many points to transfer to Participant B, the period 
is over. 
 
{PAGE APPLIES TO AGENT PARTICIPANTS ONLY – ALL CONDITIONS} 
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Please take notice:  As Participant A you have to decide on the amount to be transferred 
to Participant B before you know whether or not you are forced to transfer 10 points 
to Participant B.  This means you have to make two decisions.  You will submit your 






So, you will specify how many points you will transfer to Participant B if:  
− You are forced to transfer at least 10 points (case 1), and 
− The decision is left to your free choice (case 2). 
 
Which of the two decisions is relevant for the actual transfer for that period will be 
determined by Participant’s B decision.  If you are forced to transfer at least 10 points to 
him/her, your decision specified for case 1 will count.  If you are free to choose, the 






− During the first 10 periods, there will be no feedback. 
− Beginning with the 11th period, participants will learn the number of points they 
have earned for that period.  Participants will receive this feedback after each 
period for the remainder of the session. 
 
 
Completing today’s Study: 
 
Once all 20 periods are complete you will complete a questionnaire. 
 
When you are finished, please raise your hand and sit quietly. 
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Quiz   
Please solve the following questions.  The answers have no consequences on your 
earnings. Their only purpose is to check that every participant understands the 
instructions. When you are finished, the experimenter will go over the questions with 
you. 
 
1. Assume Participant A is left free to transfer any amount.  Participant A transfers 
22 points to Participant B.  What each participant’s earnings? 
 
Participant A: ____________                       Participant B: ____________ 
 
2. Assume Participant A is forced to transfer at least 10 points to Participant B.  
Participant A transfers 14 points to Participant B.  What are each participant’s 
earnings? 
 
Participant A: ____________                      Participant B: ____________ 
 
3. Assume Participant A is left free to transfer any amount.  Participant A transfers 6 
points to Participant B.  What are each participant’s earnings? 
 
Participant A: ____________                     Participant B: ____________ 
 
4. You will be paired with the same Participant A/B for each period: 
 
TRUE   ______                                         FALSE ______ 
 
 
5. For every 1 point Participant A transfers to Participant B, Participant B earns 2 
points. 
 
TRUE   ______                                         FALSE ______ 
 
{FOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE UNCERTAIN CONDITION ONLY} 
 
6. At the beginning of the experiment it will be randomly determined whether 
Participant B or the computer makes the minimum transfer decision each period. 
 
TRUE   ______                                         FALSE ______ 
 
7. If it is Participant B’s decision, s/he will choose whether or not to force a 
minimum transfer each period. 
 




  EXPERIMENT 1:  
  POST EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AGENTS 
  
When scales are provided, please place a slash mark ( / ) on the point of the scale that 
corresponds to your judgment. 
             
  
Answer the questions in the order they appear. After you have answered a question, 
please do not go back and change your response. 
             
  
When answering the following questions, please try to think about the beliefs, 
expectations and feelings you had when you were making your decisions – that is, 
BEFORE you knew the outcome of these decisions. 
           
  
Please answer the following questions based on your beliefs/actions when you 
were forced to transfer at least 10 points to participant B. 
           
1)  
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did it affect the 
amount you transferred to Participant B? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  Not at All     To a Great Extent 
           
2)  
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, did it cause you to transfer more, 
less or the same amount to Participant B as when you were free to transfer any 
amount? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  
I transferred 
much less   
I transferred the same 
among   
I transferred much 
more 
           
3)  
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you feel like 
Participant B trusted you? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  Not at All     To a Great Extent 
           
4)  
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you feel 
Participant B believed you would be a generous person? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  Not at All     To a Great Extent 
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5)  
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you feel 
Participant B believed you would be a fair person? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  Not at All     To a Great Extent 
6)  
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you feel 
Participant B believed you were trustworthy? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  Not at All     To a Great Extent 
           
           
7)  
When determining the number of points to transfer (when you were forced to transfer 
at least 10 points), to what extent did you punish Participant B because your decision 
was limited? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  
I did not 
punish 
Participant B 
at all     
I punished 
Participant B to a 
great extent 
           
8)  
When you were forced to transfer at leapt 10 points to Participant B, to what extent 
did you try to be fair when choosing the number of points to transfer? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  
I did not try to 
be fair at all     
I tried very hard to 
be fair 
           
9)  
When you were forced to transfer at leapt 10 points to Participant B, how many points 
do you think Participant B expected you to transfer? 
           
                  
              
  10  65   120 
           
           
           




When you were forced to transfer at leapt 10 points to Participant B, to what extent 
did you believe that forcing the minimum requirement was fair? 
           
                  
              








           
           
11)  
When you were forced to transfer at leapt 10 points to Participant B, to what extent 
did you believe that imposing the minimum requirement was justifiable? 
           
                  
              











When you were forced to transfer at leapt 10 points to Participant B, to what extent 
did you believe that imposing the minimum requirement was reasonable? 
           
                  
              










           
           
13)  
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points to Participant B,  describe how 
you determined the number of points to transfer: 
           
           
  
Please answer the following questions based on your beliefs/actions when you 
were NOT forced to transfer at least 10 points to Participant B (i.e., when you 
were free to transfer any number of points). 
           
1)  
When you were free to transfer any number of points, to what extent did you feel like 
Participant B trusted you? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  Not at All     To a Great Extent 
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2)  
When you were free to transfer any number of points, to what extent did you feel 
Participant B believed you would be a generous person? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  Not at All     To a Great Extent 
           
3)  
When you were free to transfer any number of points, to what extent did you feel 
Participant B believed you would be a fair person? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  Not at All     To a Great Extent 
           
4)  
When you were free to transfer any number of points, to what extent did you feel 
Participant B believed you were trustworthy? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  Not at All     To a Great Extent 
5)  
When you were free to transfer any number of points, to what extent did you try to be 
fair when choosing the number of points to transfer? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  
I did not try to 
be fair at all     
I tried very hard to 
be fair 
           
           
6)  
When you were free to transfer any number of points, how many points do you think 
Participant B expected you to transfer? 
           
                  
              
  0  60   120 
           
           
           
           
           




When you were free to transfer any number of points, to what extent did you try to 
reward Participant B because your decision was not limited? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  
I did not 
reward 
Participant B 
at all     
I rewarded 
Participant B to a 
great extent 
           
           
8)  
When you were free to transfer any number of points to Participant B, describe how 













  EXPERIMENT 1:  
  POST EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PRINCIPALS 
           
  
When scales are provided, please place a slash mark ( / ) on the point of the scale that 
corresponds to your judgment. 
             
  
Answer the questions in the order they appear. After you have answered a question, please 
do not go back and change your response. 
             
  
When answering the following questions, please try to think about the beliefs, expectations 
and feelings you had when you were making your decisions – that is, BEFORE you knew 
the outcome of these decisions. 
           
  
Please answer the following questions based on your beliefs/actions when Participant 
A was forced to transfer at least 10 points to you 
           
1)  
When Participant A was forced to transfer at least 10 points, how many points did you 
expect him/her to transfer to you? 
           
                  
              
  10  65   120 
           
2)  
When Participant A was forced to transfer at least 10 points to you, how much did you 
worry that s/he would not transfer more than 10 points to you? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  
I was not at all 
worried     
I was extremely 
worried 
           
3)  
When Participant A was forced to transfer at least 10 points to you, how confident were 
you that s/he would transfer more than 10 points to you? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  Not at All Confident     
Extremely 
Confident 





When Participant A was forced to transfer at least 10 points to you, to what extent did you 
believe it would affect the amount s/he would transfer (as compared to if s/he was not 
forced)? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  
Decrease transfer 
amount to a great 
extent  
Would not increase or 
decrease the transfer 
amount   
Increase transfer 
amount to a great 
extent 
           
           
5)  
When Participant A was forced to transfer at least 10 points, how likely did you believe it 
was that s/he would transfer more than 10 points to you? 
           
                  
              
  0     100 
  Not at all Likely      
Extremely 
Likely 
           
           
6)  
When Participant A was forced to transfer at least 10 points to you, to what extent did you 
believe it would increase the likelihood that s/he would transfer more than 10 points to 
you? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  Not at all     To a great extent 
           
           
7)  
How likely is it that Participant A perceived that you did not trust him/her when s/he was 
forced to transfer at least 10 points? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  Not at all Likely     Extremely Likely 





Please answer the following questions based on your beliefs/actions when Participant 
A was NOT forced to transfer at least 10 points to you 
           
1)  
When Participant A was NOT forced to transfer at least 10 points, how many points did 
you expect him/ her to transfer to you? 
           
                  
              
  0  60   120 
         
           
           
2)  
When Participant A was NOT forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you 
trust him/her to transfer at least 10 points to you? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  Not at all     To a great extent 
           
3)  
When Participant A was NOT forced to transfer at least 10 points, how much did you 
worry that s/he would not transfer more than 10 points to you? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  
I was not at all 
Worried     
I was extremely 
Worried 
4)  
When Participant A was NOT forced to transfer at least 10 points, how confident were you 
that s/he would transfer more than 10 points to you? 
           
                  
              
  0  60   120 
  
Not at all 
Confident      
Extremely 
Confident 
           
5)  
When Participant A was NOT forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you 
believe it would affect the amount s/he would transfer to you? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  
Decrease transfer 
amount to a great 
extent  
Would not increase or 
decrease the transfer 
amount   
Increase transfer 





When Participant A was NOT forced to transfer at least 10 points, how likely did you 
believe it was that s/he would transfer more than 10 points to you? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  Not at all Likely     Extremely Likely 
           
           
7)  
When Participant A was NOT forced to transfer at least 10 points, how likely did you 
believe it was that s/he would keep all of the points for himself/herself? 
           
                  
              
  0  60   120 
  Not at all Likely     Extremely Likely 
           
           
  The following questions relate to the entire experiment: 
1)  
To what extent did you believe that Participant A was only interested in earning as many 
points as possible, no matter what? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  
Participant A was 
not solely interested 
in earning points     
Participant A was 
ONLY interested 
in earning points 
           
           
2)  
To what extent did you believe that Participant A was concerned with fairness (i.e., wanted 
to give you a fair share of the points)? 
           
                  
              
  0  50   100 
  
Being fair was not 
important at all to 
Participant A     




           






Appendix B – Experimental Materials for Experiment 2 
 
How will you be compensated? 
 
In today’s experiment, you will have the opportunity to earn points based on the choices you and 
others make.  Points will be converted to cash and each point you earn will increase your cash 
payment.  
 
The formula I will use to convert points to cash has the following structure: 
 
US $ Payment = (Points earned X .01) + 5.00 
 
The amount of points and money you earn will be based on the decisions you make and the 
decisions made by others.  Therefore, the exact amount of money you will be paid cannot be 
precisely estimated beforehand.  However, I can tell you that you will be paid a minimum of $5 
for sure with maximum possible earnings exceeding $40.  You will receive your payment, in 
cash, today before you leave. 
 
The choices you will make during today’s experiment are described in more detail below.  
 
 
Overview of session 
 
This is a computerized decision making study. I expect the entire session to last approximately 60 
minutes.  The session will consist of 20 periods. 
 
In this experiment, you will assume the role of either Participant A or Participant B.  You will 
remain in the same role throughout the entire experiment. 
 
At the start of each period, the computer will randomly match participants by type (one 
Participant A with one Participant B). Both participants will make decisions and these decisions 
will determine the number of points earned by each participant during that period. 
 
The pairings are anonymous and will be reassigned each period.  You will not be told who you 
are paired with either during or after the experiment.   
 
Detailed information about the specific decisions made each period and how points are allocated 
to each participant as a result of his/her decisions is provided on the pages that follow.  At the 
end, there will be a short quiz on these instructions to ensure your understanding. 
 




You are Participant A (B). 
 
At the beginning each period, every Participant A will receive 100 points. 
 
Participant B will receive 120 points. 
 
 
Decisions of Participant B: 
 
In each period, Participant B has two decisions: 
(1) Participant B can transfer any amount of his points (0 – 120) to Participant A (in 
increments of 10). 
(2) Participant B can require that Participant A return a minimum number of those points to 
him/her.  Each point returned to Participant B is tripled by the experimenter. 
 
More specifically, Participant B can transfer any of his/her 120 points to Participant A in 10 point 
increments.  Participant A will then have the opportunity to return any number of those points to 
Participant B.  Each point returned to Participant B will be tripled by the experimenter.   
 
In addition, Participant B can force Participant A to return at least 10 points to him/her.   
 
However, Participant B can also choose not to force Participant A to any minimum return and 
thus, leave the decision completely free to Participant A.  
 
 
In summary, there are two (2) possible cases: 
 
Case 1:   Participant B forces Participant A to return at least 10 points to Participant B.  In this 
case, Participant A may return any whole numbered amount between 10 and the 
total number of points transferred by Participant B.  
 
Case 2:   Participant B leaves Participant A completely free to decide the number of points to 
return and does not force him/her to return a minimum of 10 points to Participant B.  
In this case, Participant A may return any amount between 0 and the total number 
of points transferred by Participant B.  
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Decision of Participant A: 
 
During the period, Participant A can choose any number of the points transferred from Participant 
B to return to him/her (up to the total transferred from Participant B).  Every point returned from 
Participant A to Participant B will be tripled by the experimenter.  Every point not returned to 
Participant B is kept by Participant A and increases Participant A’s income. 
 
Every point returned from Participant A to Participant B therefore decreases Participant A’s 
income by one (1) point and increases Participant B’s income by three (3) points. 
 
The formulas for the each participant’s earnings in each period are below: 
 
 









The experiment therefore consists of three steps: 
 
Step 1: 
In the first step, Participant B decides either to force Participant A to a minimum return of 10 
points or to leave him/her free to decide the number of points to be returned. 
 
Step 2:  
In the second step, Participant B decides how many of his points (0 – 120) to 
Transfer to Participant A.  Participant B can transfer points to Participant A in increments of 10. 
 
Step 3: 
In the third step, Participant A decides on the number of points which s/he wants to return to B.  
This may be an amount: 
− Between 10 and the total transferred by Participant B, if Participant B has forced 
Participant A to return at least 10 points, or 
− Between 0 and the total transferred by Participant B, if Participant B has not 
forced Participant A to return at least 10 points. 
 
After Participant A has decided how many points to return to Participant B, the period is over. 
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Decision(s) of Participant B: 
 
In each period, Participant B makes the following decision: 
− Participant B can transfer any amount of his points (0 – 120) to Participant A (in 
increments of 10). 
 
More specifically, Participant B can transfer any of his/her 120 points to Participant A in 10 point 
increments.  Participant A will then have the opportunity to return any number of those points to 
Participant B.  Each point returned to Participant B will be tripled by the experimenter.   
 
As described below, Participant A may be forced to return a minimum number of points to 
Participant B: 
 
Minimum return requirement 
Importantly, at the beginning of the experiment the computer will randomly determine if:  
(1) Participant B makes the following decision in each period, or  
(2) The decision is made by the computer for each period.   
 
If Participant B makes the decision: 
 
In each period, Participant B can determine a minimum transfer, before Participant A has chosen 
how many points s/he wants to transfer to Participant B.  
 
In particular, Participant B can force Participant A to transfer at least 10 of his/her points to 
Participant B.   
 
However, Participant B can also choose not to force Participant A to any minimum transfer and 
thus to leave the decision completely free to Participant A.  
 
In summary, there are two (2) possible cases: 
 
Case 1:   Participant A is forced to return at least 10 points to Participant B.  In this case, 
Participant A may transfer any whole numbered amount between 10 and 120 to 
Participant. B.  
 
Case 2:   Participant A is completely free to decide the number of points to return to Participant B 
and is not forced to return a minimum of 10 points to Participant B.  In this case, 
Participant A may transfer any amount between 0 and 120 to Participant B.  
 
If the computer makes the decision: 
 
In each period, the computer will randomly determine whether a minimum transfer is forced, 
before Participant A has chosen how many points s/he wants to transfer to Participant B.  
 
Case 1 & Case 2 are the same regardless of whether Participant B or the computer makes the 
decision. 
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Decision of Participant B: 
 
In each period, Participant B has one decision: 
− Participant B can transfer any amount of his points (0 – 120) to Participant A (in 
increments of 10). 
 
More specifically, Participant B can transfer any of his/her 120 points to Participant A in 10 point 
increments.  Participant A will then have the opportunity to return any number of those points to 





Minimum return requirement: 
In each round the computer will randomly determine whether Participant A is required to return a 
minimum number of the points transferred from Participant B back to him/her.  Each point 
returned to Participant B is tripled by the experimenter. 
 
Specifically, the computer will randomly determine whether Participant A is forced to return at 
least 10 points to Participant B.   
 
However, the computer may also not force Participant A to return a minimum of 10 points and 
thus, leave the return decision completely free to Participant A.  
 
 
In summary, there are two (2) possible cases: 
 
Case 1:   The computer forces Participant A to return at least 10 points to Participant B.  In this 
case, Participant A may return any whole numbered amount between 10 and the 
total number of points transferred by Participant B.  
 
Case 2:   The computer leaves Participant A completely free to decide the number of points to 
return and does not force him/her to return a minimum of 10 points to Participant B.  
In this case, Participant A may return any amount between 0 and the total number 
of points transferred by Participant B.  
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Please take notice:  As Participant A you have to decide on the amount to be returned to 
Participant B before you know whether Participant B does or does not force you to return at 
least 10 points.  This means you have to make two decisions.  You will submit your decision 






So, you will specify how many points you will return to Participant B if:  
− Participant B forces you to return at least 10 points (case 1), and 
− Participant B leaves the decision to your free choice (case 2). 
 
Which of the two decisions is relevant for the actual return for that period will be determined by 
Participant’s B decision.  If Participant B forces you to return at least 10 points to him/her, your 
decision specified for case 1 will count.  If Participant B leaves the decision to your free choice 




− During the first 10 periods, there will be no feedback. 
− Beginning with the 11th period, participants will learn the number of points they have 
earned for that period.  Participants will receive this feedback after each period for the 
remainder of the session. 
 
 
Completing today’s Study: 
 
Once all 20 periods are complete you will complete a questionnaire. 
 




Quiz   
Please solve the following questions.  The answers have no consequences on your earnings. Their 
only purpose is to check that every participant understands the instructions. When you are 
finished, raise your hand and the experimenter will go over the questions with you. 
 
1. Assume Participant B transfers 100 points to Participant A and leaves the return decision 
entirely to participant A.  Participant A returns 22 points to Participant B.  What each 
participant’s earnings? 
 
Participant A: ____________         Participant B: ____________ 
 
2. Assume Participant B transfers 50 points to Participant A and forces Participant A to 
return at least 10 points to Participant B.  Participant A returns 12 points to Participant B.  
What are each participant’s earnings? 
 
Participant A: ____________         Participant B: ____________ 
 
3. Assume Participant B transfers 20 points to Participant A and leaves the decisions to 
Participant A.  Participant A returns 6 points to Participant B.  What are each 
participant’s earnings? 
 
Participant A: ____________         Participant B: ____________ 
 
4. You will be paired with the same Participant A/B for each period: 
 
True: ____________              False: ____________ 
 
5. For every 1 point Participant A returns to Participant B, Participant B earns 3 points. 
 




  EXPERIMENT 2:  
  POST EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AGENTS 
            
  
When scales are provided, please place a slash mark ( / ) on the point of the scale that 
corresponds to your judgment. 
              
  
Answer the questions in the order they appear. After you have answered a question, please do 
not go back and change your response. 
              
  
When answering the following questions, please try to think about the beliefs, expectations and 
feelings you had when you were making your decisions – that is, BEFORE you knew the 
outcome of these decisions. 
            
  
Please answer the following questions based on your beliefs/actions when you were forced 
to transfer at least 10 points to participant B. 
            
1)  
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did it affect the amount you 
transferred to Participant B? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  Not at All      To a Great Extent 
            
2)  
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, did it cause you to transfer more, less or the 
same amount to Participant B as when you were free to transfer any amount? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I transferred much 
less    
I transferred the same 
among   
I transferred much 
more 
            
3)  
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you feel like Participant 
B trusted you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  Not at All      To a Great Extent 
            
4)  
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you feel Participant B 
believed you would be a generous person? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  Not at All      To a Great Extent 
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5)  
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you feel Participant B 
believed you would be a fair person? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  Not at All      To a Great Extent 
6)  
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points, to what extent did you feel Participant B 
believed you were trustworthy? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  Not at All      To a Great Extent 
            
            
7)  
When determining the number of points to transfer (when you were forced to transfer at least 10 
points), to what extent did you punish Participant B because your decision was limited? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I did not punish 
Participant B at 
all      
I punished 
Participant B to a 
great extent 
            
            
8)  
When you were forced to transfer at leapt 10 points to Participant B, to what extent did you try 
to be fair when choosing the number of points to transfer? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I did not try to be 
fair at all      
I tried very hard to 
be fair 
            
            
9)  
When you were forced to transfer at leapt 10 points to Participant B, how many points do you 
think Participant B expected you to transfer? 
            
                    
               
  10   65   120 
            




When you were forced to transfer at leapt 10 points to Participant B, to what extent did you 
believe that forcing the minimum requirement was fair? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
Forcing the 
minimum was not 




            
            
11)  
When you were forced to transfer at leapt 10 points to Participant B, to what extent did you 
believe that imposing the minimum requirement was justifiable? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
Forcing the 
minimum was not 






When you were forced to transfer at leapt 10 points to Participant B, to what extent did you 
believe that imposing the minimum requirement was reasonable? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
Forcing the 
minimum was not 





            
            
13)  
When you were forced to transfer at least 10 points to Participant B,  describe how you 
determined the number of points to transfer: 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
  
Please answer the following questions based on your beliefs/actions when you were NOT 
forced to transfer at least 10 points to Participant B (i.e., when you were free to transfer 
any number of points). 




When you were free to transfer any number of points, to what extent did you feel like 
Participant B trusted you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  Not at All      To a Great Extent 
            
            
2)  
When you were free to transfer any number of points, to what extent did you feel Participant B 
believed you would be a generous person? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  Not at All      To a Great Extent 
            
            
3)  
When you were free to transfer any number of points, to what extent did you feel Participant B 
believed you would be a fair person? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  Not at All      To a Great Extent 
            
            
4)  
When you were free to transfer any number of points, to what extent did you feel Participant B 
believed you were trustworthy? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  Not at All      To a Great Extent 
5)  
When you were free to transfer any number of points, to what extent did you try to be fair when 
choosing the number of points to transfer? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I did not try to be 
fair at all      
I tried very hard to 
be fair 
            
6)  
When you were free to transfer any number of points, how many points do you think Participant 
B expected you to transfer? 
            
                    
               
  0   60   120 
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7)  
When you were free to transfer any number of points, to what extent did you try to reward 
Participant B because your decision was not limited? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I did not reward 
Participant B at 
all      
I rewarded 
Participant B to a 
great extent 
            
            
8)  
When you were free to transfer any number of points to Participant B, describe how you 
determined the number of points to transfer: 
            
            
            
            
  The following questions relate to the experiment as a whole: 
            
1)  
To what extent did the amount of points that Participant B transferred to you affect the number 
of points you returned to him/her? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
The amount 
transferred did not 
influence my 
return decision at 
all      
The amount 
transferred 
influenced my return 
decision to a very 
great extent 
            
            
2)  
To what extent did you try to reward Participant B for transferring a high number of points to 
you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I did not reward 
Participant B for 
large transfers at 
all      
I rewarded 
Participant B for 
large transfers to a 
very great extent 
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3)  
To what extent did you try to punish Participant B for transferring a low number of points to 
you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I did not punish 
Participant B for 
low transfers at all      
I punished 
Participant B for low 
transfers to a very 
great extent 
            
            
4)  
Did the number of points transferred by Participant B or the imposition of the minimum transfer 
requirement influence your return decision to a greater extent? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I was ONLY 
influenced by the 
amount of the 
transfer   
I was equally 
influenced by both the 
amount transferred 
and the forced 
minimum   
I was ONLY 
influenced by the 
imposition of the 
minimum 
            
            





  EXPERIMENT 2:  
  POST EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PRINCIPALS 
            
  
When scales are provided, please place a slash mark ( / ) on the point of the scale that corresponds to 
your judgment. 
              
  
Answer the questions in the order they appear. After you have answered a question, please do not 
go back and change your response. 
              
  
When answering the following questions, please try to think about the beliefs, expectations and 
feelings you had when you were making your decisions – that is, BEFORE you knew the outcome 
of these decisions. 
            
  
Please answer the following questions based on your beliefs/actions when Participant A was 
forced to return at least 10 points to you 
            
1)  
When Participant A was forced to return at least 10 points, how many points did you expect him/her 
to return to you? (Place an "X" next to the best answer.) 
            
  Exactly 10 points    
  More than 10, but less that 1/3 of the points I transferred     
  Exactly 1/3 of the points I transferred     
  More than 1/3 of the points I transferred     
  Exactly enough points so that we would earn an equal number     
  All of the points that I had transferred to him/her     
            
2)  
When Participant A was forced to return at least 10 points to you, how much did you worry that s/he 
would not return more than 10 points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I was not at all 
worried      
I was extremely 
worried 
            
            
3)  
When Participant A was forced to return at least 10 points to you, to what extent did you trust 
him/her to return more than 10 points to you 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I did not trust 
Participant A at all      
I was extremely 
trusting of 
Participant A 
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4)  
When Participant A was forced to return at least 10 points to you, how confident were you that s/he 
would return more than 10 points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  Not at all Confident      
Extremely 
Confident 
            
5)  
When Participant A was forced to return at least 10 points, how likely did you believe it was that 
s/he would return more than 10 points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0      100 




When Participant A was forced to return at least 10 points to you, to what extent did you believe it 
would affect the amount s/he would return (as compared to if s/he was not forced)? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
Decrease return 
amount to a great 
extent   
Would not increase or 
decrease the return 
amount   
Increase return 
amount to a great 
extent 
            
7)  
To what extent did you increase (or decrease) the number of points you transferred to Participant A 
when you forced him/her to return at least 10 points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I decreased the 
number of points 
transferred to a great 
extent   
I did not change the 
number of points I 
transferred   
I increased the 
number of points 





            
8)  
When Participant A was forced to return at least 10 points to you, to what extent did you feel it was 
more (or less) risky to transfer a large number of points (i.e., more than 30 points) than when no 
minimum return was required? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
It was much riskier 
to transfer points 
when I forced 
Participant A to 
return at least 10    
It was equally risky to 
transfer points 
regardless of whether 
or not I forced a 
minimum   
It was less risky 
to transfer points 
when I forced 
Participant A to 
return at least 10 
            
9)  
How likely is it that Participant A perceived that you did not trust him/ her when you forced him/her 
to return at least 10 points? 
            
                    
               
  0      100 
  Not at all Likely       
Extremely 
Likely 
   
  
Please answer the following questions based on your beliefs/actions when Participant A was 
NOT forced to return at least 10 points to you 
            
1)  
When Participant A was forced to return at least 10 points, how many points did you expect him/her 
to return to you? (Place an "X" next to the best answer.) 
            
  Zero points     
  Exactly 10 points     
  More than 10, but less that 1/3 of the points I transferred     
  Exactly 1/3 of the points I transferred     
  More than 1/3 of the points I transferred     
  Exactly enough points so that we would earn an equal number     
  All of the points that I had transferred to him/her     
            
            
2)  
When Participant A was NOT forced to return at least 10 points, to what extent did you trust 
him/her to return at least 10 points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 




When Participant A was NOT forced to return at least 10 points, how much did you worry that s/he 
would not return more than 10 points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I was not at all 
Worried      
I was extremely 
Worried 
4)  
When Participant A was NOT forced to return at least 10 points, how confident were you that s/he 
would return more than 10 points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   60   120 
  
Not at all 
Confident       
Extremely 
Confident 
            
            
5)  
When Participant A was NOT forced to return at least 10 points, how likely did you believe it was 
that s/he would return  more than 10 points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   60   120 
  Not at all Likely       
Extremely 
Likely 
            
            
6)  
When Participant A was NOT forced to return at least 10 points, to what extent did you believe it 
would affect the amount s/he would return to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
Decrease return 
amount to a great 
extent   
Would not increase or 
decrease the return 
amount   
Increase return 
amount to a great 
extent 
            
            
7)  
When Participant A was NOT forced to return at least 10 points, how likely did you believe it was 
that s/he would keep all of the points for himself/herself? 
            
                    
               
  0   60   120 
  Not at all Likely      Extremely Likely 
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  The following questions relate to the entire experiment: 
1)  
To what extent did you believe that Participant A was only interested in earning as many points as 
possible, no matter what? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
Participant A was 
not solely interested 
in earning points      
Participant A was 
ONLY interested 
in earning points 
            
            
2)  
To what extent did you believe that Participant A was concerned with fairness (i.e., wanted to give 
you a fair share of the points)? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
Being fair was not 
important at all to 
Participant A      




            
            
3)  
To what extent did you believe that the number of points you transferred to Participant A would 
affect the number of points s/he returned to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  Not at All      
To a Very Great 
Extent 
            
4)  
Did your decision to impose the minimum transfer amount change over the course of the 
experimental session?  How?  What factors influenced any changes or caused you to continue your 
strategy? 
            
            
            
            
5)  Describe how you determined the number of points to transfer to Participant A: 
            
            
            
            
            




Appendix C – Experimental Materials for Experiment 3 
 
{NO CONTROL STAGE} 
 
How will you be compensated? 
 
In today’s experiment, you will have the opportunity to earn points based on the choices you and 
others make.  Points will be converted to cash and each point you earn will increase your cash 
payment.  
 
The formula I will use to convert points to cash has the following structure: 
 
US $ Payment = (Points earned X .06) + 5.00 
 
The amount of points and money you earn will be based on the decisions you make and the 
decisions made by others.  Therefore, the exact amount of money you will be paid cannot be 
precisely estimated beforehand.  However, I can tell you that you will be paid a minimum of $5 
for sure with maximum possible earnings exceeding $40.  You will receive your payment, in 
cash, today before you leave. 
 
The choices you will make during today’s experiment are described in more detail on the 
following pages.  
 
 
Overview of session 
 
This is a computerized decision making study.  In this experiment, you will assume the role of 
either Participant A or Participant B.  You will remain in the same role throughout the entire 
experiment. 
 
Before you begin, the computer will randomly match participants by type (one Participant A with 
one Participant B). Both participants will make decisions and these decisions will determine the 
number of points earned by each participant. 
 
The pairings are anonymous. You will not be told who you are paired with either during or after 
the experiment.   
 
Detailed information about the specific decisions made and how points are allocated to each 
participant as a result of these decisions is provided on the pages that follow.  At the end, there 






You are Participant A (B). 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, every Participant A will receive 100 points. 
 
Participant B will receive 120 points. 
 
Decision of Participant B: 
 
Participant B has one decision: 
− Participant B can transfer any amount of his points (from 10 – 120) to Participant A (in 
increments of 10). 
 
Decision of Participant A: 
 
Once Participant B has chosen the number of his/her points to transfer:  
− Participant A chooses any number of these points transferred from Participant B to return 
to him/her (up to the total transferred from Participant B).   
 
Every point returned from Participant A to Participant B will be tripled by the experimenter.  
Every point not returned to Participant B is kept by Participant A and increases Participant A’s 
income. 
 
Every point returned from Participant A to Participant B therefore decreases Participant A’s 
income by one (1) point and increases Participant B’s income by three (3) points. 
 
The formulas for the each participant’s earnings are below: 
 
 










The experiment therefore consists of two steps: 
 
Step 1:  
In the first step, Participant B decides how many of his points (up to 120) to 
transfer to Participant A.  Participant B can transfer points to Participant A in 
increments of 10. 
 
Step 2: 
In the second step, Participant A decides on the number of points which s/he wants to return to B.  
This may be an amount between 0 and the total transferred by Participant B. 
 
After Participant A has decided how many points to return to Participant B, all participants will 
complete a short questionnaire. 
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Quiz   
Please solve the following questions.  The answers have no consequences on your earnings. Their 
only purpose is to check that every participant understands the instructions. When you are 
finished, raise your hand and the experimenter will go over the questions with you. 
 
1. Assume Participant B transfers 100 points to Participant A.  Participant A returns 22 
points to Participant B.  What are each participant’s earnings? 
 
Participant A: ____________   Participant B: ____________ 
 
2. Assume Participant B transfers 50 points to Participant A.  Participant A returns 12 points 
to Participant B.  What are each participant’s earnings? 
 
Participant A: ____________   Participant B: ____________ 
 
3. Assume Participant B transfers 20 points to Participant A.  Participant A returns 6 points 
to Participant B.  What are each participant’s earnings? 
 
Participant A: ____________   Participant B: ____________ 
 
 
4. For every 1 point Participant A returns to Participant B, Participant B earns 3 points. 
 
TRUE   ______  FALSE ______ 
 
5. Participant A will know the number of points transferred by Participant B before s/he 
makes the return decision. 
 
TRUE   ______  FALSE ______ 
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You are Participant A (B). 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, every Participant A will receive 100 points. 
 
Participant B will receive 120 points. 
 
Decisions of Participant B: 
 
Participant B has two decisions: 
(1) Participant B can transfer any amount of his/her points (from 10 – 120) to Participant A 
(in increments of 10). 
(2) Participant B can require that Participant A return a minimum number of those points to 
him/her.  Each point returned to Participant B is tripled by the experimenter. 
 
More specifically, Participant B can transfer any of his/her 120 points to Participant A in 10 point 
increments.  Participant A will then have the opportunity to return any number of those points to 
Participant B.  Each point returned to Participant B will be tripled by the experimenter.   
 
In addition, Participant B can force Participant A to return at least 10 points to him/her.   
 
However, Participant B can also choose not to force Participant A to any minimum return and 
thus, leave the decision completely free to Participant A.  
 
In summary, there are two (2) possible cases: 
 
Case 1:   Participant B forces Participant A to return at least 10 points to Participant B.  In this 
case, Participant A may return any whole numbered amount between 10 and the 
total number of points transferred by Participant B.  
 
Case 2:   Participant B leaves Participant A completely free to decide the number of points to 
return and does not force him/her to return a minimum of 10 points to Participant B.  
In this case, Participant A may return any amount between 0 and the total number 
of points transferred by Participant B.  
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Decision of Participant A: 
 
Participant A chooses the number of the points transferred from Participant B to return to him/her 
(up to the total transferred from Participant B).  Every point returned from Participant A to 
Participant B will be tripled by the experimenter.  Every point not returned to Participant B is 
kept by Participant A and increases Participant A’s income. 
 
Every point returned from Participant A to Participant B therefore decreases Participant A’s 
income by one (1) point and increases Participant B’s income by three (3) points. 
 
The formulas for each participant’s earnings are below: 
 
 





Earnings of Participant B = 120 – B’s transfer + (3 X return) 
 
 
The experiment therefore consists of three steps: 
 
Step 1: 
In the first step, Participant B decides either to force Participant A to a minimum return of 10 
points or to leave him/her free to decide the number of points to be returned. 
 
Step 2:  
In the second step, Participant B decides how many of his points (10 – 120) to 
transfer to Participant A.  Participant B can transfer points to Participant A in 
increments of 10. 
 
Step 3: 
In the third step, Participant A decides on the number of points which s/he wants to return to B.  
This may be an amount: 
− Between 10 and the total transferred by Participant B, if Participant B has forced 
Participant A to return at least 10 points, or 
− Between 0 and the total transferred by Participant B, if Participant B has not 
forced Participant A to return at least 10 points. 
 
After Participant A has decided how many points to return to Participant B, all participants will 
complete a questionnaire. 
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You are Participant A (B) 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, every Participant A will receive 100 points. 
 
Participant B will receive 120 points. 
 
Decision(s) of Participant B: 
 
Participant B makes the following decision: 
− Participant B can transfer any amount of his/her points (10 – 120) to Participant A (in 
increments of 10). 
 
More specifically, Participant B can transfer any of his/her 120 points to Participant A in 10 point 
increments.  Participant A will then have the opportunity to return any number of those points to 
Participant B.  Each point returned to Participant B will be tripled by the experimenter.   
 
As described below, Participant A may be forced to return a minimum number of points to 
Participant B: 
 
Minimum return requirement 
Importantly, at the beginning of Part II the computer will randomly determine if:  
(1) Participant B makes the following decision, or  
(2) The decision is made by the computer.  
 
If Participant B makes the decision: 
 
Participant B can require that Participant A return a minimum number of points to him/her. 
  
In particular, Participant B can force Participant A to return at least 10 of his/her points to 
Participant B.   
 
However, Participant B can also choose not to force Participant A to any minimum transfer and 




In summary, there are two (2) possible cases: 
 
Case 1:   Participant A is forced to return at least 10 points to Participant B.  In this case, 
Participant A may transfer any whole numbered amount between 10 and 120 to 
Participant B.  
 
Case 2:   Participant A is completely free to decide the number of points to return to Participant B 
and is not forced to return a minimum of 10 points to Participant B.  In this case, 
Participant A may transfer any amount between 0 and 120 to Participant B.  
 
If the computer makes the decision: 
 
The computer will randomly determine whether a minimum transfer of 10 points is forced.  
 





Decision of Participant A: 
 
Participant A chooses the number of the points transferred from Participant B to return to him/her 
(up to the total transferred from Participant B).  Every point returned from Participant A to 
Participant B will be tripled by the experimenter.  Every point not returned to Participant B is 
kept by Participant A and increases Participant A’s income. 
 
Every point returned from Participant A to Participant B therefore decreases Participant A’s 
income by one (1) point and increases Participant B’s income by three (3) points. 
 
The formulas for each participant’s earnings are below: 
 
 









The experiment therefore consists of three steps: 
 
Step 1: 
In the first step, Participant A is either forced to return a minimum return of 10 points or is left 
free to decide the number of points to be returned. 
 
Step 2:  
In the second step, Participant B decides how many of his points (10 – 120) to 
transfer to Participant A.  Participant B can transfer points to Participant A  
in increments of 10. 
 
Step 3: 
In the third step, Participant A decides on the number of points which s/he wants to return to B.  
This may be an amount: 
− Between 10 and the total transferred by Participant B, if s/he is forced to return at 
least 10 points, or 
− Between 0 and the total transferred by Participant B, if s/he is not forced to return 
at least 10 points. 
 
After Participant A has decided how many points to return to Participant B, all participants will 
complete a questionnaire. 
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You are Participant A (B). 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, every Participant A will receive 100 points. 
 
Participant B will receive 120 points. 
 
Decision of Participant B: 
 
In Part II, Participant B has one decision: 
− Participant B can transfer any amount of his points (10 – 120) to Participant A (in 
increments of 10). 
 
More specifically, Participant B can transfer any of his/her 120 points to Participant A in 10 point 
increments.  Participant A will then have the opportunity to return any number of those points to 




Minimum return requirement: 
In Part II, the computer will randomly determine whether Participant A is required to return a 
minimum number of the points transferred from Participant B back to him/her.  Each point 
returned to Participant B is tripled by the experimenter. 
 
Specifically, the computer will randomly determine whether Participant A is forced to return at 
least 10 points to Participant B.   
 
However, the computer may also not force Participant A to return a minimum of 10 points and 












In summary, there are two (2) possible cases: 
 
Case 1:   The computer forces Participant A to return at least 10 points to Participant B.  In this 
case, Participant A may return any whole numbered amount between 10 and the 
total number of points transferred by Participant B.  
 
Case 2:   The computer leaves Participant A completely free to decide the number of points to 
return and does not force him/her to return a minimum of 10 points to Participant B.  
In this case, Participant A may return any amount between 0 and the total number 
of points transferred by Participant B.  
 
 
Decision of Participant A: 
 
Participant A chooses the number of the points transferred from Participant B to return to him/her 
(up to the total transferred from Participant B).  Every point returned from Participant A to 
Participant B will be tripled by the experimenter.  Every point not returned to Participant B is 
kept by Participant A and increases Participant A’s income. 
 
Every point returned from Participant A to Participant B therefore decreases Participant A’s 
income by one (1) point and increases Participant B’s income by three (3) points. 
 
The formulas for the each participant’s earnings are below: 
 
 










The experiment therefore consists of three steps: 
 
Step 1: 
In the first step, the computer randomly determines whether Participant A is forced to return a 
minimum of 10 points to Participant B or to leave him/her free to decide the number of points to 
be returned. 
 
Step 2:  
In the second step, Participant B decides how many of his points (10 – 120) to transfer to 
Participant A.  Participant B can transfer points to Participant A in increments of 10. 
 
Step 3: 
In the third step, Participant A decides on the number of points which s/he wants to return to B.  
This may be an amount: 
− Between 10 and the total transferred by Participant B, if Participant A is forced to 
return at least 10 points, or 
− Between 0 and the total transferred by Participant B, if Participant A is not forced 
to return at least 10 points. 
 
After Participant A has decided how many points to return to Participant B, all participants will 
complete a questionnaire. 
{ PAGE APPLIES TO AGENT PARTICIPANTS ONLY – ALL CONDITIONS} 
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Please take notice:  As Participant A you have to decide on the amount to be returned to 
Participant B before you know whether the computer does or does not force you to return at 
least 10 points.  This means you have to make two decisions.  You will submit your decision 






So, you will specify how many points you will return to Participant B if:  
− The computer forces you to return at least 10 points (case 1), and 
− The computer leaves the decision to your free choice (case 2). 
 
Which of the two decisions is relevant for the actual return will be determined randomly by the 
computer.  If the computer forces you to return at least 10 points to Participant B, your decision 
specified for case 1 will count.  If the computer leaves the decision to your free choice the amount 






QUIZ: Please solve the following questions.  The answers have no consequences on your earnings. 
Their only purpose is to check that every participant understands the instructions. When you are 
finished, raise your hand and the experimenter will go over the questions with you. 
 
1. Assume Participant B transfers 100 points to Participant A and the return decision is left 
entirely to Participant A.  Participant A returns 22 points to Participant B.  What are each 
participant’s earnings? 
 
Participant A: ____________  Participant B: ____________ 
 
2. Assume Participant B transfers 50 points to Participant A and Participant A is forced to 
return at least 10 points to Participant B.  Participant A returns 12 points to Participant B.  
What are each participant’s earnings? 
 
Participant A: ____________  Participant B: ____________ 
 
3. Assume Participant B transfers 20 points to Participant A and the return decision is left 
entirely to Participant A.  Participant A returns 6 points to Participant B.  What are each 
participant’s earnings? 
 
Participant A: ____________  Participant B: ____________ 
 
4. For every 1 point Participant A returns to Participant B, Participant B earns 3 points. 
TRUE   ______ FALSE ______ 
 
5. Participant A will know the number of points transferred by Participant B before s/he 
makes the return decision. 
 
TRUE   ______ FALSE ______ 
 
{For Uncertain Condition Only} 
 
6. Before you begin, it will be randomly determined whether Participant B or the computer 
will make the minimum transfer requirement decision.   
 




  EXPERIMENT 3:  
  POST EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AGENTS 
            
  
When scales are provided, please place a slash mark ( / ) on the point of the scale that 
corresponds to your judgment. 
              
  
Answer the questions in the order they appear. After you have answered a question, 
please do not go back and change your response. 
            
  The following questions relate to the no control stage only. 
1)  To what extent did you feel like Participant B trusted you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
Participant B did 
not trust me at 
all      
Participant B trusted me 
to a very great extent 
2)  To what extent did you feel Participant B believed you would be a generous person? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
Participant B did 
not believe I 
would be 
generous at all      
Participant B strongly 
believed that I would be 
generous 
            
            
3)  To what extent did you feel Participant B believed you would be a fair person? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
Participant B did 
not believe I 
would be fair at 
all      
Participant B strongly 
believed that I would be 
fair 




            
4)  To what extent did you feel Participant B believed you were trustworthy? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
Participant B did 
not believe I 
would be 
trustworthy at 
all      
Participant B strongly 
believed that I would be 
trustworthy 
5)  To what extent did you try to be fair when choosing the number of points to transfer? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I did not try to 
be fair at all      
I tried very hard to be 
fair 
            
            
6)  
What percentage of the points transferred do you think Participant B expected you to 
return? 
            
                    
               
  0%   50%   100% 
            
         
7)  
To what extent did the amount of points that Participant B transferred to you affect 
the number of points your returned to him/her 
            
                    
               




not influence my 
return at all      
The amount transferred 
influenced my return 
decision to a very great 
extent 





{FOR THE CONTROL STAGE, AGENT PARTICIPANTS ANSWERED THE 
SAME QUESTIONS AS PROVIDED AFTER EXPERIMENT 2} 
8)  
To what extent did you try to reward Participant B for transferring a large number of 
points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I did not reward 
Participant B for 
large transfers at 
all      
I rewarded Participant B 
for large transfers to a 
very great extent 
            
            
9)  
To what extent did you try to punish Participant B for transferring a small number of 
points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I did not punish 
Participant B for 
small transfers 
at all      
I punished Participant B 
for small transfers to a 
very great extent 
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  EXPERIMENT 3:  
  POST EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PRINCIPALS 
            
  
When scales are provided, please place a slash mark ( / ) on the point of the scale that 
corresponds to your judgment. 
              
  
Answer the questions in the order they appear. After you have answered a question, please 
do not go back and change your response. 
                      
1)  
How many points did you expect him/her to return to you? (Place an "X" next to the best 
answer.) 
            
  Zero points     
  Exactly 10 points     
  More than 10, but less that 1/3 of the points I transferred     
  Exactly 1/3 of the points I transferred     
  More than 1/3 of the points I transferred     
  Exactly enough points so that we would earn an equal number     
  All of the points that I had transferred to him/her     
2)  To what extent did you worry that s/he would not return any points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I was not at all 
worried      
I was extremely 
worried 
3)  To what extent did you worry that s/he would not return more than 10 points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I was not at all 
worried      
I was extremely 
worried 
4)  To what extent did you trust him/her to return more than 10 points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  
I did not trust 
Participant A at all      
I was extremely 
trusting of 
Participant A 
            
 
169 
5)  How confident were you that s/he would return more than 10 points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0   50   100 
  Not at all Confident      
Extremely 
Confident 
6)  How likely did you believe it was that s/he would return more than 10 points to you? 
            
                    
               
  0      100 
  Not at all Likely       
Extremely 
Likely 
7)  Describe how you determined the number of points to transfer to Participant A: 
   
  
{FOR THE CONTROL STAGE, PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS ANSWERED 




Appendix D:  Instructions for Risk Preferences Lottery 
 
The next page contains 15 items representing choices between a sure thing 
and a lottery.  For each item, please indicate whether you prefer the $2.50 
for sure or the specified lottery by placing a mark next to your choice.  Be 
sure to make a choice for each of the 15 items. 
 
After you have made your choices, we will randomly select one of the 15 
items for payment by drawing a numbered ball from a container holding 
balls numbered 1 through 15.  For example, if item 1 was selected for 
payment (i.e., the ball with the number 1 was drawn) the lottery has an 85% 
chance of paying $5.00 and a 15% chance of paying nothing; participants 
who chose the sure thing will receive $2.50.  Similarly, if item 12 was 
selected for payment (i.e., the ball with the number 12 was drawn) the 
lottery has a 30% chance of paying $5.00 and a 70% chance of paying 
nothing; again, participants who chose the sure thing receive $2.50. 
 
We will then conduct the lottery for the selected item by drawing a 
numbered ball from the container holding 100 balls numbered 1 through 
100.  For example, if item 12 was selected for payment, participants who 
chose the lottery for item 12 would win $5.00 if the number on the ball 
drawn is between 1 and 30 (i.e., 30% chance of winning).  Alternatively, if 
the ball drawn for item 12 is between 31 and 100 (a 70% chance), 
participants choosing the lottery would win nothing.  Participants who chose 
the sure thing instead of the lottery would receive $2.50. 
 
These extra payments are in addition to anything you have already earned 
from the earlier part of the experiment. 
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PLEASE MAKE ONE CHOICE FOR EACH ITEM 
 
 Sure Thing 
 
 Lottery 
1. _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  85% chance for $5.00 
                  15% chance for $0.00 
 
2. _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  80% chance for $5.00 
                  20% chance for $0.00 
 
3. _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  75% chance for $5.00 
                  25% chance for $0.00 
 
4. _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  70% chance for $5.00 
                  30% chance for $0.00 
 
5. _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  65% chance for $5.00 
                  35% chance for $0.00 
 
6. _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  60% chance for $5.00 
                  40% chance for $0.00 
 
7. _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  55% chance for $5.00 
                  45% chance for $0.00 
 
8. _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  50% chance for $5.00 
                  50% chance for $0.00 
 
9. _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  45% chance for $5.00 
                  55% chance for $0.00 
 
10. _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  40% chance for $5.00 
                  60% chance for $0.00 
 
11. _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  35% chance for $5.00 
                  65% chance for $0.00 
 
12. _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  30% chance for $5.00 
                  70% chance for $0.00 
 
13. _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  25% chance for $5.00 
                  75% chance for $0.00 
 
14 _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  20% chance for $5.00 
                  80% chance for $0.00 
 
15 _________ $2.50 for sure OR ________  15% chance for $5.00 
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